them a disproportionate share in the security. Where the liability is enforced in equity alone, its enforcement is for the benefit of all with no distinction between judgment and general creditors. So where a statute imposes a liability upon stockholders "for the purpose of securing the creditors" and proceedings are instituted by a part for all, no one creditor can acquire priority, even by a separate action.3 Neither can such priority be attained upon the motion of an individual creditor while a general suit against a stockholder is pending.4 h. CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN STOCKHOLDERS.-See CONTRIBUTION, vol. 4, p. 7; MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, vol. 14, P. 306. V. TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP.-See DISFRANCHISEMENT, vol. 5, p. 684. STOCK IN TRADE-(See also EFFECTS, vol. 6, p. 194).—See note 5. 1. In Eames v. Doris, 102 Ill. 350, the court said: "The liability under section nine is created for all losses and deficiencies as to the trust funds and saving funds deposited, that is, as to the depositors of trust funds and savings funds. The liability constitutes a fund for the benefit of all of these two classes of creditors, and they are entitled to share in it in proportion to the amount of their debts. The debts here largely exceed the assets and this liability combined, so that the fund will be insufficient to discharge all of the claims upon it. If individuals of these two classes of savings and trust depositors be allowed to prosecute their separate suits, they may recover payment of their demands in full, while others of the classes, having claims equally equitable, may be enabled to obtain no payment whatever, or but a partial one. Hence the propriety, in the case of such a deficiency in a common fund for the common benefit of creditors, of a proceeding in equity by one or more in behalf of all the creditors, in order that the equitable principle that equity is equity, may be applied; that single creditors, by individual suits, may be prevented from an appropriation to themselves of the entire or unequal benefit of the security, to the exclusion of others equally entitled, and that there may be a collection and pro rata distribution of the whole fund among all the creditors." 2. McDonnell v. Alabama Gold L. Ins. Co., 85 Ala. 401. 4. Donnelly v. Mulhall, 12 Mo. App. 139; Marks v. Hardy, 86 Mo. 232. 2 5. An Indiana statute required the president, or other accounting officer, of every railroad company in the State to furnish the auditor of the county in which the principal office of the road was situated, a list of "stock for taxation." It was held that the word "stock" as here used did not mean the subscriptions of stock, but the actual, tangible property of such company. The court, by Perkins, J., said: "The word stock is used both in common parlance and statutory enactments in a variety of senses, some broader, some more limited. Its use may open wide field for the work of interpreta tion, and require a close consideration of the whole subject-matter in relation to which it is applied. We speak of the goods of a merchant, as his stock; of the lumber and materials of the manufacturer, as his stock of raw materials; of the cattle, hogs, etc., of the farmer, as his stock; of the cars, locomotives, etc., of the railroad companies, as their stock of these articles respectively; and we speak of the subscriptions and shares in these companies as stock, though these are more properly, it would seem, denominated the capital stock of such corporations." State v. Hamilton, 5 Ind. 313. See also Floyd Co. v. New Albany, etc., R. Co., 11 Ind. 570; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Porter, 17 Ind. 380. A testator by his will gave his plantation and tannery with "all the stock 3. Wright v. McCormack, 17 Ohio of every kind." It was held that the term "stock" included leather in the St. 87. STOCK YARDS-(See also CARriers of Live STOCK, vol. 3, p. 1.) I. Definition, 900. II. Rights, Duties, and Liabilities, 900. I. DEFINITION.-A stock yard is an inclosure connected with a railroad, slaughterhouse, or market, for the distribution, assorting, sale, or temporary keeping of live stock.1 II. RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES.-The business of a stock yard company, except in the character of the property which is the subject of bailment, is similar to that of a warehouseman, and it may not be compelled in the absence of contract to receive stock of any person or corporation.2 vats. Cameron v. Commissioners, I Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 437. A Mississippi statute fixed a privilege tax upon each store in proportion to the "stock" carried therein. It was held, that "stock," as here used, comprised only the goods, etc., kept by the merchant for sale in the course of business, and did not include cotton taken by the merchant in payment of debts. Harness v. Williams, 64 Miss. 600. Stock in Trade.-As to what a policy on the "stock in trade of a merchant or mechanic will cover, see FIRE INSURANCE, vol. 7, p. 1006. Upon a dissolution of partnership and division of the "stock in trade," property, etc., it was held, that the goodwill was not within the phrase "stock in trade." Chapman v. Hayman, 1 Times Rep. 397. A testator was a barge-builder, and, according to the custom of that trade, would sometimes on the sale of a new barge accept an old one in part payment, which he would repair and let out on hire. At the time of his death he had five such barges, and it was held, that these barges passed under a bequest of his "stock in trade as a barge-builder." In re Richardson, 50 L. J. Ch. 488. Where one carried on the business of selling United States internal revenue stamps, it was held that the revenue stamps which he had on hand were not subject to taxation under Massachusetts Gen. St., ch. 11, § 12, as "stock in trade." Polfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass. 329. For the scope of the term as used in exemption laws, see EXECUTIONS, vol. 7, p. 135n.; ATTACHMENT, vol. 1, p. 917. See also In re Jones, 2 Dill. (U. S.) 343; Hillyer v. Remore, 42 Minn. 254; Martin v. Bond, 14 Colo. 466; Bequillard v. Bartlett, 19 Kan. 382. Stock on Hand-(See also HAND, vol. 9, p. 262).—A chattel mortgage on the "stock on hand" of a baker does not sufficiently describe the property. Rocheleau v. Boyle (Mont.), 28 Pac. Rep. 872. "Stock of Ladies' Notions."— A mortgage described the goods as “the general stock of millinery, stock of ladies' notions, consisting of hats," etc., "and all other goods now on hand or to be purchased and used in the business of a general millinery store." It was held that by the phrase, “"stock of ladies' notions," only such property was conveyed as is described immediately following such phrase, and that by the last clause was meant only such millinery as might be on hand for sale, or might be purchased for sale, or might be made up for sale. Chapin v. Garretson (Iowa), 52 N. W. Rep. 104. 1. Century Dictionary. 2. In Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 74; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 82, the complainants were refused an injunction to compel defendants to receive at their yards from the complainants live stock carried over their road and consigned for delivery at defendants' yard, because the question whether the defendants were subject to any duty to the complainants was, as a matter of law, unsettled, and also because the injunction asked for was mandatory in its character, and such writs are never granted until a final hearing. In the opinion, it was said that "the defendants stand, in respect to their legal duties, in a position very similar to that which a common carrier occupiesbound to serve all, who have a right to demand their service, to the best of Rights, Duties and Liabilities. STOCK YARDS. Rights, Duties and Liabilities. The fact that the business of buying and selling live stock at a certain market, established and maintained by a stock yard company, itself a private corporation, and not engaged in buying and selling live stock, is of such a magnitude as to have an influence upon the commerce of the country, will not justify the courts in declaring it a public market, and applying to it any rules of public policy peculiar to public markets.i In the operation of a railroad which a stock yard is authorized to construct to connect with other railroads, it is subject to the same responsibilities as railroad companies, and is liable for the negligence of another corporation using it by permission.2 An injunction will issue in favor of a stock yard company to prevent unjust railroad discrimination;3 and in one instance an injunction was granted to restrain the withdrawal of railway connecti ons with an old established stock yard, the withdrawal being attempted to aid in the erection of a monopoly at another point.4 their ability, and on equal terms as to compensation." But in Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Central Stock Yard Co., 46 N. J. Eq. 280; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 607, Van Fleet, V. C., referring to his language quoted above, said: "This opinion was based on an assumption that there was a strong and close similitude between a railroad or canal company, in their character as a common carrier, and the defendants, both in respect to the powers which each might exercise, and the duties which each were bound to perform for the public. But it is now entirely clear that such is not the fact. Between the defendants and a railroad or canal company there is not the slightest analogy. The business of the defendant has no exact counterpart or model in any of the established instruments of commerce or agencies used by the public in the transaction of business." The denial of the injunction was put upon the ground of the analogy between the defendants' business and that of a warehouseman; and, further, the presence in the defendants' charter of a provision authorizing them to make contracts with the several railroad companies having a terminus in Hudson county, for the transportation and delivery of live stock at their yards, in the opinion of the court, showed clearly that the legislature did not intend that the defendants should be subject to any duty to railroad companies in that respect, except such as they should voluntarily assume by contract. Where, however, the yards are main tained by the railroad company itself, and the cattle have been placed in them by the direction of the carrier's agent for immediate shipment, and part of them have been actually placed in the cars, the cattle are to be considered as having been received by the carrier for shipment and held by him as a common carrier and not as a warehouseman. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Trawick, So Tex. 270, 15 S. W. Rep. 568. 1. American Live Stock Commission Co. v. Chicago L. S. Exchange (Ill. 1892), 32 N. E. Rep. 274. 2. Pennsylvania Co. v. Ellett, 132 Ill. 654; 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 64. 3. In M'Coy v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 3, it was held that a railroad company may not bind itself to deliver to a particular stock yard all live stock coming over its line to a certain point, but is bound to transport over its road and deliver to all stock yards at such point, reached by its tracks or connections, all live stock consigned, or which shippers desire to consign, to them, upon the same terms and in the same manner as under like conditions it transports and delivers to their competitors, and the performance of this duty may be enforced by injunction at the instance of the proprietor of the yards discriminated against. 4. Coe v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 775. Breach of Contract- Evidence as to Measure of Damages.-Where a person agrees to construct stock yards, and a railroad company agrees to send all stock to those yards, unless otherwise ordered by the shippers, if the com A stock yard company may be prevented by injunction from conducting its business in such a manner as materially to affect the health or property of persons living in the vicinity.i Stock left in the custody of the company may be sold when no owner can be found, and when, from the perishable nature of the property, a necessity for sale arises.2 When a railroad company holds itself out as a carrier of live stock, it is obliged to provide suitable facilities, such as yards or pens, for receiving and discharging the stock, and for these, it may not, in addition to the customary and legitimate charges for transportation, make a special charge.3 And it may not ab solve itself from its statutory duty to provide suitable facilities, by showing that the yards or pens were so badly constructed as to make it contributory negligence on the part of the shipper to use them.4 STONE.-See note 5. pany takes stock to other yards not specially ordered there, it violates its contract, and is responsible in damages, and evidence as to the number of car loads taken to other yards is admissible in fixing the measure thereof. Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Struble, 109 U. S. 381; 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 597. 1. Babcock v. New Jersey Stock Yard Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 296. But in London, etc., R. R. Co. v. Truman, 11 App. Cas. 45; 25 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 116, the court refused to enjoin a railroad company from maintaining cattle yards near the plaintiff's residence, on the ground that the same was a nuisance, it appearing that the yards were maintained on land acquired by the company under a statute for such purposes. 2. Mill Creek v. Brighton Stock Yard Co., 27 Ohio St. 435. 3. Covington Stock yard Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 149. In this case Harlan, J., for the court, said: "A carrier of live stock has no more right to make a special charge for merely receiving or merely delivering such stock, in and through stock yards provided by itself, in order that it may properly receive and load or un load and deliver such stock, than a carrier of passengers may make a special charge for the use of its passenger depot by passengers when proceeding to or coming from its trains, or than a carrier may charge the shippers for the use of its general freight depot in merely delivering his goods for shipment, or the consignee of such goods for its use in merely receiving them there within a reasonable time after they are unloaded from the cars." 4. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Trawick, 80 Tex. 270. In this case a statute in the following terms was construed as making it incumbent upon a railroad to provide pens or yards for the shipment of cattle: "Each and every railroad company is hereby required to erect at each and every depot, station, or place established by such company for the reception and delivery of freight, suitable buildings or inclosures to protect produce, goods, wares and merchandise, and freight of every description from damage by exposure to the weather or otherwise." Texas Rev.Stat., art. 4236. Damages to Stock from Exposure-Liability of Carrier.-In Feinberg v. Delaware, L., etc., R. Co., 20 Atl. Rep. 33, the plaintiff's live stock was accepted, freight paid, and receipt given, for transportation, without express contract for limitation of liability; being delayed by a snowstorm, they were removed from the cars to the defendant's stock yards, where some died, and others were injured by cold and exposure due to insufficient shelter. The defendant was held liable for damages as a common carrier. And it was further held that the mere fact of giving a free pass to a servant of the shipper in order that he might accompany the stock would not relieve the company of responsibility. 5. A statute imposed a toll upon "goods, wares, and merchandise," and a lower toll upon "stone." It was held that blocks of stone squared and reduced to certain dimensions was STOPPAGE. In the old books set-off is sometimes called stoppage, because the amount sought to be set off was stopped or deducted from the cross demand.1 STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.-(See also BILL OF LADING, vol. 2, p. 223; CARRIERS OF GOODS, vol. 2, p. 770; EXPRESS COMPANIES, vol. 7, p. 539; SALES, vol. 21, p. 444.) 919. (b) Delivery to Buyer's Agent, 921. (4) Delivery on Board 2. To Whom Notice Given, 925. V. Loss of Right, 926. 1. How Right Is Lost, 926. 2. When Right Is Not Lost, 930. VI. Effect, 932. 1. On Rights of Parties, 932. 2. On Rights of Carrier, 933. I. DEFINITION.- Stoppage in transitu is a resumption by the seller of the possession of goods not paid for, while on their way to the vendee and before he has acquired actual possession of them. The right of stoppage in transitu is the right which the vendor, when he sells goods on credit to another, has of resuming the possession of the goods, while they are in the hands of a carrier or middleman, in their transit to the consignee or vendee, ard before they arrive into his actual possession, or at the destination which he has appointed for them, on his becoming bankrupt or insolvent.3 This is a right which arises solely upon the insolvency "stone" within the statute, and not merchandise, and therefore subject to the lower toll. Fisher v. Lee, 12 A. & E. 622; 40 E. C. L. 136. 1. Byles on Bills 349; Jeffs v. Wood, 2 P. Wms. 128. See also SET-OFF, vol. 22, p. 209. 2. Bouv. L. Dict., citing Newhall v. Vargas, 15 Me. 314. 3. 2 Kent's Com. 540. |