had gained control over the portion of the national territory wherein the property is located, and taxes so collected must be returned. Plumley, umpire, case of the Santa Clara Estates Company, British- See, also, opinion of Ralston, umpire, case of Guastini, Italian-Venezuelan XIII. NEUTRAL RIGHTS AND DUties. 1. VIOLATION OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS. $ 1049. In numerous cases damages have been obtained from belligerents for spoliations, in violation of the rights of neutrals. "I have it in charge from the President to assure the merchants of the United States concerned in foreign commerce or navigation, that due attention will be paid to any injuries they may suffer on the high seas or in foreign countries, contrary to the law of nations or to existing treaties, and that on the forwarding hither of well-authenticated evidence of the same, proper proceedings will be adopted for their relief." Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Messrs. Duke & Co., Aug. 21, 1793, 4 Jefferson's Works, 51. It is estimated that under Art. VII. of the Jay treaty, citizens of the United States recovered $11,650,000 from the British Government on account of violations of the rights of neutral American commerce. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I. 344. Under the claims convention with France of April 30, 1803, indemnity for French spoliations was made to a large amount; while, under the convention of July 4, 1831, indemnity was obtained for later spoliations to the amount of 25,000,000 francs. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 4434, 4460; as to the Spanish indemnities of 1819 and 1834, see id. 4496, 4533; as to the Danish indemnity of 1830, see id. 4549; as to the Neapolitan indemnity of 1832, see id. 4575. 2. FAILURE TO PERFORM NEUTRAL DUTIES. § 1050. By Art. VII. of the treaty with Great Britain of Nov. 19, 1794, commonly called the "Jay treaty," the United States set the example of undertaking to make pecuniary indemnity for the failure to perform the duties of neutrality, by agreeing to refer to a mixed commis sion the claims of British subjects for "loss and damage by reason of the capture of their vessels and merchandise, taken within the limits and jurisdiction of the States and brought into the ports of the same, or taken by vessels originally armed in ports of the said States." Under this stipulation awards were made against the United States to the amount of $143,428.14. The example thus set was followed at Geneva, in the proceedings of the tribunal of arbitration under the treaty of May 8, 1871, which awarded to the United States the sum of $15,500,000 on account of the depredations of the Alabama and certain other Confederate cruisers fitted out in British jurisdiction. The United States demanded compensation for the following classes of losses and expenditures, so far as they grew out of the acts of the cruisers, viz: 1. "Direct losses growing out of the destruction of vessels and their cargoes." 2. "The national expenditures in the pursuit of those cruizers." 3. "The loss in the transfer of the American Commercial Marine to the British flag." 4. "The enhanced payments of insurance." 5. "The prolongation of the war, and the addition of a large sum to the cost of the war and the suppression of the rebellion." It was denied by Great Britain that a submission of all the claims to arbitration carried with it the right of the arbitrators to take into consideration all the elements of loss, and it was insisted that the tribunal had no right, under the terms of the treaty, to take classes three, four, and five into consideration in its estimate of damages. The United States denied this proposition, and contended that the tribunal was invested with power to decide the question of the extent of its jurisdiction. The tribunal, without deciding that question, held that "these claims do not constitute, upon the principles of international law applicable to such cases, good foundation for an award of compensation or computation of damages between nations, and should, upon such principles, be wholly excluded from the consideration of the Tribunal, in making its award, even if there were no disagreement between the two Governments as to the competency of the Tribunal to decide thereon." And in regard to the second of the above items of loss, the Tribunal, in its award, decided thus: "Whereas, so far as relates to the particulars of the indemnity claimed by the United States, the costs of pursuit of the Confederate cruizers are not, in the judgment of the Tribunal, properly distinguishable from the general expenses of the war, carried on by the United States: The Tribunal is therefore of opinion, by a majority of three to two voices, that there is no ground for awarding to the United States any sum by way of indemnity under this head." Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I. 315, 343; J. C. B. Davis, Notes, Treaty Vol. (1776-1887), 1334; Moore, American Diplomacy, 49, 50. For the Geneva award, see infra, § 1330, 66 It is maintained by Sir W. Harcourt (Historicus, 161, 162) that when In 1779 Captain Landais, of the Alliance, of the squadron under John Paul Jones, captured three British vessels and carried them into Bergen, Norway, then under the Danish crown. On demand of the British minister they were seized by the Danish Government and restored to their owners on the ground that, as Denmark had not acknowledged the independence of the United States, the prizes could not be considered lawful. In a note to M. Bernstorf, Danish minister of foreign affairs, December 22, 1779, Franklin asked that the order of restoration be repealed, or that, if it had been executed, the value of the prizes, which was estimated at £50,000, should be paid by Denmark to the United States. M. Bernstorf answered evasively, though in substance he pleaded duress as an excuse for the order, which had been carried into effect. The United States continued to press the claim for indemnity, but without success. the act of March 28, 1806 (6 Stat. 61), Congress appropriated $4,000 to be paid to Landais as prize money on account of the captures. The settlement of claims against Denmark, made by the convention of March 28, 1830, was construed by the United States as not embracing the claim on account of the Bergen prizes. By the act of By March 21, 1848 (9 Stat. 214), Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the legal representatives of Jones and of the officers, seamen, and marines their just proportions of the value of the prizes, after deducting from Landais's share what he had received under the act of 1806. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 4572. Lawrence's Wheaton (3d ed.), note 16, p. 41; House Report, 380, 25 In May, 1814, Mr. W. G. Miller, agent of the United States at Buenos Ayres, made to that Government an unsuccessful application for indemnity for the capture within its waters in 1812 of the ship Hope, Obed Chase, master, by the British frigate Nevens. The application was renewed in November, 1827, by Mr. Forbes, chargé d'affaires of the United States at Buenos Ayres, under instructions of December 21, 1826. The minister of foreign relations promised to take the case into consideration. Mr. Forbes's attention was again called to the matter on April 29, 1830. On June 30, 1840, Mr. Forsyth, as Secretary of State, brought the case to the attention of General Alvear, minister of Buenos Ayres at Washington. Mr. Forsyth, who seems to have been under the impression that the claim had not previously been presented, said he presumed that the proposition would not be contested that it was the duty of the Buenos Ayres Government for the time being, as a neutral power, "to have prevented the capture referred to, and that, by failing so to do, it became accountable to the suffering parties." General Alvear apparently did not reply to Mr. Forsyth's note, and on December 28, 1841, Mr. Webster stated that a further communication would be made to him. The claim seems eventually to have been allowed to lapse. Mr. Brent, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Verplanck, M. C., April 26, 1830, 23 MS. Dom Let. 331; Mr. Brent, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Forbes, chargé d'affaires to Buenos Ayres, No. 12, April 29, 1830, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, XIV. 70; Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to General Alvear, June 30, 1840, MS. Notes to Argentine Leg. VI. 7; Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to Mr. McKeon, M. C., Dec. 28, 1841, 32 MS. Dom. Let. 134. The destruction of the American armed brig General Armstrong by a British man-of-war, in the harbor of Fayal, in 1814, gave rise to a long-continued correspondence, which resulted, in 1851, in an agreement to refer the claims growing out of it to "the arbitrament of a sovereign, potentate, or chief of some nation in amity with both the high contracting parties." The President of the French Republic (afterwards Napoleon III.) was selected as the arbiter. His decision was adverse to the United States. Congress afterwards made an appropriation for the relief of the claimants. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 1071. XIV. DEFENSES. 1. PART PAYMENT. § 1051. Such payment, when on account, only bars pro tanto, but the acceptance by claimants from the Government of a sum smaller than that claimed in full of their demand, without protest or objection, is a valid and binding compromise of the demand, and a bar to a suit therefor against the Government. United States v. Child, 12 Wall. 232; United States v. Justice, 14 id. 535. 2. LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION. § 1052. "It appears from the correspondence of Mr. Livingston with the minister for foreign affairs, that the recognition of the claims of our citizens was at first objected to on the ground that a certain 'Law of Public Credit' of Ecuador required all claims against that Republic to be presented prior to the 18th of May, 1848. This objection, however, seems to have been subsequently waived; but as Mr. Livingston intimates that it may hereafter be renewed, it is proper that you should be apprized of the views of the Department upon the subject. "This Government can never allow any claims of our citizens which it may think proper to present to another government, to be rejected on account of a municipal law of the foreign government like that in question. "The claims of our citizens against the Government of Ecuador are based upon acts committed by authorities of the late Republic of Colombia, contrary to the law of nations. No law of the Republic of Ecuador can sever or weaken obligations to redress injuries thus inflicted. It is essential to the dignity of a state that it should consult its own convenience in preferring complaints of this character. This by no means implies a necessity for trenching upon the just prerogatories [prerogatives] of the debtor government. On the contrary, the delay may and often does spring principally from a regard to the circumstances of the debtor government itself. This has been emphatically our own case with reference to Ecuador. That country, ever since the dissolution of the Colombian Confederacy, had had so little stability in its government and had been so constantly the scene of sanguinary and impoverishing civil wars, that we felt reluctant even to mention our demands. As soon, however, as those tokens of adversity there became mitigated enough to warrant the steps, we dispatched a chargé d'affaires thither chiefly for the purpose of prosecuting the claims. Consequently, the reference of that Government |