2. Matters of Fact; Change of Evidence.-In case of appeal where the court finds certain facts from the evidence, and requires certain findings of fact by the lower court and remands the case for that purpose, there can be no investigation upon a second writ of error. All the facts and rulings, so far as consistently may be, will be adhered to in all subsequent consideration of the case. If new the same cause this court will not revise or reverse their former decisions. It is urged, and there is force in the argument, that if there is error in the decision and it is ever to be reversed, it should be done in the same court. Although this position may be sound in theory as applicable to a single case, yet as a rule to be acted on in all cases it would lead to incalculable mischief. If all questions that have been determined by this court are to be regarded as still open for discussion and revision in the same cause, there would be no end to their litigation until the ability of the parties or the ingenuity of their counsel were exhausted. A rule that has been so long established and acted upon and that is so important to the practical administration of justice in our courts, we think should not be departed from. And whatever views the different members of this court may entertain as to the soundness of the former decision, we all agree that the doctrine there enunciated is to be regarded as the law of this case." No new matter or points come before a court beyond what came before the inferior court in cases of appeal. The record, the pleadings and evidence as previously submitted only will be considered, except in some instances where the hearing takes place de novo. The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 431. See also Hayes v. Collins, 114 Mass. 54; Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch (U. S.) 313; Skillern z. May, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 267; Matthews v. Sands, 29 Ala. 136; Huffman v. State, 30 Ala. 532; Ogden 7. Lanabee, 70 Ill. 510; Rising v. Carr, 70 Ill. 596; Hawley v. Smith, 45 Ind. 183: Kibler v. Bridges, 5 S. Car. 336; Parker v. Pomeroy, 2 Wis. 122. In Attorney-Gen'l v. Lum, 2 Wis. 514, the court, by Smith, J., said: This opinion of the supreme court, pronounced by the chief justice, would seem to be conclusive as to the right here sought to be enforced. But it is contended that the opinions pronounced by the supreme court are not of binding authority upon the circuit court, and it is intimated that though inferior courts may treat such opinions never so contemptuously, yet the mere remittitur certified and transmitted by our clerk is the only authoritative direction to the court below. This is not the correct view of the law. It is not intended to be declared that all the reasoning and instances of illustration introduced into an opinion of this court are to be adopted by inferior tribunals from which cases or matters may come here by appeal, writ of error, or otherwise; but it is insisted and declared that the opinion of this court upon the points in judgment presented and passed upon in cases brought here for adjudication, are the law of the land until overruled or otherwise annulled, and that inferior courts and tribunals must yield obedience to the law thus declared. We should be unfaithful to the high trust committed to us should we fail to discharge this solemn duty of enforcing the law in this respect, upon the faithful and complete execution of which the most sacred and vital rights of the citizen must frequently depend; and every inferior officer, judicial or ministerial, must know and be informed that such acquiescence and obedience will be rigidly exacted, and resistance will be most effectually subdued." See also Thomason v. Dill, 34 Ala. 177; Frankland v. Cassaday, 62 Tex. 418; Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Houser, III Ind. 266; Davis v. Curtis, 70 Iowa 398; Mix v. People, 122 Ill. 641; Smyth v. Neff, 123 Ill. 310. Wood v. Wheeler, 9 Tex. 128; Davidson v. Dallas, 15 Cal. 82; Stacy v. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 32 Vt. 552; Rector v. Danley, 14 Ark. 307; Attorney Gen'l v. Lum, 2 Wis. 514; Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. (U. S.) 425. Where the appellate court declared a deed of trust to be void, that decision was held to be the immutable law of the case to govern all subsequent proceed. ings therein, notwithstanding that afterwards in another case a different decision was made on a similar deed. Thomson v. Albert, 15 Md. 285. Where a will was construed in refer evidence is produced at a subsequent trial, it may so change the whole case as to render a different and entirely independent decision imperative, and the previous rulings will be lightly regarded. But in appellate or any subsequent consideration of a case, the limits within which the evidence has been kept, and the issues involved, will be kept directly in view, and no indirect, collateral, or immaterial evidence or issues will be entitled to any considera tion. In cases of title to real estate, the courts will be especially particular to avoid interference, and no evidence or facts will be admitted to show anything having a tendency to vitiate a previous decision if it can be prevented. In fine, all parties will be protected in their property interests, and no question will be passed upon in a way to upset prior decisions and invalidate titles, if there is any way to avoid it.1 ence to a certain title and the same will in regard to the same property was again brought up for construction on the same question in another suit, it was held that the former decision would be sustained whether techni cally conclusive or not. Here the court put it in the proviso, "unless manifestly erroneous." But the rule does not usually admit such a reservation. Dugan . Hollins, 13 Md. 162. Here the court, by Eccleston, J., said: "We have not been able to discover a sufficient reason for making this an exception to the almost uninterrupted practice of all courts of receiving their own decisions as of binding force." Relation of Landlord and Tenant. Where a decision was given that if a landlord, without the consent of the tenant, should enter upon the premises before the termination of the lease and relet them to another, these acts would release the tenant from his covenant, except as to such part of the rent as had accrued when the entry was made, and afterwards the case again came before the court, when the exception above noted was adjudged palpably erroneous and unjust, the court by Heydenfeldt, J., refused to disturb the decision because it was the law of the case, and said: "The latter portion of that decision is in abrogation of one of the plainest principles of the law, and if this case was a new one I would not hesitate to overrule it. But legal rules deprive us of the power to do so. The decision having been made in this case, it has become the law of the case, and is not now the subject of revision." Dewey v. Gray, 2 Cal. 377. The same reasons were held in proceedings for divorce, sufficient for al lowing the decision to stand. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 40 Wis. 462. But not in a case in equity where the ruling was clearly erroneous, and the same was brought directly to the attention of the court. Bane v. Wick, 6 Ohio St. 13. 1. Dodge v. Gaylord, 53 and. 365; Tuttle v. Garrett, 74 Ill. 444; Matthews v. Sands, 29 Ala. 140; Huffman v. State, 30 Ala. 534; Thomason v. Dill. 34 Ala. 177; Ogden v. Larrabee, 70 Ill. 510; Parker v. Pomeroy, 2 Wis. 122; Com. v. Stevens, 142 Mass. 457; Taliaferro v. Barnett, 47 Ark. 359; State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455; Richmond St. R. Co. v. Reed, 83 Ind. 9; Heinlen v. Martin, 59 Cal. 181; Reed v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 283; Pond v. Irwin, 113 Ind. 243; Weare v. Deering, 60 N. H. 56; Frankland v. Cassady, 62 Tex. 418; Langford v. Wilkinson County, 75 Ga. 502; Feurt v. Ambrose, 34 Mo. App. 360; Hombs v. Corbin, 34 Mo. App. 393. In Donner v. Palmer, 51 Cal. 629, the court, by Wallace, J., said: "The stipu lation distinctly looked to the rendition of a final judgment, which should determine that Donner or Bradley,the one or the other, had acquired the title in fee to the undivided quarter assumed and admitted to have been formerly vested in Yontz. We cannot regard it as reserving the question as to whether or not Yontz himself ever had the title, or as merely presenting the abstract question of the relative priority of the lien under which each claimed to have acquired that title for himself. It cannot be considered that it was the purpose of the parties to obtain the opinion of the court upon one ab 3. Questions of Jurisdiction. The same principle applies in regard to decisions relating to jurisdiction. If there has been either a direct or an implied decision as to jurisdiction, the question cannot be raised again or reopened in the same case, although the decision might be reversed, modified or affirmed in another case.1 VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE RULE.-There are certain reasonable limitations to this as to almost all rules. There are clear and palpable mistakes of law which should be corrected, especially when it can be done without injury to any person or property. If no injury or injustice would result to anyone, and a future and permanent benefit would undoubtedly result, the correction should be made at once. No prior decision is to be reversed without good and sufficient cause, yet the rule is not in any sense iron-clad, and the future and permanent good to the public is to be considered rather than any particular case or interest. Even if the decision affects real-estate interests and titles, there may be cases where it is plainly the duty of the court to interfere and overrule a bad decision. Precedent should not have an overwhelming or despotic influence in shaping legal decisions. No elementary or well settled principle of law can be violated by any decision for any length of time. The benefit to the public in the future is of greater moment than any incorrect decision in the past. Wherever a correction can be made without working more harm than good, it should be done.2 stract proposition in the first instance, and then upon another, and so on ad infinitum, as they may see proper to submit them, and to be followed, it may be, by no determination of the ultimate rights of either party. Our judicial system has not as yet provided for the establishment of moot courts, or made it our duty to solve legal conundrums for purposes of mere amusement or instruction." 1. Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. (U. S.) 413; Clary v. Hoagland, 6 Cal. 685; Rising t. Carr, 70 Ill. 596; Hawley v. Smith, 45 Ind. 183; Kibler v. Bridges, 5 S. Car. 336; Dewey v. Gray, 2 Cal. 377; Dugan v. Hollins, 13 Md. 162; Tompson v. Albert, 15 Md. 285; Bane v. Wick, 6 Ohio St. 13; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 40 Wis. 462. See also last preceding note. 2. Bane. Wick, 6 Ohio St. 14; Gwin v. McCarroll, 1 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 371; McFarland v. Pico, 8 Cal. 631; San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 509; Aud v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 291. In this last case, the court, by Baldwin, J., said: "In overruling the case of Bryan v. Berry (6 Cal. 394), we feel less reluctance because we think that the principle there laid down is of injurious import. We think that principles of commercial law long established and maintained by a consistent course of decision in the other States should not be disturbed; that the tendency of such disturbance in any instance is to confusion and uncertainty, and gives rise to perplexing litigation and doubts and uneasiness in the public mind. Almost any general rule governing commercial transactions, if it has been long and consistently upheld as a part of the general system, is better than a rule superseding it, though the latter were much better as an original proposition. Men knowing how the law has been generally received and repeatedly adjudged govern themselves and are advised by their counsel accordingly; but if courts establish new rules whenever they are dissatisfied with the reasons upon which the old ones rest, the standards of commercial transaction would be destroyed and commercial business regulated by a mere guess at what the opinion of the judges at the time might be, and not by a knowledge of what the doctrines of recognized Where vital and important public or private rights are concerned and the decisions regarding them are to have a direct and permanent influence in all future time, it becomes the duty as well as the right of the court to consider them carefully and to allow no previous error to continue if it can be corrected. The reason that the rule of stare decisis was promulgated was on the ground of public policy, and it would be an egregious mistake to allow more harm than good to accrue from it. Much not only of legislation but of judicial decision is based upon the broad ground of public policy, and this latter must not be lost sight of. Permanent rights should not be interfered with if it can be avoided, others may with less hesitancy.1 VII. THE RULE AS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS.- On questions of the construction or application of provisions of the Federal Constitution, of treaties, and of Federal law, the decisions of the Federal courts have the greater weight; on such questions the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are binding upon the State courts. On questions of the construction or interpretation of State statutes or constitutions, the decisions of the court of the State whose constitution or statute is in question are followed by the Federal courts.2 On questions of general works of authority and the precedents decisis seriously invoked by the re- And see, to the same effect, the reasoning of the Pennsylvania court in Callender v. Keystone Mut. L. Ins. Co., 23 Pa, St. 471, where a prior decision was attacked on the ground that it had no support from the cases whence it purported to be derived, and the court yielded, and said in regard to the posi tive right and duty of a court to correct errors when practicable: "Do we violate the doctrine of stare decisis by now correcting the mistake and going back to the well-established doctrine which that case has disturbed? If we do, we commit a greater error than the one we have felt bound to correct; for that doctrine, though incapable of being expressed by any sharp and rigid definition, and therefore incapable of becoming an institute of positive law, is among the most important principles of good government." 1. Hardigree v. Mitchum, 51 Ala. 151; Linn v. Minor, 4 Nev. 462; Hollinshead v. VonGlahn, 4 Minn. 190; I Kent's Com. 477; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 609; Butler v. Van Wyck, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 459; Callender v. Keystone Mut. L. Ins. Co., 23 Pa. St. 474; Aud v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 291. 2. There is no difficulty in stating the rule; the difficulty is in its application. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that an ejectment in a Federal court is governed by the local statute giving one or more new trials as of right. Equator Min., etc., Co., v. Hall, 106 U. S. 86. It was held in Hamilton Bank v. Dudley, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 492, that federal courts should follow the decision of a State court as to the validity of a local law under the State constitution. So in East Hartford 7. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. (U. S.) 511; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. (U. S.) 541, and Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. (U. S.) 488, it was held that a decision by the highest court of a State that a statute of the State is repugnant to the constitution of the State, was binding upon the Federal courts. In Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 35, it was held that the Federal courts were bound by the decision of the highest court of the State that a statute of the State was not in conflict with the constitution of the State. In Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black (U. S.) 510, the supreme court followed the decision of a State court holding a statute requiring a railroad aid tax leviable exclusively on realty to be in violation of a provision of the State constitution declaring that the rule of taxation should be uniform and that taxes should be levied on such property as the legislature should prescribe. In Chambers County v. Clews, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 317, it was held that the Supreme Court of the United States was bound by a decision of the highest court of the State declaring constitutional a statute under which municipal bonds had been issued. In Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 175, it was held that where the State court, by a series of decisions, had affirmed the right of a State legislature, under the State constitution, to authorize the issue of muncipal bonds in aid of a railroad, the United States Supreme Court, on approving such decisions, would follow them in a suit on bonds issued and put on the market while those decisions remained in force, even though the State court had since finally overruled them. In this case, Miller, J., dissented and wrote an exhaustive opinion reviewing the cases. See, on this point, Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 294; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 327; Mitchell . Burlington, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 270; Larned v. Burlington, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 275; Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 181; Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 477. So it has been held that the Federal courts are bound by the decision of a State court denying the validity of a statute on the ground that it was not enacted in the mode required by the State constitution. South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Post v. Kendall County, 105 U. S. 667. In line with the current of the foregoing cases are Elmwood Tp. v. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289, and Indianapolis, etc., Ř. Ćo. v. Vance, 96 U. S. 450. On a question of the construction and effect of a State statute regulating voluntary assignments, a decision by the State supreme courts binds the federal courts. Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223. Where the supreme court affirms the validity of a voluntary conveyance, the Supreme Court of the United States will follow it, although the statute is common to many States and some have differently construed it. Randolph v. Quidnick Co., 135 U. S. 457. Where, in an action for personal injuries received by a passenger while traveling on Sunday, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff's evidence did not show that he was traveling either from necessity or charity, and he took a nonsuit, and sued in the United States circuit court, this court refused to submit the question of necessity or charity to the jury. Bucher v. Čheshire R. Co., 125 U. S. 555. It was held in Fairfield . Gallatin County, 100 U. S. 47, that the United States Supreme Court would follow the decisions of the State court construing the State constitution, even though such construction was contrary to that given by the Federal court in a rule of property having been fixed by the interpretation of the State court and not having been abandoned. In Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, it was laid down that the validity of contracts arising under a provision of the organic law of a State must be determined in the light of the construction given to such provision by the highest court of the State. To the same effect substantially is Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. (U. Š.) 523. Other cases of the same court asserting or recognizing the general doctrine are M'Keen v. Delancy, 5 Cranch (U. S.) 22; Polk v. Wendal, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 87; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 119; Sneed v. Wister, S Wheat. (U. S.) 690; Elmendorf 7. Taylor, ΙΟ Wheat. (U. S.) 152; M'Dowell v. Peyton, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 454; Shelby v. |