of the law (registration of property, 1859) must be so construed as to allow a married woman not only to hold property as separate property, without the intervention of a trustee, but also to exchange one species of her separate property for another and to authorize her to sell any part of her separate property and retain the purchase money as her own; or with it to buy other property to be held by her in the same manner and for the same purpose". And in this same case the Court in discussing registration as necessary for the recognition of a married woman's property as her separate possession said, "Without her consent she cannot be divested of her title to it, whether registered or not but when a registry law has been enacted the wife must comply with it in order to bind innocent parties" 56 In several of the early cases, the judges seemed to feel obliged to reiterate that the constitution had radically changed the common law relations of husband and wife as to the wife's property by adopting "the more rational and enlightened maxims of civil law which recognized the rights of married women to property" 57 "The members of the constitutional convention", said Judge R. B. Boise, himself a member, "were mostly foreigners who acquired land under the 1850 act. When the settlers were married people, the wife received from the government an equal share of her land with her husband and as there was a vast amount of this land the title to which was in the married women of the country, a large majority of the members of the convention enacted this clause sup posing that it would protect this property from the debts and contracts of the husband and they did not think it capable of any other construction"' 58

But though a wife's separate property might not be liable for her husband's debts, on marriage her debts to him were cancelled and he became liable for such other debts of hers as were pressed upon him during coverture.59 This common law ruling was just, however, since on marriage at common law, the wife's personalty actually or constructively in her possession, became the property of the husband and so also did the personalty which during coverture is reduced to his or her posses

sion.60 Though the Constitution refers only to property acquired by "gift, devise or inheritance" it was decided that the wife was likewise entitled to own, control and hold property earned by her after marriage, and her husband could not interfere.61 The wife may be permit ted to mortgage her property for her husband's debts though, in which case it will be held as surety for them.62

In 1872 the legislature passed the "sole trader" bill which increased the privileges granted by the constitution in that it exempted the property real or personal acquired by a married woman through the earnings of her personal labor during marriage from the debts, contracts and liabilities of her husband, and such earned property was to be subject to the same exemptions as property owned at the time of her marriage or afterwards acquired by gift, devise or inheritance.63

Up to 1878 no statute had exempted the husband from the common law rule of liability for his wife's debts. contracted before marriage. In that year, therefore, the legislature, acting on the axiom that "increased rights bring increased responsibilities", decreed that henceforth neither husband nor wife is liable for the debts or liabilities of the other incurred before marriage, and they are not liable for the separate debts of each other nor is the rent nor income of such property liable for the debts of the other.64

65

The Code of 1854 permitted a husband and wife by their joint deed to convey the real estate of the wife as she might do by her separate deed if she were unmarried; but the wife might not be bound by any covenant contained in such deed. A case covered by this law which was brought to the Supreme Court of the State in 1862, was that of a woman who had settled on a piece of land with her husband under the Donation Land Law and who had mortgaged it before the four years' required residence had expired. When she had proved up on her claim she and her husband instead of delivering it or paying the amount of the mortgage to the mortgagee, denied their contract with him on the ground that it was void because she was a married woman. The judge, in deciding that the first mortgagee had the right

to foreclose, commented that "if married woman cannot be estopped in a case like this, they would in no case. In cases of deeds without covenants, the same rule applies to femme covert as to a femme sole, and especially under the constitution of the state which gives to married women the control and disposition of their real estate" 66 But in 1862, in a case mentioned previously, the judge declared that the right of a married woman to hold property did not give her the power to alienate it. This law of 1854 continued on the statute books in its original form until 1919 when the provision that the wife was not to be bound by any covenants contained in a joint deed, was stricken out.68

Her right to have full control of her separate property, to contract as though unmarried, and to bring suits in her own name, were established gradually by a series of statutes. How much these were due to the agitation for equal suffrage which was begun about 1870, it is difficult to say, but without doubt the equal suffrage discussion was responsible for some of them.

In 1862 a statute relative to the bringing of actions provided that when a married woman was a party to an action, her husband should be joined with her except (1) when the action affected her separate property, she might sue alone and (2) when the action was between herself and her husband, she might sue or be sued alone and in no case need she prosecute or defend by a guardian or next friend.69 In 1876 this was amended by the additional exception that when the cause of the action was for a wrong committed against her person, or character or for wages due for her personal services, she might sue or be sued alone.70 This received further emphasis in 1878 in the act which stated that a "wife may receive the wages of her personal labor, and maintain an action therefor in her own name, and hold the same in her own right, and she may prosecute and defend all actions at law or in equity, for the preservation of her rights and property as if unmarried"."

In 1878, too, the section of the constitution, Article XV, Section 5, which exempted her property from her husband's debts, was made the basis of a statute and

her privileges further enlarged so that she was permitted to manage, sell, convey or devise by will her property and pecuniary rights at the time of marriage or afterwards acquired to the same extent and in the same manner that her husband can property belonging to him".72 And "when property is owned by either husband or wife", the legislature declared "the other has no interest in it which can be the subject of contract between them, or such interest as will make the property liable for the contracts or liabilities of either husband or wife who is not the owner of the property"" Should either obtain possession or control of property belonging to the other, either before or after marriage, the owner of the property might maintain an action for it to the same extent as if they were unmarried.

A conveyance, transfer or lien executed by either husband or wife to or in favor of the other was made valid to the same extent as between other persons. Either was also permitted to constitute the other his or her attorney in fact, to control or dispose of his or her property for their mutual benefit and to revoke the same as other persons might do. This last provision was amended in 1907 to enumerate the powers of the attorney in fact, as being, to "control, sell and convey, mortgage or bar dower or curtesy, in his or her prop erty for their mutual benefit" with equal powers of revocation.75 Another provision of the laws of 1878 per mitted the wife to make contracts, to incur liabilities, the same as though she were unmarried and these were to be binding upon her to the same extent.76

Two years later, in 1880, another step was taken by the legislature toward establishing the legal identity of a married woman. The act then passed repealed "all laws which impose or recognize civil disabilities upon a wife which are not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband; provided that this act shall not confer the right to vote or hold office upon the wife except as is otherwise provided by law and for any unjust usurpation of her property and natural rights she shall have the same right to appeal in her own name alone or

to the courts of law or equity for redress that her husband has" 77

These

Until 1893, the law of 1878 which freed the pecuniary rights of every married woman from the debts and contracts of her husband read as follows: "The property and pecuniary rights of every married woman acquired by gift, devise or inheritance. words, "gift, devise or inheritance", had but little restrictive value, however, since the "Sole Trader" Bill of 1872 gave to a married woman entire control of property acquired by her through her personal labor. The legislature of 1893, therefore amended the law so that it reads today, "The property and pecuniary rights of every married woman at the time of her marriage, or afterwards acquired shall not be subject to the debts or contracts of her husband, and she may manage, sell, convey, or devise the same by will to the same extent and in the same manner that her husband can property belonging to him" 78

In 1895, a case came before the Supreme Court which required interpretation of the above statute. This was a suit brought by a married woman to recover real property, concerning which the cause for action had accrued more than ten years earlier, this (ten years) being the statutory limit of time allowed for the bringing of such actions. The defendant pleaded the ten year limitation on the action, claiming that the act of 1878 modified the provisions of an act of 1862, which extended the period of time within which married women (infants and insane) might institute an action.79 The Court held that "if the married women's acts of 1878 and 1880 had removed all the legal disabilities of married women, they did not change her status or remove her marital disability and so did not modify the statute of limitations by which a married woman is allowed fifteen years to institute an action for the recovery of real property. The exemption of a married woman from the operation of the ten years statute of limitations is founded upon her marital relation, not upon the idea that such relation prevented her from suing in her own name.''80 In 1915, the legislature amended Section 17, Lord's Oregon