(8) nor unless monthly accounts are rendered to the court by the applicant, of the efficiency of which the court shall be the judge;

(9) nor to a mother the presence of whose husband in the home is a menace to the physical or moral welfare of the mother or childen;

(10) nor to a mother who, the court finds, is not physically, mentally or morally the proper person to care for the children;

(11) nor to one who has in use a home of an appraised value of more than $500 unless the court finds that further assistance is necessary to save such children from physical or moral neglect;

(12) nor if a mother in the judgment of the court is improvident, careless or negligent in the expenditure of the money, but the money may be paid to some person whom the court shall designate to be used for the support of the mother and children.

Relief is not to be given during any absence of the applicant from the county. All money received for pensions, by mothers shall be exempt from execution. In 1921199 the legislature amended the act and increased the sum for one child to $15.00 a month and for each additional child $10.00 but in no case was the total to exceed $60.00 a month.

The two classes of rights of any person are natural and legal. Natural rights have been defined as those which "grow out of the nature of man and depend upon the personality . or they are those which are plainly assured by natural law" 200 Several of the natural rights are grouped in a classification known as personal rights as "distinguished from such as are created by law and depend upon civilized society." Some personal rights of women differed as did their property rights, under common law according to whether a woman was a married or unmarried person. Statute law in Oregon has almost obliterated this distinction, and in the matter of protection of health, it has passed statutes discriminating in favor of women. The personal rights which we shall consider here are legal settlement or domicile, the right to recover for personal injuries, to testimony, to change of name, to guardianship of children and to follow certain professions.

Oregon has no special legislation in the matter of what determines whether a person is a resident of the state. Rules have been laid down by the legislature to determine the qualifications of voters; these declare that the residence of a married man is the place where his family resides, and of an unmarried man, the place where he sleeps; that after registration in Oregon a man who votes in another state shall be considered to have lost his status as a resident of Oregon.201 But such voting in another state "is not conclusive of his domicile there as regards jurisdiction of an action for divorce" 202 and though he may not be allowed to vote in Oregon, for the reason given above, he may claim to be a resident of the state and the Court may have jurisdiction over his suit for divorce if he is the plaintiff and has resided in the state for a year prior to commencement of the action. The wife has the same privilege of claiming residency if she has lived in the state a year. But a wife's claim that she was a resident of another state while her husband was a resident of Oregon was denied admittance by the Court in a divorce suit "upon the gen

eral rule of law that the domicile of the wife is controlled by that of the husband-that in law she is incapable of acquiring a different domicile from that of her husband but the case is different with a divorced woman", 203

RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR INJURIES.

The right of a married woman to recover for injuries to her person or her character was settled in 1876 when the legislature decreed that "when the cause of action is for a wrong committed against her person or her character . . she may sue or be sued alone" 204 The old common law which gave a husband the right to chastise his wife, with certain limitations on the thickness of the rod, was completely overturned in this respect in Oregon in 1905,205 by a law punishing wife-beating with the whipping-post, but this was repealed in 1911. Common law doctrine still holds sway over situations in which a husband or a wife is injured indirectly through physical injury to the other spouse. A husband may sue for direct injuries to himself due to the loss of "consortium" through physical injuries to his wife; but opinions differ as to his right to sue for personal injuries due to alienation of her affections. In one case brought as the result of the death of the wife in an automobile accident, the Court said in its decision: "The legislation of modern times has greatly affected the status of married women by the recognition of their rights to a separate existence, thus empowering them to exercise dominion over their separate property, and to contract, and conferring upon them power to sue or be sued; but it has not in any way abridged the common law right of a husband to the companionship, love, and service of his wife which are comprehended in the term "consortium" and his accompanying right to sue therefor in the event of its loss occasioned by some personal injury to her negligently inflicted by a third person (but) we are not in accord with the assertion that a husband is entitled to recover damages for the loss of the services of his wife only in actions for seduction, alienation of affections and the like" 206

A wife may sue for alienation of her husband's affections since the law of 1880 removing her civil disabilities. Alienation of affections is considered a direct attack upon marital relations and a direct injury to her, but she may not sue for indirect injuries to herself due to a negligent injury to her husband depriving him of life. "The whole question hinges upon the determination of whether or not a widow can maintain an action for loss of consortium incident to the marriage relation between herself and her deceased husband. It may be set down that at common law, while the husband could maintain an action for an injury to or death of the wife whereby he lost her services and consortium, yet the wife herself could not maintain a corresponding action to recover for the loss of services and consortium due from the husband to herself. The section (of the Oregon law) which repeals laws imposing civil disabilities on the wife not imposed on the husband ... does not confer upon the wife any new right of action. It only allows her admission to the courts as a suitor independently of her husband for the purpose of redressing infringement of rights which she already had. If our legislation gave a widow the right to recover for the death of her husband, or a wife to recover for an injury to her spouse, she would be a competent suitor under this section to institute an action for damages for violation of her statutory right but no enactment exists giving her that privilege" 207

An unmarried woman's right to recover is the basis of a statute which permits an unmarried woman over twenty-one years to sue in her own name for recovery for damages for seduction. This action may be taken in civil courts regardless of what kind of reputation she had borne previously but punishment is provided for in the Criminal Code, only when the injured person has been of previous chaste character.208

TESTIMONY.

The Oregon law makes no distinction between the privileges of husband and wife in the matter of testi

mony, and the statutes as they stand today are but very little different from those of the 1855 Code.209 As the law stands today, persons in relations of confidence who cannot be witnesses are a husband and wife; they may not be examined, the one for or against the other, without the consent of the one on trial; nor may they be examined concerning any communication made by one to the other during the marriage but this exception does not apply to a civil action by one against the other nor to a crime committed by one against the other.210 As to modifications of common law which the Oregon statutes have made, one judge declared as follows: "Our statute has so far modified the rule of the common law that either husband or wife may be a witness for or against the other in a criminal action by the consent of both, but it would be relaxing that rule to an extent not contemplated by the legislature, and wholly unauthorized by any statutory provision, that such consent could be implied from the fact that the defendant offered himself as a witness'.211

CHANGE OF NAME.

Age old custom continues in Oregon to determine that a married woman shall bear her husband's name. No lawful change of name of a person "except a woman upon her marriage or divorce" may be made in the state except for sufficient reasons.212 The privilege of restoring a woman's maiden name to her after divorce was granted to the courts by the first statutes "for just and reasonable cause" when the wife brought the suit, and was not the party in fault.213 At present there are no restrictions on the action of the court in this regard.214

GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN.

The common law doctrine which gave the father control over his children in preference to the mother, found its first expression in Oregon legislation in the statutes on Masters and Apprentices where a father was permitted to bind out his child; if the father were dead or incompetent the mother might do so.215 The next stat