force in our own state" for the failure to grant a mother this testamentary privilege equal with the father was not an imposition of a civil disability on the wife; the privilege was one not granted to either parent by common law, which took away nothing from a wife when it created this legal capacity in her husband. Hence the law removing civil disabilities of married women had no effect here; nor did the other law of 1880 which gave the mother full and complete control of the children and their estate in case of the father's death, grant it, for the right to appoint a testamentary guardian is not essential to the full enjoyment of the custody of the children and their estate; it cannot be considered as included in this section of the law and the mother is still without the right to appoint a guardian.

At the next session of the legislature following this decision, the law was amended to read: "Every father may, by his last will in writing appoint a guardian for any of his children and every mother may by her last will appoint a guardian for her children, provided that the father of such children is dead and has not appointed a guardian or whenever by decree of divorce, custody of the child has been awarded to the mother; provided that nothing in this section shall be construed to deprive either the surviving father or mother of the custody of the persons of his or her children, such surviving parent being competent to transact his or her own business" 185

If no person appeared within five years after the probate 186 or rejection of a will, such probation or rejection was to be binding, except in the case of married women, infants, persons of unsound mind, and those absent from the United States, who were given five additional years to request a proving, after their disabilities were removed. In 1893 this period was reduced to one year after probate or rejection for every person. 187

5. THE AGE OF MAJORITY.

The age at which the feminine portion of the population shall be deemed to have arrived at majority was fixed at eighteen years by the 1864 code.188 An additional determination by the legislature of 1915189 deemed all females "to arrive at the age of majority upon their being married according to the law, or for the purpose of consenting to the adoption of an illegitimate child when it was shown in court that the person to consent to such adoption was the mother of the child". The following provision was added in 1919 to protect the married minors from exploitation, "provided that in the enforcement of laws regulating the hours of labor of minor children any female under the age of eighteen years shall be regarded as a minor and subject to labor laws applying to minor children" 190 This provision suggests a question as to whether its necessity was brought about by the law permitting girls to marry at the age of fifteen years. The fact that the Child Labor Commission was responsible for the introduction of the amendment in the legislature is dependable proof that it was necessary. The Fourteenth Census 191 reported 3906 females between the ages of 15 and 19 years in Oregon, as married; the largest number of these in any one age group is probably in the eighteen year group, but the total number is large enough to indicate that the 1919 amendment was well timed.

6. IN THE MATTER OF SUPPORT.

Mrs. Abigail Scott Duniway tells a story in "Pathbreaking" which shows why she and other pioneer women worked unceasingly for many years to change the laws which often placed women at a disadvantage and worked great hardship on her. A woman lived near Mrs. Duniway whose husband had sold their household furniture and disappeared, leaving her and their five small children destitute. With the aid of neighbors, she rented and furnished a house and gave a mortgage on the furniture to the man who advanced the money for its purchase, and then she took in boarders. She was prospering most happily, when her husband returned, took Tegal possession of everything, repudiated the mortgage which she as a married woman had no legal right to contract, and there was nothing left for her but the divorce court and the scattering of her family. She had no redress against this husband who would neither support her nor permit her to earn her and her children's support.192

The act of 1872, the first in the state relative to nonsupport, would have covered just such a situation as this. This law provided,193 that if a married man residing in this state should abandon his wife without support for one year, the wife, after an adjudgment of the fact of abandonment by the county court of her resident county might deal with her separate property as if she were unmarried and might in her own name sue and be sued in relation to her separate property on any contract made by her after the adjudication, and before the return of her husband. If her husband should return during an action in which she was a party, the action was not to abate on this account. The enabling acts of 1878 making the expenses of the family and the education of the children chargeable "upon the property of both husband and wife or either of them", intended as a protection to the family creditor. It probably had another effect, however, that of encouraging indolent husbands to shirk their duties of family maintenance.

was

Positive legislation to compel a delinquent husband to contribute to his wife's support was finally passed in 1889.195. The act permits any married woman to apply to the circuit court of the county in which she resides for an order upon her husband for the support of herself and their minor children, and she must state in her petition her reasons for believing that her husband is able to contribute to her support. The court "after hearing the parties', may issue a decree to the husband, equitable in view of the circumstances of both parties. But not until 1907 was a statute penalizing non-support of a family passed.196 This statute has evolved through various emendations until today "it deems guilty of a felony" any person who refuses without sufficient cause to support his wife or minor children, his sons under sixteen and his daughters under eighteen, and decrees that as punishment for such felony he may be confined in the state prison for not more than one year or in the county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than a year. This confinement may take the form of compulsory employment upon the county roads or other public works of the county for which his wife or child will be paid at the rate of one dollar a day for every day except Sundays and holidays of the sentence served. However, he may give bond that he will furnish his family with the necessities of life and so have his sentence suspended. If a convicted man has his sentence enforced, and his wife is dependent, the county court under the act authorizing relief for paupers may pay her one dollar per day and twenty-five cents additional for each child under sixteen years but in no event more than one dollar and seventy-five cents a day, while her husband is in prison, and this sum is not to be considered wages nor in lieu of wages.

Fathers, separated from their children by divorce, or unwilling for other reasons to support them have asked the courts to interpret the statute by declaring what is "just and sufficient cause" for non-support. In a series of decisions,197 the courts have held that "just and sufficient cause" means "legal and lawful cause". For example, that the wife has means of her own is not

"sufficient cause", as the statute of 1878 making the wife jointly responsible for family expenses did not remove the "primary obligation" on the part of a father to support his child; nor is remarriage of the mother "just cause".

Another act198 of the kind now termed "Social Legislation" was adopted in 1913 for the relief of dependent mothers whose husbands were dead, inmates of state institutions or physically or mentally incapable on account of disease of supporting their families. The act made it incumbent upon the juvenile or country court of each county to pay to such a mother if she were a citizen of the United States and had resided in the state for three years and in the county for one year previous to her application, not to exceed $10.00 a month for one child, and if more than one, not more than $7.50 for each additional child but in no case more than $40.00 a month.

Other conditions necessary before the pension could be assigned and paid were added in succeeding legislative sessions;

(1) that the mother had not come to the state in an indigent condition;

(2) that no children be granted assistance who were not alive or had not been born within ten months of the time when the father had been committed to an institution or become wholly unable to work (includes death presumably);

(3) that no person over sixteen years be living in the mother's household who is not contributing his share to the household expenses;

(4) no assistance may be given to a child who has property of his own; or

(5) who is not living with his mother;

(6) nor to a mother and child who have other property or sources to draw upon for support, provided that the allowance of a child under sixteen years shall cease as soon as it is eligible for a permit to work;

(7) nor may the pension be given to an applicant who has deprived herself of property or income in order to come under the act;