STOPPING PLACE.--See STATIONS; USUAL. STORE (See also SHOP, vol. 22, p. 778; WAREHOUSEMAN).— I. v. To keep goods and merchandise for safe custody, to be delivered in the same condition substantially as when received. The term only applies when the safe keeping is the principal object of the deposit.1 2. n. A store is any place where goods are sold either by wholesale or retail.2 It is used in this country as nearly synony mous with "shop." 3 goods to another person and place, and if he fails to forward them in pursuance of such order the right of action against him is as a warehouseman for failing to forward, and not as a common carrier. MacVeagh v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 3 N. Mex. 205; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 651. 1. New York Equitable Ins. Co. v. Langdon, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 628; O'Neil v. Buffalo F. Ins. Co., 3 N. Y. 127; Hynds v. Schenectady Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 119. See also WAREHOUSEMAN. 2. Webster's Dict. followed in Martin v. Portland, S1 Me. 293; Com. v. Whalen, 131 Mass. 419. 3. Barth v. State, 18 Conn. 439. And in that case the court, by Storrs, J., said: "By a reference to the lexicographers of this country and England, it appears that the word shop is used in the same sense in both; but that the word store as applied to a building is used in a more extensive sense in this country than in that. There it is never applied to a place where goods are sold, but only to one where they are merely deposited, but here it is used to denote both." See also Richards v. Washington F. & M. Ins. Co., 60 Mich. 425; Com. v. Annis, 15 Gray (Mass.) 197; Com. v. Riggs, 14 Gray (Mass.) 376; 77 Am. Dec. 333. But compare Sparrenberger v. State, 53 Ala. 481; 25 Am. Rep. 643. In the United States, shops for the sale of goods of any kind, by wholesale or retail, are often called stores; that is, we use the word store for storehouse; the word which properly means the quantity of a thing accumulated or deposited, as a designation of the place of deposit. 'Shop' is defined by Richardson to be a place for the purpose of containing merchandise for sale, protected from the weather.' Webster defines it as 'a building in which goods, wares, drugs, etc., are sold by retail;' also as 'a building in which mechanics work.' In conversa. tion we speak of a store as a place where goods are exposed for sale, thus giving it the same meaning as shop. Still, we recognize a difference between the meanings of these two words. Thus, we do not call the place where any mechanic art is carried on a store, but we give it the name of shop, as a tailor's shop, a blacksmith shop, a shoemaker's shop. We usually understand by the word store, a place where goods are exhibited for sale, but we do not always mean a store when we use the word shop." State v. Canney, 19 N. H. 137. See also Boston Loan Co. v. Boston, 137 Mass. 336. A Store is not Necessarily a Building. -In Com. v. M'Monagle, 1 Mass. 517 (see also Folkes v. State, 63 Miss. §3), it was held that an indictment for breaking a "store" cannot be support. ed under a statute making it a felony to break up any dwelling house, shop, mill, etc., or other "building" whatsoever, with criminal intent, unless it be averred in the indictment that the store is a building. But in that case Sewell, J., doubted whether it was necessary to aver it" because the word has in this state a settled, known meaning and is not used otherwise than as and for the name of a building." And it has been held several times that a shop" must necessarily be a structure of some sort. See SHOP, vol. 22, p. 778. An ice house, in which a dealer in ice had stored his stock, was held not to be a "store" within a Massachusetts tax statute. The court, by Colburn, J., said: "We are of opinion that the natural import and common use in this country of the word 'store,' when ap plied to a building, is to designate a place where traffic is carried on in goods, wares, or merchandise, and not to designate a storehouse." Hittinger v. Westford, 135 Mass. 259. Desk-room is not a "Store."-A STORE ORDER ACTS.-The term Store Order Acts (or Truck Acts, as this legislation is called in Great Britain), is applied to statutes having for their object the prevention of the payment of workmen by orders redeemable by the master in goods or truck. These statutes provide for the payment of wages in lawful money only.1 In the states of the Union where these statutes have been enacted they are of comparatively recent date. They have been enacted in West Virginia, Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Maine statute provided that all personal property employed in trade should be taxed in the town in which it was so employed, provided the owner had his store or shop in such town. It was held that a stockbroker who merely had desk-room in a city did not occupy a store or shop within the statute. Martin v. Portland, 81 Me. 293. Bakery a Store.-An insurance policy stated that the building insured was used as a store and residence; it was held that a bakery was a "store." Richards . Washington F. & M. Ins. Co., 60 Mich. 425. A Saloon and Restaurant was held a "store" in Com. v. Whalen, 131 Mass. 419; and see BURGLARY, vol. 2, p. 677, where that case is set out at some length. Storehouse (See HOUSE, vol. 9, p. 780).-A room occupied as a news depot in which papers, pamphlets, and the like are kept for sale, and communicating by a door-way with another room used as an outer hall or entrance to the building, is a storehouse within the meaning of the Ohio Burglary Act. Bauer v. State, 25 Ohio St. 70. See also BURGLARY, vol. 2, p. 677. The terms "storehouse" and "warehouse," as used in Kentucky Gen. Sts., ch. 29, art. 6, § 4, mean any house not an office or a shop, or any room in a steam or other boat, in which goods, wares and merchandise, are usually deposited for safe keeping or for sale. Ray v. Com., 12 Bush (Ky.) 397. Ship Stores.-See PROVISIONS, vol. 19, p. 299; SHIPS AND SHIPPING, vol. 22, p. 710. And see U. S. v. TwentyFour Coils of Cordage, 1 Baldw. (U. S.) 502, for a restricted use of the term in an old United States Revenue law. Store Fixtures.-What included under the term in a policy of insurance. See INSURANCE, vol. 11, p. 290. 1. English Statutes and Decisions.In England, statutes have been passed at various times aiming at the abolition of the "Truck System of giving orders payable in goods or truck in lieu of cash wages. In 1837 the "Truck act" of 1 & 2 Wm. IV, ch. 37, was enacted. This act consolidated previous acts on the subject, and prohibited manufacturers of iron and certain other things, and miners of coal, salt, etc., from paying the wages of their laborers in anything other than the lawful money of the realm. The application of that act was extended by 50 & 51 Vict., ch. 46. The purpose of this legislation was to prevent fraud and to prohibit employers from compelling their employés to accept goods of inferior quality at a high price. Sweet's L. Dict.; Black's L. Dict. See also McCullogh, Commercial Dict., Truck System. There are a few English cases involving the construction of these acts. It was held in Riley v. Warden, 2 Exch. 59, that the statute 1 and 2 Wm. IV, ch. 37, applied only to persons contracting as laborers-that is, to those contracting to use their personal services and to receive payment for such services in wages. Sharman v. Sanders, 13 C. B. 166; Chawner v. Cummings, 8 Q. B. 311; Bowers v. Lovekin, 3 El. & Bl. 584; Ingram v. Barnes, 7 El. & Bl. 115; Sleeman v. Barrett, 2 H. & C. 934; Morehouse v. Lee, 4 F. & F. 455; Pillar v. Llybni Coal & Iron Co., 4 L. R., C. P. 752, involve questions of who are artificers within the act. It was held in Floyd v. Weaver, 16 Jur. 289; 21 L. J. Q. B. 151, that the act applied only to agreements for personal services, and not to agreements for the performance of a certain quantity of work which the contractor could not perform except by making use of the labor of others. It was held in Archer v. James, 2 B. & S. 61, that deductions or stoppages made from the wages of an artificer in Indiana, and perhaps in other states. In certain instances they have been declared unconstitutional, but it would seem that the statutes thus adjudged unconstitutional were declared to be so on the ground that they applied to miners and manufacturers, and, therefore, attempted to discriminate between classes of employers, instead of being general in their application to all employers. It would seem that legislation general in its nature, and not objec tionable as class legislation, was within the legitimate exercise of the police power, as defined in the various cases where its limits have undergone judicial discussion.1 the hosiery trade in respect of frame rent, machine rent, standing of frames or machines, winding the material, fines for illegal attendance, gas for lighting the factory, and fire in waiting-room amounting to a little over three shillings a week, fixed charges, were not illegal. It was held in Wilson v. Cookson, 13 C. B. N. S. 496, that to constitute an offense within the statute it was not necessary that the payment of wages in goods instead of money should be the result of any contract or understanding between the employer and the workman -that the mere payment was enough; and that the offense was not purged by a subsequent payment in money, whether made voluntarily or compulsorily under an order of justices. In Smith v. Walton, 3 C. P. D. 109, it appeared that an artificer in a trade within the Truck act had damaged a piece of cloth through negligent workmanship, and that his employer had delivered the damaged cloth to him instead of such wages earned as were equivalent to the value which, according to the assessment of the employer, the cloth would have had if undamaged. It was held that the employer had paid wages otherwise than in current coin, and was, therefore, liable to the penalty fixed by the act. In Pillar. Llynbi Coal & Iron Co., 4 L. R. C. P. 752, it appeared that an employer had stopped part of the wages of an artificer as a contribution to funds established by the employer to provide medicine and medical attendance for the artificers employed, and schools for their children, but without any written agreement with the artificer. It was held that the latter was entitled to recover the deduction specified by the act. See also Cutts v. Ward, 2 Q. B. 357. 1. West Virginia act 1891, ch. 76, is as follows in its application to the sub ject under discussion, and affords an example of this legislation: "It shall be unlawful for any corporation, company, firm, or person engaged in any trade or business, either directly or indirectly. to issue, sell, give, or deliver, to any person employed by such corporation, company, firm, or person, in payment of wages due such laborer, or as advances for labor not due, any scrip, token, draft, check, or other evidence of indebtedness, payable or redeemable' otherwise than in lawful money; and, if any such scrip, token, draft, check, or other evidence of indebtedness, be so issued, sold, given, or delivered to such laborer, it shall be construed, taken and held in all courts and places to be a promise to pay the sum specified therein in lawful money by the corporation, company, firm or person issuing, selling, giving or delivering the same to the person named therein, or to the holder thereof." The foregoing provision was declared to be constitutional in Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State (W. Va. 1892), 15 S. E. Rep. 1000. From the opinion in this case two of the judges dissented, however. An earlier West Virginia act was adjudged unconstitutional in State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, on the ground that it applied in terms to mine-owners and manufacturers, and thus constituted class legislation. Illinois.-Sections 1 and 2 of Illinois act, May 28, 1891, declared it unlawful for any person, company, corporation, or association engaged in mining or manufacturing, to be engaged or interested in keeping a truck store, or controlling any store or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to employés. This legislation was declared unconstitutional in Frorer v. People (Ill. 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 395. Missouri.-In State v. Loomis, 22 S. W. Rep. 350; 48 Alb. L. J. 46, a case STORM.-See note I. decided in the spring of 1893, the Missouri statute was held unconstitutional as class legislation. This case was before a division of the court in 1892, and the decision was the other way. State v. Loomis (Mo.), 20 S. W. Rep. 332. The Missouri statute attacked in this case applied in its terms to corporations, persons or firms, engaged in manufacturing or mining," being in this respect similar to the Illinois statute referred to above. Pennsylvania. — In Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; 6 Atl. Rep. 354, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl vania adjudged §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the act of June 29, 1881, providing that the wages of laborers in and about iron mills, etc., should be paid at regular intervals and in lawful money of the United States, to be unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Gordon, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The first, second, third and fourth sections of the act of June 29, 1881, are utterly unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what, in this country, cannot be done; that is, prevent persons sui juris from making their own contracts. The act is an infringement alike of the right of the employer and the employé; more than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States." The West Virginia court, in Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State (W. Va. 1892), 15 S. E. Rep. 1000, in commenting upon Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, said: "The decision rested upon a peculiar provision of their constitution, as follows: 'The general assembly shall not pass any local or special law regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing, granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity.' Section 7, art. 3, Const. Pa. In our state we have no such constitutional provision; if we had, the defendant and other mining companies could not have been clothed with the 'special and exclusive privilege' of watering stock, holding 10,000 acres of land, and laying out towns and cities. After the above decision was rendered, the legislature of Pennsylvania effected its remedial legislation by prohibiting altogether mining or manufacturing companies from carrying on company stores,' or 'general supply stores,' where any goods or merchandise are sold, other than those mined or manufactured by themselves. Laws Pa. 1891, p. 256." In Indiana, an act of the legislature requiring the owners of mines to pay for mining coal every two weeks in lawful money of the United States, and forbidding the execution of contracts waiving the right to payment in money, was held to be constitutional. In Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366; 16 Am. St. Rep. 396, Judge Elliott, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It cannot be denied, without repudiating all authority, that the legislature does possess some power over the right to contract, and if it does, then nothing can be clearer than that this power extends far enough to uphold a statute providing that payment of wages shall be made in money where there is no agreement to the contrary made after the services have been rendered. The provision of the statute to which our decision is directed operates upon all members of the classes it enumerates. It neither confers special privileges nor makes unjust discrimination. All who are members of the classes named are entitled to its benefits or subjected to its burdens. It is open to every citizen to become a member of any of the classes designated, and the privileges conferred belong on equal terms to all." In Maryland, in Shaffer v. Union Min. Co., 55 Md. 74, the court, without otherwise discussing questions of constitutionality, said: "It being conceded that the legislature, when it incorporated the Union Mining Company, reserved the right to alter or amend its charter at pleasure, there can be no doubt that the legislature could enact a law prohibiting the corporation from paying its employés otherwise than in money, and that it could forbid the corporation from making contracts with them for payment in anything but money." 1. A policy of insurance insured against loss by "fire or storm;" a freshet, occasioned by the melting of the snow and prevailing south winds and rain, carried away the property. STORY.-See note I. STOWAGE.-See SHIPS AND SHIPPING, vol. 22, p. 710. STRANDING (See also MARINE INSURANCE, vol. 14, p. 376). --A stranding is when a ship takes ground, not in the ordinary course of navigation, but by accident or the force of the wind or sea, and remains stationary for some time. The vessel must ground from an accident happening out of the ordinary and usual course of navigation.2 The loss was held not to be covered by the policy. Stover v. Insurance Co., 3 Phila. (Pa.) 38. 1. In a statement, filed in order to obtain a mechanic's lien, the building intended to be covered by the lien was described as being of three stories. The court, by Knowlton, J., said: "The description of the house was not inaccurate nor misleading. If the lower part of it was properly called a basement, it was, according to the definitions of lexicographers and the common understanding of the word, a story of the building." Cleverly v. Moseley, 148 Mass. 284. 2. Wells v. Hopwood, 3 B. & Ad. 20; 23 E. C. L. 18; 3 Kent's Com. 323; Lake v. Columbus Ins. Co., 13 Ohio 66; 42 Am. Dec. 188. It may be said, in general terms, that in order to constitute a stranding the ship must be in the course of prosecuting her voyage when the loss occurs; there must be a settling down on the obstructing object, and the vessel must take the ground by reason of extraordinary casualty, and not from one of the ordinary incidents of a voyage. Arn. Ins., §§ 297, 318; Bouv. L. Dict. "Stranding is understood to be the striking of a vessel upon a rock, bank, reef, or the like." Strong v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N. Y. 106; 88 Am. Dec. 242. To constitute a stranding the vessel must be stationary for some time. Thus, if the ship merely touches or strikes and gets off again, howsoever much she may be injured, she is not stranded. McDougle v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co., 1 Stark. 130; 4 M. & S. 503; Harmon v. Vaux, 3 Camp. 429; Lake v. Columbus Ins. Co., 13 Ohio 48; 42 Am. Dec. 188. In the following cases the vessel was held to have stranded: A resting for fifteen or twenty minutes has been held to be a stranding, whether it be upon a bank or rock. Baker z. Towry, 1 Stark. 436. Where a ship was improperly fastened to a pier in a basin so that she took ground and when the tide left her she fell over and was bilged, this was held to be a stranding. Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 M. & S. 77. See also Bishop v. Pentland, 7 B. & C. 219; 14 E. C. L. 33. Where the water was drawn off from an inland navigable water for purposes of repair, and a vessel settled accidentally upon some spiles which were not known to be there, it was held that the vessel had stranded. Rayner v. Godmond, 5 B. & A. 225. A ship under stress of weather made a tidal harbor, but it being low water she grounded there. Held, a stranding. Corcoran v. Gurney, 1 E. & B. 456; 72 E. C. L. 455. See also De Mattos . Saunders, L. R.,7 C. P. 570; Letchford v. Oldham, 5 Q. B. Div. 538; Wells v. Hopwood, 3 B. & Ad. 20; 23 E. C. L. 18. Not a Stranding. · Where a vessel takes ground in the ordinary and usual course of navigation and management in a tidal river or harbor upon the ebbing of the tide, or from a natural deficiency of water, so that she may float again upon the flow of the tide or increase of the water, this is not a stranding. Magnus . Butte mer, 11 C. B. 876; 73 E. C. L. 875 Hearn v. Edmunds, I B. & B. 388. Compare Corcoran v. Gurney, I E. & B. 456; 72 E. C. L. 455. A vessel took the ground in a tidal harbor where it was intended she should do so at the time she was moored, and was injured by striking against some hard substance. This was considered not to be a stranding. Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 458; 21 E. C. L. 344. See also Potter v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 2 Sumn. |