between the husband and the plaintiff, to which the wife did not give assent.149 Finally in a divorce suit, the judge declared that the law that a husband and wife may be sued jointly for family expenses was for the protection of creditors only and did not change the common law duty of the husband to maintain his wife and to provide the family necessaries as between them.150

An amendment to the act was passed in 1923 which provides 151 that in cases where it is sought to hold the wife responsible for family expenses, either jointly or separately, the action against her must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued; furthermore, after a divorce, the wife is not to be held responsible for debts or family expenses contracted by the husband while they were living together; likewise, after the wrongful and wilful separation or abandonment of the husband by his wife, the husband is not to be held responsible for the debts contracted by the wife consequent to such abandonment except for the maintenance, support and education of the minor children of both parties.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.

The Oregon law exempting homesteads from sale on execution from the lien of every judgment, as first passed in 1889, was called by one of the Justices of the State Supreme Court the "best intended and worst drawn law on the statute books" 152 The law in question provided that the homestead of any family should be exempt from judicial sale for the satisfaction of any judgment to be obtained in the future, but this homestead must be the actual abode of and owned by the family.153 The section which gave the judges trouble when suits were brought under this law was the second one which provided that the homestead was to be exempt from sale after the death of the person entitled to it, for the collection of any debts for which the homestead could not have been sold during his lifetime "but such homestead shall descend as if death did not exist". In this last phrase the words were meaningless in them

selves to the court, and so it was held154 that by some inadvertence in the writing of the law, the word "death' had been inserted when "exemption" was intended; the effect of the second construction, so the court said,155 was that the property descends to the heirs subject to the widow's right of dower and is exempt from execution for previous debts of the deceased.

In 1910, in a case already mentioned,156 the court said further, that the homestead statute is a statute only of exemption and contains no other elements. It does not create a homestead in which the wife and child have any right and title other than that of the owner, to claim it exempt from attachment. There is no provision against a conveyance or incumbrance by the owner except that it be exempt from execution and sale in a mortgage in which husband and wife did not join.

Moved by the vagueness of the law probably, the legislature in 1919157 revised the homestead exemption statute as follows: "The homestead shall be exempt from sale on execution for the debts of the owner to the amount in value of $3,000". The homestead must be the actual abode of and occupied by the owner and his spouse and such exemption is not to be impaired by the temporary removal with the intention to reoccupy, nor by sale to the extent of not exceeding $3,000 while held to procure another homestead for a period not exceeding one year.

The homestead when not located in a town set off into blocks and lots, might consist of any quantity of land not exceeding 160 acres; and in a town, not to exceed one block, provided that it did not exceed in value $3,000. Mechanics' liens for work, labor, or material done or furnished for the improvement of the property, or purchase money liens, or mortgages lawfully executed, were not barred by the act.

The descent of the homestead in the case of an owner dying intestate was to follow the law of descent of real property, except that the exemption should not extend to any other than the child, grandchild, widow or husband, and father or mother of the deceased owner, and the homestead might be charged with the expenses of

the last sickness of the owner, the funeral, and the cost of administration.

Various decisions of the Supreme Court in suits brought before revision of the act in 1919, tried to give some meaning to this "worst statute", as in the case cited above, where the court declared "the term 'homestead' as used, is not the designation of a particular estate implying prohibitions and limitations not incident to ordinary titles, but only means 'the home place' of 'the house and adjoining grounds' where the head of the family dwells." And again, the homestead exemption may be waived or relinquished by abandonment or conveyance, so that the property will be subject to levy and sale under execution upon a judgment had against the owners,158 for a "homestead is purely statutory and

the right to it does not exist ipso facto" 159

3. IN THE MATTER OF ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.

There seems to have been no question in Oregon as to the capacity of a single woman to act as an executrix; the first law which mentions administration of estates implies that she may so act but her subsequent marriage is to extinguish her powers and revoke her letters.160 Apparently this section was passed from fear that after marriage, an executrix might be influenced by her husband to administer to his advantage, for the act said, "if any executrix marry, her husband shall not thereby acquire any interest in the effects of her testator or intestate, nor shall the administration devolve upon him" 161 But by 1864, when a new code was prepared, the legislators had arrived at a more trustful attitude toward their brethren and omitted the section making marriage an automatic revocation of an executrix's power.

However incompetent a married woman might be to manage property, as soon as death released her husband from his responsibility of managing it, the widow, even though under twenty-one years of age, might act as executrix of her deceased husband's estate. Letters of administration were ordered to be granted (by a law of 1854) "to the widow, or next of kin, or both" 162 If the deceased were a married woman, administration of her estate was in all cases to be granted to her husband, if competent and willing, unless by force of a marriage settlement, or otherwise she would have made some testamentary disposition of her separate estate, "making it necessary to appoint some other person".

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

In 1849163 the first state legislature made arrangements for the distribution of the personal property of an intestate by declaring that in addition to dower, the widow shall be allowed to keep as her absolute property, "all the wearing apparel of the family, her wheels, looms, and other implements of industry; all yarn cloth, and clothing made up in the family for their own use; all

grain, meat, vegetables, and other provisions on hand, necessary for the subsistence of the widow and family for twelve months, and as many beds with bed. ding, as shall be necessary for herself and the family of the deceased residing with her under her control". In addition she might take such personal property as she chose, not to exceed the appraised value of $200. The above was to be deducted from the widow's share in the personal estate, if there were any, and was to be exempt from the debts of the deceased.

The language of the code of 1855164 was less explicit, and described the widow's share of the personal estate as "all articles of her apparel or ornament, according to the degree and estate of her husband, and such provisions and other necessaries for the use of herself and the family under her care, as shall be allowed and ordered in pursuance of the provisions of this act". After the settlement of the husband's debts and funeral expenses, the widow was to have one-half of the residue, the issue the other half, but if no issue, the widow was to have all. But if the intestate were a married woman, her husband was to have the whole of the residue.

Besides this, another statute provided165 that when a person died the widow and minor child or children were to remain in possession of the homestead and all wearing apparel of the family and household furniture of the deceased and were to be entitled to a reasonable provision for their support, which was to be allowed by the probate judge. After the inventory had been made the court was directed to set apart for the use of the widow and minor children all the property of the estate exempt by law from execution. If this should be insufficient, the court was to allow "further reasonable allowance out of the estate, as may be necessary". When the property had been set apart for the use of the family, if there were no minor children but a widow, the property was to be the property "of the widow"; if there were minor children, one-half was to go to them in equal shares and one-half to the widow. But if the value of the estate did not exceed $300 the whole estate,