of every proposition of the compact, and of its consent thereto, but may be shown by clear and satisfactory inference from an act which necessarily implies such consent.1 In a compact between. two states, the states in their character as states are the parties, and not the individual citizens, though the latter are bound as well as the contracting parties, and the same power which establishes the compact may modify or annul it.2 The conditions of a compact which has received the sanction of Congress may be enforced by the courts without further legislation. A compact affecting commerce, though entered into before the adoption of the Constitution, is subordinate to the provisions of that instrument on that subject. A compact between members of the Union is a contract within the meaning of the Constitution, and when a state law impairs the obligation thereof, the Supreme Court is authorized to declare such law unconstitutional. A question. arising under and to be decided by a compact between two states

ence at the time the compact was made. Wilson v. Mason, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 45. Compact Between New Jersey and Pennsylvania Right of Fishery.The compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania recognizes the right of fishery in riparian owners on the Delaware river. Bennett v. Boggs, I Baldw. (U. S.) 60.

1. Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 39; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1. And an act of Congress, which, after recognizing the conditions upon which alone one of the states agrees to a compact, assents to the compact by express declaration, necessarily includes an assent to these conditions and is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement. Pennsylvania 7. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 518; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1.

2. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. (U. S.) 91. See also Fleeger v. Pool, 1 McLean (U. S.) 185.

3. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 518.

4. The compact between South Carolina and Georgia, made in 1787, by which it was agreed that the boundary between the two states should be the northern branch of the Savannah river, and that the navigation of the river along a specified channel should forever be equally free to the citizens of both states, and exempt from hinderance, interruption, or molestation, attempted to be enforced by one state on the citizens of the other, has no effect upon the subsequent constitu

tional provision that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce between the several states. Congress has the same power over the Savannah river that it has over the other navigable waters of the United States. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4.

The compact between Virginia and Kentucky cannot restrict the power of Congress to regulate commerce be tween the states, and an act of Congress declaring a bridge across the Ohio river to be a lawful structure, although it does in fact interfere with commerce, is valid. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 518.

5. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 518. The act of Kentucky of 1812, superseding that of 1797, on the same subject, and providing, that occupying claimants in good faith of lands from which they might be evicted by a better title, should have a right to compensation for improvements, and be exempt from liability for rents and profits to the time of rendition of judgment against them, is unconstitutional and void because it violates the clause of the compact of 1789, providing that the right in lands, existing at that date, should be determined by the then existing laws of Virginia. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1.

To bring a case within the protection of this clause, it must be shown that the title to the land asserted is derived from the laws of Virginia prior to the separation of the two

partakes of an international character, and the adjudications of either state are not controlling as a rule of decision in the Federal courts.1

X. STATE OFFICERS 1. Introduction; Definition. It is not proposed here to treat comprehensively the subject of state officers, the principles applicable having been set forth and elaborated elsewhere.2 At the same time there are numerous recent cases dealing with the duties, rights, and liabilities of various state officers which may well be set forth in this connection. A state officer is one whose duties concern the state at large or the general public.3 An officer appointed for a particular locality, but whose duties are essentially of a public or general nature, is

a state officer, whether the legislature makes the appointment or delegates its authority to the municipality.1

2. Election and Appointment.-A constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to create state offices and to prescribe the manner of choosing the officers, does not confer upon that body the power to elect.2 When an office is created in pursuance of such authority, to be filled immediately, and no legitimate mode is provided for filling the same, and the office belongs to a class made elective by the people, the governor, by virtue of a constitutional provision enjoining upon him the duty of seeing to the faithful execution of the laws, may fill the vacancy until a general

election by the people. If an office is, by the statute creating it, authorized to be filled by appointment of the governor, and is made elective by a subsequent statute, the governor is authorized to fill a vacancy occurring between the time fixed for the general election and the expiration of the term of the present incumbent.2 3. Official Bonds (See also BONDS, vol. 2, p. 466f; PUBLIC OFFICERS, vol. 19, p. 442; SURETYSHIP).-Where a state officer is appointed for a limited time, the sureties on his official bond are not liable for his defaults beyond the term of his appointment or commission under which the bond was furnished.3 The dereliction of a prescribed duty on the part of one state officer, whereby another is enabled to appropriate state funds to his own use, and to conceal the fact, does not release the sureties on the latter's official bond.4

4. Salaries. If the constitution of a state declares that a specified salary "shall be received" by an officer, no legislative act making an appropriation for such salary is necessary. But in the absence of some such provision a specific appropriation by the legislature seems necessary before payment by the custodian of the public funds can be authorized.2

An appropriation of an official salary may be prospective and payable periodically out of any funds in the treasury not otherwise appropriated at the time when the services are performed, and the periodical payments become due, and the appropriation may be made in any form of words expressing the intention of the legislature to provide for the payment of the salary as it -accrues,3

In most of the states there are constitutional provisions relative to increasing or decreasing the salaries of state officers.4

The legislature of a state may increase or diminish the salary of a state officer unless there be a constitutional prohibition to the contrary. But it has been held that the appropriation of a

commissioner of insurance. State v. Thomas, 88 Tenn. 491.

1. State v. Hickman, 9 Mont. 370; Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189; State v. Weston, 4 Neb. 216; Green v. Purnell, 12 Md. 333.

When the amount of an officer's salary is prescribed by the constitution, and the legislature appropriates a sum more than sufficient to pay it and other salaries of the same class, the comptroller neither errs in his judgment nor transcends his authority in refusing to allow such officer a different amount than that prescribed by the constitution, when that instrument imposes upon him the duty of auditing the officer's claim and deciding upon the amount payable to him as a salary. State v. Barnes, 25 Fla. 75.

Under the state constitution of Missouri of 1875, and the statutes enacted thereunder, officers of the executive department are entitled to compensation for services rendered by them as members of the state board of equalization. State v. Walker, 97 Mo. 162, overruling State v. Holladay, 67 Mo. 64.

2. State v. Hickman, 9 Mont. 370; Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 348; Thomas 7. Owens, 4 Md. 189; State v. Weston, 6 Neb. 16.

Priority of Payment of Salaries of State Officials-In Louisiana, warrants for the salaries of constitutional officers, the amounts of which salaries are fixed by the constitution of the state, are

entitled to payment from the general fund of the state by preference and priority over all other warrants drawn against that fund. State v. Burke, 34 La. Ann. 404.

Appropriation for Several Offices in Solido-By Nevada act February 17, 1883, the lieutenant-governor was made ex officio state librarian, and ex officio adjutant-general, and an appropriation in solido made for his salary as such. A vacancy arose in the office of state librarian, which was filled, and the appointee sought to recover his salary out of the appropriation— but relief was denied on the ground that the appropriation had become inoperative. State v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 371.

3. Humbert v. Dunn, 84 Cal. 57. In this case the salary of certain state officers was, by the act creating the offices, made "payable monthly" and "out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated," and this language was construed to mean that the salaries should be paid when the services were performed and the monthly payment became due, and not as indicating an intention on the part of the legislature to postpone the payment of the salaries until the next session of that body, as was contended.

4. See PUBLIC OFFICERS, vol. 19, p. 525 et seq., where the subject is discussed at length.

5. Farwell . Rockland, 62 Me. 296. See Collins 7. State (S. Dak. 1892),