tion of a levy upon personal property, the bond being considered security for the debt and ample indemnity to the creditor for arresting the action of the sheriff under the writ. Similarly when a stay of execution is obtained by an injunction, the property levied upon is released and the lien is lost. Eldridge v. Chambers, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 411. And this is the case whether the injunction be obtained at the suit of the defendant in the execution or by a third person. Telford v. Cox, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 298.

1. In Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. (U.S.) 400, execution was issued against certain property which was claimed by a third party, who gave bond for the forthcoming of the property if it should be found subject to the execution. The property was then delivered to the claimant, but was afterwards seized under another execution. It was insisted that the bond was substituted for the property, and that the property was released from the levy, and thus could be subjected to another execution. But the court held that the law provided that the property should be delivered into the possession of the claimant on his giving bond and security that he would return it to the sheriff if it should be found subject to the execution. The bond cannot be taken as a substitute for the property, as the condition requires its return to the sheriff. On the giving of the bond the property is placed in the possession of the claimant. His custody is substituted for the custody of the sheriff. The property is not withdrawn from the custody of the law. In the hands of the claimant, under the bond for its delivery to the sheriff, the property is as free from the reach of other process of execution as it would have been in the hands of the sheriff.

If a fieri facias be issued and levied upon personal property and the defendant gives a forthcoming bond to entitle him to a stay of execution, and the same is so returned by the sheriff and within a year an execution issues at the suit of another plaintiff and the same property is levied on and sold, the first execution will be entitled to the proceeds of sale. Sedgwick's Appeal, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 260. Hence the taking of the forthcoming bond is not a dissolution of the levy; and a postponement of the execution sale of the property to a time before the return day, being but an adjournment, will not avoid the right of the execution creditor, for the benefit of a subsequent execution creditor, it being consistent with an intention to levy the debt under the writ. An indefinite postponement of a sale is inconsistent with the legitimate end of an execution which is to have the money at the return of the writ, or for good reasons stated in the writ, to hold the property for another writ. Lantz v. Worthington, 4 Pa. St. 153; 14 Am. Dec. 682.

Other cases to the effect that the taking of a forthcoming bond to stay execution does not release the property from the lien of the execution are Brush v. Seguin, 24 Ill. 254; Lusk v. Ramsay, 3 Munf. (Va.) 417; Bain v. Lyle, 68 Pa. St. 66. See also generally, FORTHCOMING BOND, vol. 8, p. 565.

2. Boisé Co. v. Gorman, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 661. In this case an officer was ousted from his office on February 3, by virtue of a writ on a judgment rendered on the previous January 20. Subsequent to the ousting under the writ, and on the same day, a supersedeas bond was filed by the officer. Upon the principle that a stay under a supersedeas does not interfere with what has already been done, the peti

tion of the ousted officer for relief was denied.

In Kreglo v. Fulk, 3 W. Va. 74, a judgment in ejectment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The execu tion of the judgment was suspended for a certain time, after which execution was issued and the possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiffs. Defendants then appealed and superseded the judgment, and moved for a writ of restitution of the property. The court denied the motion, holding that the supersedeas only stayed the proceedings in the state they were when it was allowed; but if the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs were reversed on appeal it would then be proper to award a writ of restitu

tion to the defendants.

In apparent conflict with the above it was held that when a sheriff collected money from a defendant upon an execution which was afterwards superseded, it was his duty to return it to defendant. Trueman v. Berry, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 536; and this is made the duty of the sheriff by statute in Virginia. Virginia Code, § 3595. And where the term of office of the clerk and master of a chancery court had not expired when his successor was appointed, and the latter procured a warrant directing the seizure of the official books and papers, on application for a writ of error from the judgment, on which the warrant issued, a supersedeas will issue, though the warrant has been fully executed, with a direction to restore the books and papers; that being the only method of preserving the rights of the parties as they were before the making of the order. Stafford v. Williams (Tenn. 1889), 13 S. W. Rep. 793; Runyon v. Bennett, 4 Dana (Ky.) 598; 29 Am. Dec. 431;

Polk Co. v. Johnson, 21 Fla. 577; Archer v. Hart, 5 Fla. 254.

1. State v. Chambers, 2 Greene (Iowa) 311.

"The natural and most obvious import of the word 'steal' is that of the felonious taking of property, or larceny. But it may be qualified by the context." In that case, an action for slander, it was held that where defendant charged that plaintiff “stole my patents to get up his castings by," it was for the jury and not for the court to decide whether he intended to charge the crime of larceny. Dunnell v. Fiske, II Met. (Mass.) 551. See also Alexander v. State, 12 Tex. 540; LARCENY, vol. 12, p. 761.

2. Fraser 7. Telegraph Construction Co., L. R., 7 Q. B. 566; 3 Moak's Rep. 203. In that case goods were shipped by plaintiffs on board of defendants' vessel under a bill of lading stating that the said vessel was a "steamship." It was held. in accordance with the definition given above, that a ship depending chiefly upon its sails, though using an auxiliary screw, did not answer the description of the vessel in the bill of lading. Steam Dredge. See MARITIME LIENS, vol. 14, p. 411.

3. Webster Dict. quoted in Milligan 7. Jefferson Co., 2 Mont. 546, in which case it was held that "steer" did not include 'calf," within a statute requiring a taxpayer to give a list of his "steers," "heifers," etc.

Steers and Working Cattle" are Synonymous.-" In common parlance, and in every day conversation, steers and working cattle are applied and used to designate one and the same thing, to wit, cattle that have worked." sels v. Territory, 1 Kan. 525.

Wes

that where the court of one of these counties should be divided, each division should have a stenographer appointed by the judge. See Missouri Acts, April 2, 1883.

1. Schoenfeldt v. State, 30 Tex. App. 695.

2. Etter v. O'Neil, 83 Iowa 655.

Removal.-Rev. Sts. of Missouri of 1889, ch. 153, art. 2, providing for the appointment of official stenographers, contains a provision also That the judge shall at any time have power to remove such stenographer upon proper charges entered of record for incompetency or any misconduct in office, specifying such misconduct and giving such stenographer an opportunity of being heard." Also that "It shall be the duty of such stenographer to attend the sessions of the court" and that he "may appoint one or more deputies to assist him in the discharge of his duties, and shall not be allowed any additional compensation on account of such deputies." Const. of 1875, art. 2, § 18, provides that no person elected or appointed to any office or employment of trust or profit under the law of the state shall hold such office without personally devoting his time to the performance of the duties to the same belonging. It was held that where an official stenographer did not devote his personal attention to the duties of his office but left them to be performed by his deputy, this was cause for his removal from office by the judge who appointed him. State v. Slover (Mo. 1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 788. Where a stenographer is thus removed he is not entitled to compensation for the time between the preferring of charges against him and the time when the entry of the order

for removal is made. State v. Slover (Mo. 1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 790.

3. Michigan Comp. Laws, p. 1528; Pennsylvania Act, 1876, § 3; New York Code Civ. Proc., §§ 254, 258; California Code Civ. Proc., § 274.

Under the New York Code Civ. Proc., 86, 289, court stenographers are only entitled to charge counsel for furnishing an official copy of the stenographic minutes of a trial, ten cents per folio of one hundred words by actual count, and, on application of the attorney he will be ordered to write out his minutes and make out his bill at such rate. Wright v. Nostrand, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 184; Guth v. Dalton, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 289.

By the proper construction of New Jersey Acts of 1871 and 1874, relating to stenographic reporters, the circuit judge in his discretion may fix the compensation of such officer for attendance and transcript of proceedings furnished by the order of the court. Knight v. Ocean County, 49 N. J. L. 485.

In California, prior to 1885, it was held that neither section 869 of the Penal Code, nor any provision of law, fixed the fees of stenographers generally; and that a magistrate had no power to fix them according to the standard fixed for official reporters. Fox v. Lindley, 57 Cal. 650. But since that time, by an amendment passed in 1885, a magistrate is allowed to fix such fees, not to exceed those allowed reporters in the superior courts of the state, as provided for in the California Code of Civil Procedure, § 274, which declares that the official reporter shall receive as compensation a sum to be fixed by the court not exceeding $10.00 per day. McAllister v. Hamlin, 83