son, and after some further limitations reserves the ultimate reversion to himself. Held, that the voluntary deed remained in force, in as far as it was not revoked by the subsequent marriage settlement; and that the reversion belonged to those claiming under the son, and not to those claiming under the father.-Croker v. Martin, p. 15.

DEFAMATION. See MAGISTRATES.

DEVISE.

Devise to A. for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, remainder to B. for life, remainder to certain of his sons for life, remainder to their first and other sons in tail in their order; proviso, that if B. or any of his sons should become entitled, the estate should be charged with a sum of 2,000l. for C.; a grandson of B. is the first of B.'s family who become entitled in possession, and this held sufficient to support the charge for C.-Lord Lorton v. Gore, 191.

G. E. devises his estates at S. and H. to trustees, in trust, "in 66 case there should be but one son of my daughter, who "shall attain the age of 21 years, for such son, his heirs "and assigns for ever; and in case there shall be two or more sons who shall attain the age of 21 years, then in "trust for the second of such sons, his heirs and assigns for

ever: and in case there shall be no son (of the daughter) "who shall attain the age of 21 years, then in trust for such " of the daughters (if any) as shall attain the age of 21 years, 66 or, before that, be married with consent of the trustees, "her heirs and assigns for ever," &c.

And as to the residue of the property, of whatever descrip

tion, which the testator should be possessed of or entitled to at the time of his death, in trust, to convert the whole into money, and invest the produce in the funds for the benefit of testator's daughter's children, in the manner in the will mentioned.

And the testator empowered the trustees to apply what should appear to them to be a competent part of the rents, profits and proceeds of the estates and funds, for the maintenance of such of the children as should be PRESUMPTIVELY entitled, during their minority.

Testator having, after making his will, purchased some additional freehold property, executed a codicil, by which he revoked that part of his will which directed the sale of his residuary freehold property, and directed," that the son

"of my daughter who shall first attain the age of 21 years, "shall, on attaining that age, change his name for that of "Elwes; and I devise to such son, on his attaining the age "of 21 years and changing his name to Elwes, all my free"hold property, lands, &c., his heirs and assigns for ever." No son of testator's daughter by her said husband, during his infancy, and no daughter, during her infancy and nonmarriage, entitled to the rents and profits of the S. and H.

estates.

If the younger of the two sons should die in infancy, the elder would not be entitled to such rents and profits during his infancy, and that a third son becoming a second son would not be entitled to such rents and profits during his infancy.

The rents and profits during the infancy of the sons, and the infancy and before marriage of the daughters, belong to testator's heir at law.

As to the maintenance, there being two sons, infants, at the time of testator's death, the trustees should execute the power by applying part of the rents and profits of the premises first demised to the maintenance of the second of such sons during his infancy; and in case the second son died in infancy, and the elder became an only son, the trustees should apply part of such rents and profits to his maintenance during his infancy; and in case a third son should be born during the infancy of the first, the maintenance for the first son to cease, and part of the rents and profits to be applied for the maintenance of such third son; and supposing there were an only son and an infant unmarried daughter, the trustees would have no power to apply any part of the rents and profits to the maintenance of such daughter during her minority.

No son of testator's daughter is entitled to the freehold estates mentioned in the codicil until his attaining the age of 21 years and assuming the name of Elwes; and until the happening of both events, the rents and profits of such estates belong to testator's heir at law.

Per Lord Eldon.-I hope this will be a leading case.-Duffield v. Duffield, p. 268. 395.

J. S. devises to his son T. S. certain real estates specifically, and charged with certain specific burdens, and bequeaths certain pecuniary legacies, and made his real and personal

estates liable to the payment of the legacies, and made T. S. his residuary devisee and legatee, and sole executor. Held by the Lords, reversing a decree of the L. Ch. B. of the Exchequer, that the real estates specifically devised to T. S. were not liable to contribute to the payment of the pecuniary legacies.-Spong v. Spong, p. 365.

DIRECTION (OF JUDGE.)

On a question whether a deed was void in law, on the ground
of unsoundness of mind in the person by whom it was exe-
cuted, the Judge directed the jury that the question for
them to try was, whether J. S. B. was a person of sound
mind or not; and that, to constitute such unsoundness of
mind as should avoid a deed at law, the person executing
must be incapable of understanding and acting in the
ordinary affairs of life. Exception to this-for that the
Judge ought to have directed the jury that the unsoundness
must amount to idiotcy, in the strict legal definition of the
term. But the Judge's direction held by the Courts below
to be good, and the judgment affirmed by the Lords.
Judge's direction objected to, on the ground of ambiguity; but
as this point was not brought under the notice of the Judge,
nor made matter of exception at the time of the direction
given, held that it could not afterwards be relied on.-Ball
v. Mannin, p. 381.

DONATIO (MORTIS CAUSA.)

A father, in contemplation of speedily-approaching death, wishing to make a larger provision for a daughter than he had done by his will, delivers or causes to be delivered to her a bond and a mortgage security for a certain sum of money, and a mortgage security for another sum of money. This is a good donatio mortis causâ, and the heir or executor is bound to give effect to the intent of the donor. Per Eldon (Earl of): "This is the first absolute decision on the "question."-Duffield v. Duffield, p. 1.

ELECTION.

A woman entitled absolutely to certain leasehold premises marries, and by the marriage settlement becomes entitled absolutely to the same premises, in case she survives the husband. He, by his will, disposes of the premises as if they had been his own, and gives them to his wife for life, and then to her first and second daughters for life in suc

cession. The wife takes some advantages under the will of the husband, in addition to the leasehold premises, but is entirely ignorant of any necessity to elect, and makes no election in fact. The wife makes a will, by which the leasehold premises are left to her eldest daughter absolutely, according to her power under the marriage settlement, but in contravention of the husband's will, by which the eldest daughter had only an estate for life. On the death of the eldest daughter, the second daughter claims the property, and is let into possession by the representative of the eldest daughter, in ignorance of his own right. Some years afterwards, the representative of the eldest daughter filed his bill in the Exchequer for restitution to him of the premises in question, on the ground that the wife had a right to dispose of the premises absolutely, and that she was not bound to elect, and never thought of electing under the will of her husband. Held by the House of Lords, affirming a judgment of the Court of Exchequer, that the claim of the representative of the eldest daughter was good, and that this was not a case for election.-Morgan v. Edwards, p. 104.

P. R. having a lease (1736) for lives renewable, settles (1743) the lands comprised in it, on the marriage of his son, T. R., to the use of himself for life, remainder to T. R. for life, remainder to the sons of the marriage in tail male, or reversion to himself in fee. Issue of the marriage, P. R. the younger. P. R. the elder (1749) purchases the fee of the lands in the lease, and by will (1766) devises the inheritance to T. R. for life, remainder to P. R. the younger, for life, remainder to his sons successively in tail male; and after some other remainders, remainder to D. and W. R. (appellants), the one for life, the other in tail-reversion to his own right heirs. And T. R. was empowered, in case P. R. the younger refused to settle his interest in the lease to the same uses as testator had limited the inheritance, at his discretion to deprive P. R. the younger of his life estate, under the will; but this power not executed. Testator dies in 1769; settlement (1770) on marriage of P. R. the younger, whereby the lease is conveyed to trustees, in trust for T. R. for life, remainder to P. R. for life, remainder to the issue of the marriage in tail, reversion to T. R. absolutely. P. R. (1799) dies without ever having had issue, and T. R. con

veys the reversion of the lease to R. R. (respondent), his natural son, and dies in 1805. In 1811, D. R. and W. R. become entitled, in possession, to the inheritance of the lands comprised in the lease, as the last remainder-men, under the will of P. R. the elder, and they refuse to renew the lease to R. R., on the ground that it was merged in the fee when that was purchased by P. R. the elder; or that P. R. the younger had elected to take under the will, and allowed his interest in the lease to go with the inheritance; and that the settlement on the marriage of P. R. the younger, under which T. R. took the reversion of the lease, was a fraud on the will. But the Court below decreed a renewal, and the decree affirmed by the Lords.-Rutledge v. Rutledge, p. 330.

Marriage articles lost: Evidence that the house of the person in whose custody they ought to be, had been ransacked in 1798, by French troops and rebels, and many papers destroyed. Diligent search afterwards for the articles, which were not to be found: this is a fair presumption that they were destroyed, and secondary evidence of their existence and tenor admitted.-Lord Lorton v. Gore, p. 191.

EXCEPTION. See DIRECTION.

EXECUTOR. See DEVISE. LEGACY.

FRAUD. See COURT. ELECTION.

GIFT. See DONATIO.

GLEBE. See MANSE.

HUSBAND (AND WIFE.)

Deeds of separation, in 1817 and 1818, between Lord and Lady W. By the deed of 1817 it is provided that the parties shall continue to reside together and cohabit as husband and wife, but that on the renewal of dissentions the separation should immediately take effect. Disputes continue, and the deed of 1818 is executed, which provides for an immediate separation; but Lady W. is prevailed upon to allow her husband to occupy apartments in the same house with her till he can procure an appointment abroad. They accordingly live, dine and visit together for about a year after the execution of the deed, but without cohabitation as