session about September 1, 1902, and remained in possession during September, October, and November, vacating the premises in December, 1902. In the latter part of August, 1902, Van Etten went to the brewing company of Flanagan, Nay & Co. for the purpose of getting that company to supply him with beer. He saw Mr. Tighe, manager of the brewery, who requested him to bring down his lease. Later on Van Etten, accompanied by the plaintiff, went to the office of the brewery, where the plaintiff signed the following writing, which was indorsed on the lease: "I hereby consent to the transfer of the within lease to William L. Flanagan, Managing Director. Emily L. Blum." This consent was signed by the plaintiff at the request of a clerk of Flanagan, Nay & Co. It also appears that, prior to the entry of possession of the demised premises, Van Etten executed a paper which the plaintiff claims is an assignment of the lease, but this paper is a blank form of a lease. The date, name of the assignee, consideration, etc., are all blank, and the instrument merely having thereon the signature of Van Etten. This action was begun against William L. Flanagan, and subsequent to the trial of the case, and before the judgment was rendered by the trial justice, Flanagan died, and his executors were substituted as defendants by an order of the court. Thereafter the justice rendered a judgment adjudging the executors of William L. Flanagan liable for the December rent of the demised premises. In March, 1903, the plaintiff began two new actions against said executors-one to recover $100 for the January rent of the same premises, and the other to recover $200 for rent for February and March. These actions were tried upon the same testimony; the same witnesses being sworn and the same facts admitted, and the evidence and proceedings in both actions being exactly similar to each other and to this original action. In the last two cases the defendants had a judgment, from which judgments the plaintiff appeals; being cases Nos. 159 and 160 upon the present calendar of this court. He It is difficult to understand upon what theory, based upon the testimony in this case, the estate of Flanagan can be held liable. To establish liability on the part of Flanagan, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an assignment of the lease to him, followed by entry or possession by him or his agents, or some agreement on his part to pay the rent. By the plaintiff's own testimony, it is clear that she knew that her dealings regarding the lease were with the brewing company. The premises were let to Van Etten for saloon purposes. He applied to the brewery to be supplied with beer. Mr. Tighe, the manager, told Van Etten to bring down his lease. brought it down, accompanied by the plaintiff, who testified "that I was supposed to be better secured by the brewery having this lease transferred to them," and her consent was to an assignment to Flanagan as "Managing Director." This consent was executed at the request of a Mr. Dunn, who was a clerk of Flanagan, Nay & Co., not shown to be in any way connected with William N. Flanagan. Neither Flanagan nor the brewery had possession of the premises. Van Etten entered into possession of the premises about September Ist, and paid rent to the plaintiff, who gave him receipts therefor. and 118 New York State Reporter The whole case is barren of testimony creating a liability on the part of Flanagan. The foregoing decision also disposes of cases Nos. 159 and 160. In each of those cases the judgments must be affirmed, with costs. The judgment in the case at bar must be reversed. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellants to abide the event; and judgments in Nos. 159 and 160 affirmed, with costs. All concur. EGNSTFELD v. CENTRAL CROSSTOWN RY. CO. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term. June 22, 1903.) 1. STREET RAILWAY-PASSENGER INJURED BY CLOSING DOOR-NEGLIGENCE. Plaintiff boarded a crowded street car, and stood on the platform till some passengers alighted, when the conductor directed him to go inside, saying there was plenty of room. Thereupon he entered, and, the car being still crowded, he pushed his way in sidewise, using his left hand, by placing it against the door jamb, to support himself, and before he had time to avail himself of other means of support, if any could be reached, the conductor went inside, and closed the sliding door on his hand. Held, that whether the conductor was negligent was a question of fact, a finding on which for plaintiff would not be disturbed on appeal. Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Third District. Action by Ernest Egnstfeld against the Central Crosstown Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ. Edward D. O'Brien, for appellant. FREEDMAN, P. J. There is no conflict of evidence in this case. The action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff on February 9, 1903, while riding on a car of defendant. The plaintiff testified that while the car was on Christopher street, just past Ninth avenue, the conductor told him to step inside. The car was crowded at the time. He stepped inside, at the same time placing his left hand on the door jamb. The conductor followed him, and closed the sliding door, catching one of plaintiff's fingers and breaking it. The only claim made by appellant is that there is no testimony showing negligence on the part of the defendant. The record shows that at the time the plaintiff boarded the car it was crowded, and the plaintiff stood upon the rear platform until the car passed Houston street, at which point some of the passengers had alighted. The conductor then directed the plaintiff to go inside the car, saying "there was plenty of room." The plaintiff thereupon entered the door, and, the car being still crowded, pushed his way in sideways, using his left hand, which he placed. against the door jamb, to support himself. He was immediately followed by the conductor, who, with his right hand behind his back, at once pulled the door shut. The door was a sliding one, and, in closing, it caught the plaintiff's fingers, causing the injuries complained of. It appears that at the time the door was closed the plaintiff had no means of support, other than to rest his hand upon the side of the door, and had not had time to avail himself of other means if it were possible. He entered the inside of the car by the express orders of the conductor, who closely followed him in, and who consequently knew the crowded condition of the car. Whether or not, under the circumstances, the conductor gave the plaintiff sufficient time to get completely inside the car and to reach a place of safety before he closed the door, was a question of fact for the court, in the absence of a jury (Baker v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 118 N. Y. 533, 23 N. E. 885), and his finding should not be disturbed. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur. BACKER v. UNITED STATES GAS FIXTURE CO. OF CITY OF (Supreme Court, Appellate Term. June 22, 1903.) 1. CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS-AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT. In an action against a corporation for a percentage of certain claims collected by defendant, a paper bearing the corporate seal, and signed by the treasurer, agreeing that, in event the company should collect certain claims, they would pay the plaintiff one-third of the proceeds, was not admissible in evidence, in the absence of any showing of special authority given the treasurer for entering into such agreement, he having no general authority so to do. Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District. Action by George Backer against the United States Gas Fixture Company of the City of New York. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed. Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ. J. A. Seidman, for appellant. MacLEAN, J. On April 4, 1902, the plaintiff, then or theretofore president of the defendant company, executed to that company under seal, and in consideration of $1 and other valuable considerations, a general release of all claims which he then had or ever had against it, excepting certain commissions, not shown to be material in this action. Later in the same day, and apparently in an individual transaction, he was given a paper, sealed with the seal of the company, and signed by Badanes as its treasurer, reciting that in consideration of $1 it was agreed that, in the event the company should collect claims against five persons therein named, it would pay the plaintiff one-third of the proceeds realized upon collection of the claims. This paper was received in evidence upon proof of the signature and the authenticity of the seal. It should have been excluded upon the de and 118 New York State Reporter fendant's objection and proper exception. Nothing was shown or offered to prove that the signer had special or apparent authority to so act, and, as his office was not one attended with inherent general executive authority for the conduct and management of the corporate business, the paper signed, sealed, and delivered by him did not afford even presumptive evidence of an obligation on the part of the defendant. It was attempted to prove, but abortively, that the corporation had ratified the agreement by collecting two of the claims mentioned in it by showing that some check had been given to the company's attorney for one of the claims, and that something had been received by the same attorney in settlement of another, but it was not shown that the company had realized anything. The jury found, and was allowed to find, against objection and exception, for the full amount demanded in the complaint, which, in view of the evidence, was excessive. Judgment should be reversed. Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur. WUPPERMANN v. VALENTINE. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term. June 22, 1903.) 1. DISMISSAL OF CAUSE-FAILURE TO PROSECUTE-ABUSE OF DISCRETION. An order on motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution unless plaintiff placed the cause on the calendar within a time fixed will not be disturbed, no abuse of the court's discretion appearing. Appeal from City Court of New York, Special Term. Action by Josephine W. Wuppermann against Ferdinand ValenFrom an order granting a motion to dismiss the complaint unless plaintiff placed the cause on the calendar within three days, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ. Menken Bros., for appellant. PER CURIAM. The defendant made a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of prosecution. The motion was granted, unless plaintiff placed the cause on the calendar within three days from the entry of the order. The defendant entered an order on said motion, and then appealed from each and every part of said order. We are not satisfied that there has been such an abuse of discretion on the part of the court below, in giving plaintiff the opportunity of placing the cause on the calendar, as to call for a reversal. The order is affirmed, with costs. SALSBERG v. TOBIAS. 1. JUDGMENT. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term. June 22, 1903.) A judgment in the words: "Judgment rendered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Plaintiff is duly entitled to $10"-determines nothing. Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fourth District. Action by Bessie Salsberg against Sam Tobias. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals. Reversed. Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ. Louis Levene (Abraham B. Schleimer, of counsel), for appellant. De PER CURIAM. The pleadings herein were oral. Plaintiff claimed and proved herself entitled to two weeks' wages, earned in the employ of the defendant as bookkeeper, amounting to $10. fendant claimed payment. Although the testimony is not very clear, it appears that the defendant gave his check for the amount due the plaintiff to the Legal Aid Society, who at one time had the plaintiff's claim for collection, and that this check was subsequently returned by the bank upon which it was drawn as being not good. The trial court rendered judgment in these words, viz.: "Judgment rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. Plaintiff is duly entitled to $10." This determines nothing. The plaintiff, if "duly entitled to $10," should have had judgment therefor. Judgment reversed. New trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. RYAN v. SWARTWOUT. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term. June 22, 1903.) 1. APPEAL-FINDINGS OF FACT-REVIEW. Findings for plaintiff on the question whether defendant requested him to do work, and promised to pay for it, will not be disturbed on appeal; the parties contradicting each other, and there being against defendant the statement of one or more witnesses, and some corroborative incidents, though plaintiff was contradicted by one of his witnesses, and was confronted with a misstatement in his petition to sue in forma pauperis, the order for which was then vacated. Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District. Action by Joseph A. Ryan against Frank G. Swartwout. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Modified. Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ. James C. Bushby, for appellant. Edward A. Scott, for respondent. MacLEAN, J. The plaintiff brought this action for work done by himself and others, as assignors, upon premises not belonging to the |