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tries have been so long involved, cannot but tend to render that termination near at hand and permanent.

"I feel it to be a duty to do justice to the accuracy with which General Cass has recapitulated the circumstances under which the controversy has been sustained, and the efforts hitherto employed to settle it have failed." (Lord Malmesbury to Lord Napier, Dec. 8, 1858, Correspond

ence, etc., 294.) In connection with the foregoing note, the following correspondence may be seen in the document just cited: Lord Napier to Lord Clarendon, March 12, and May 6, 1857, pp. 254, 255; Mr. Cass to Lord Napier, May 29, 1857, p. 256; Lord Napier to Mr. Cass, May 31, 1857, p. 152; Mr. Cass to Lord Napier, Oct. 20, 1857, p. 260; Lord Napier to Lord Clarendon, Oct. 22, 1857, p. 261; Lord Napier to Mr. Cass, Nov. 30, 1857, p. 272; Lord Napier to Mr. Cass, Feb. 15, 1858, p. 276; Lord Napier to Lord Malmesbury, March 22, 1858, p. 277; Mr. Cass to Lord Napier, April 6, 1858, p. 109; Lord Malmesbury to Lord Napier, April 8. 1858, p. 279; Lord Malmesbury to Lord Napier, Dec. 8, 1858, p. 294; Lord Napier to Lord Malmesbury, April 4, 1859, p. 125; Lord Malmesbury to Sir W. G. Ouseley, April 30, 1859, p. 126; Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury, May 10, 1859, p. 127; Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury, May 30, 1859, pp. 127, 128; Lord John Russell to Mr. Wyke, Aug. 15, 1859, p. 130; Mr. Cass to Mr. Dimitry, Sept. 22, 1859, p. 119; Mr. Cass to Mr. Clarke, Oct. 1, 1859, p. 121, and Feb. 18, 1860, p. 124; Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons, Aug. 4, 1860, p. 14.

Further correspondence may be found in the British Blue Book, entitled "Correspondence respecting Central America, 1856–1860."

See, also, Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dallas, min. to England, confidential, April 7, 1859, MS. Inst. Gr. Br. XVII. 179; same to same, April 12, 1859. The instruction of April 12, 1859, may be found in the Blue Book, p. 215.

For the text of the Dallas-Clarendon convention, Oct. 17, 1856, see Blue Book, 24.

The text of the treaty signed at Washington, Nov. 16, 1857, by Mr. Cass, on the part of the United States, and Señor Yrisarri, on the part of Nicaragua, may be found in the Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, 265. It was in the nature of a general treaty of amity and commerce, with special stipulations in regard to interoceanic transit through the territories of Nicaragua. The United States and their citizens were to enjoy the privileges of such transit, whether by land or by water, on equal terms with the Republic and citizens of Nicaragua. The United States engaged to protect and to "guarantee the neutrality " of all interoceanic routes through the territories in question, and “to employ their influence with other nations to induce them to guarantee such neutrality and protection." Free ports were to be established by Nicaragua at the ends of the routes, and the Government of the United States was to have the unobstructed use of the transit for troops and munitions of war. Nicaragua agreed to employ if necessary her military forces for the security of persons and property in transit, and, on her failure to do so, the United States was to have the right, on notice to the Government of Nicaragua, or to its minister in the United States, to employ military forces for that purpose. Stipulations were also made with a view to prevent the charging of excessive tolls on the routes of interoceanic communication.

The reference made by General Cass, in his note of Nov. 8, 1858, supra, to the expeditions of William Walker to Nicaragua, brings into view a subject that tended, probably as much as anything else, to complicate the negotiations for the adjustment of questions growing out of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, since it served to breed suspicion and to secure for Great Britain the support of France on Central American questions. In an instruction to Mr. Mirabeau B. Lamar, minister of the United States to Central America, July 25, 1858, referring to a recent contract made by M. Belly, a citizen of France, with Costa Rica and Nicaragua, under which important privileges with regard to the canal were to be enjoyed by the French Government, as well as to charges of complicity on the part of American officials with Walker's movements, General Cass said:

"As to the statement it has been thought proper to make that 'all the official agents of the United States in Nicaragua have been the accomplices, and auxiliaries of the invaders,' I know nothing of it, except what is mentioned in this paper, and its position there, in the absence of all proof, is not sufficient to entitle it to confidence. I repeat the assurance already given with relation to yourself that if any of these agents have justly rendered themselves obnoxious to such charges, let the governments, considering themselves injured by their conduct, transmit to this Department specific charges, embodying these or any other accusations with evidence in support of them, and the subject shall receive immediate attention, followed by such action as may be justly called for. "As to the protectorate which is invoked for the 'independence and nationality of the republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica,' it is a subject very easily disposed of, so far as the United States have any concern in the question. The President has no belief that either of the Powers, thus publicly and improperly appealed to, has ever given the least encouragement to such a proposition, nor had any reason to anticipate it. The French Government has voluntarily disclaimed any connection with M. Belly, and has given assurances that it has no designs upon Central America, but on the contrary has avoided any interference of that kind. A guarantee for the general use and security of a transit route, and also for its neutrality, is a desirable measure which would meet the hearty concurrence of the United States. These views have already been made known to the governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and they have been informed that the President indulges the hope that these routes may yet be considered by general consent as neutral highways for the world, not to be disturbed by the operations of war. (MS. Inst. Am. States, XV. 321, 331. Other parts of this instruction may be found in Correspondence (1885), 281, and 50 Br. & For. State Papers, 202.) Again, in an instruction to Mr. Mason, minister to France, Nov. 26, 1858, General Cass said:

The general policy of the United States concerning Central America is familiar to you. We desire to see the isthmian routes opened and free for the commerce and intercourse of the world, and we desire to see the States of that region well governed and flourishing and free from the control of all foreign powers. The position we have taken we shall adhere to, that this country will not consent to the resubjugation of those States, or to the assumption and maintenance of any European authority over them.

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"The United States have acted with entire good faith in this whole matter. They have done all they could do to prevent the departure of illegal military expeditions with a view to establish themselves in that region, and at this time measures are in progress to prevent the organization and departure of another, which is said to be in preparation. Should the avowed intention of the French and British Governments be carried out and their forces be landed in Nicaragua, the measure would be sure to excite a strong feeling in this country, and would greatly embarrass the efforts of the Government to bring to a satisfactory close these Central American difficulties which have been so long pending." (MS. Inst. France, XV. 401.) Dec. 1, 1858, Gen. Cass enclosed to Mr. Lamar memoranda of certain conversations with M. Sartiges, the French minister, as well as with Lord Napier, in regard to Central America. (MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI. 22.) By these memoranda it appears that on Nov. 8, 1858, Lord Napier informed General Cass that orders had been given to the English naval force in Central America to prevent the landing of filibusters in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, if requested to do so by the governments of those states; and to prevent their landing upon any part of the Mosquito coast or at Greytown, without any application for that purpose from any local authority. Lord Napier also stated that these orders would remain in force during the negotiations of Sir W. Gore Ouseley.

On Nov. 9, the subject was renewed, when General Cass said that the United States objected to the design of the British Government to land forces in any part of Central America, (1) because it would be an exercise of dominion and a palpable violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and (2) because it would seriously complicate existing difficulties and excite a very strong feeling in the United States. It might, indeed, declared General Cass, be attended with the most serious consequences to the relations of the two countries.

Continuing, the memoranda read as follows:

"Lord Napier maintained the right of the British Government to take this measure, tho' he agreed that it might be productive of injurious consequences. He stated that he had no authority in the matter, but that he would report the representations I had made to Lord Malmesbury. He avowed his conviction, however, that his Government would inflexibly adhere to the design, as they felt it necessary to afford protection to Sir W. Gore Ouseley, while conducting negotiations with which he had been charged in that quarter. And that this was important to us as well as to England as their object was to make a fair and just treaty, which if effected would go far towards the settlement of the Central American difficulties.

Nov. 21, 1858.

"M. de Sartiges called to inform me that he had just received a letter from Count Walewski, who informed him that the British Government had applied to the French Government to send some armed vessels to St. Juan del Norte, with orders to land forces, if asked to do so by the Government of Nicaragua, to defeat the projects of the filibusters. The Government of France had assented to this application, and had ordered a naval force there, but M. de Sartiges considered the measure as intended rather as a demonstration, than with a view to actual interference.

"I told M. de Sartiges that I much regretted the course which the French Government had indicated. That it would excite much feeling in this

country, and might still more complicate the existing difficulties in that region. That this Government was doing all in its power to prevent the departure of unlawful warlike expeditions for Nicaragua, and hoped to succeed. That Lord Napier had informed me, a similar measure had been adopted by the British Government. and I had explained to his Lordship the serious objections to it, which were entertained by the United States, arising not only out of general considerations connected with the condition of the Isthmian States, and the peculiar interest the United States had in their progress and condition, but out of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which would be violated by such a proceeding on the part of Great Britian.

"I remarked to M. de Sartiges that the United States would regret to learn that any concerted arrangements have been agreed on by Great Britain and France, in relation to those regions. That tho' France was no party to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, nor bound by its stipulations, and we could not object to her right to guard her interests there, still the position which had been taken by this country against European interference was well known and had become a part of our established policy, and that any concert of action looking to the control of the Isthmus or to a protectorate, as this would be supposed to be, would be peculiarly unacceptable here. That I hoped no action would take place, for if it did it would produce great excitement in this country, and could not fail to call for the attention of the Government. I requested M. de Sartiges to communicate these views to Count Walewski and also to express the hope that the contemplated measure might yet be stopped." In an instruction to Mr. Lamar, No. 20, March 4, 1859, animadverting upon the non-ratification of the Cass-Yrisarri treaty by Nicaragua, General Cass complained that preference had been given by Nicaragua to a similar treaty with Great Britain. In this relation, Gen. Cass said: "The provision which is contained in the article of the British treaty, No. 22, as transmitted by you, which requires the United States to prevent the fitting out of armed expeditions within our borders to operate against Nicaragua, or to render assistance to any political party in that country, cannot be assented to by this Government. A similar proposal was rejected by the United States when the Cass-Irisarri treaty was negotiated, and was again rejected when proposed by General Jerez as an additional article to the treaty. It involves an offensive doubt whether this government will continue to execute in good faith the neutrality laws of the United States, although such laws have been in existence since the administration of Washington, and have always been scrupulously enforced." (MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI. 32.) In a later instruction, No. 22, April 1, 1859, General Cass directed Mr. Lamar, if, on receipt of the dispatch, the Nicaraguan Congress had adjourned without ratifying the Cass-Yrisarri treaty, or should have ratified it with the obnoxious additional article on neutrality, or if, the Congress still being in session, the treaty should not be ratified without this obnoxious article within two weeks after the receipt of the despatch, to demand his passports and return home. The Nicaraguan Government was to be informed of this and also of the fact that unless its whole course towards the United States was at once changed and reasonable redress made for injuries to citizens of the United States, the President would regard all peaceful negotiations with Nicaragua as at an end and recommend to Congress to seek redress by force. (MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI. 36.)

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Before this instruction was written, Mr. Lamar had concluded a treaty with Nicaragua which was a transcript of the Cass-Yrisarri treaty, with the addition of the modifications which Nicaragua had proposed. Mr. Lamar stated that his motive for so doing was that Sir W. Gore Ouseley had adopted these very modifications, and he thought the United States might on reconsideration accept them, since otherwise no treaty could be made. (MSS. Dept. of State.)

As to Walker's expeditions, see Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Molina, Nicaraguan min., Nov. 26, 1860, MS. Notes to Cent. Am. I. 177. The British Government disapproved the insertion by Sir W. Gore Ouseley, in his treaty with Nicaragua, of an engagement on the part of that Government to prevent the organization of filibustering expeditions in British territory against Nicaragua, and declined to ratify the treaty. not only because the article had "no real meaning so far as Great Britain and Nicaragua are concerned, except as a simple concession,' but also because it had been used by Nicaragua as the basis of an attempt to require a similar concession from the United States. (Lord

J. Russell to Sir C. L. Wyke, Aug. 15, 1859, Cor. in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, 130; 50 Br. & For. State Papers, 267.)

You will impress upon Count Walewski that we want nothing of Nicaragua which is not honorable to her, and which we have not a fair right to demand. We shall, under no circumstances, abandon the determination that the transit routes across the Isthmus shall be kept open and safe for all commercial nations." (Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, Apr. 12, 1859, MS. Inst. France, XV. 412.)

With regard to the proposal of arbitration, it may be stated that it was suggested by Lord Clarendon to Mr. Buchanan in a conversation in November 1854. Mr. Buchanan, in reply, “playfully observed that it would now be difficult to find an impartial umpire, as they had gone to war with our arbitrator, the Emperor of Russia." The subject was again mentioned by Lord Clarendon a year later, when Mr. Buchanan made the same reply. Neither Mr. Buchanan nor his Government regarded Lord Clarendon's remarks as intended to convey a formal offer of arbitration; and it appears that Mr. Crampton, who had been directed to make such an offer, overlooked that part of his instructions and failed to communicate it till the end of February 1856. (Blue Book, Corre spondence with the United States respecting Central America, 1856, 296-303.)

The subject was renewed by Mr. Crampton's successor at Washington, Lord Napier, who stated to Mr. Cass officially, although not instructed to do so, that her Majesty's Government "regarded the principle of arbitration as the ark of safety for nations differing as to the sense of treaties,” and that he did not doubt that his Government "would gladly refer the decision of all controverted points to the decision of any one of the European powers." General Cass, as reported by Lord Napier, answered that he did not repudiate the principle of arbitration on all occasions; he had invoked it, and would do so again where it seemed justly applicable; but that in the pending matter it was declined by the United States because, in the first place, the language of the treaty was so clear that in his opinion there ought not to be two opinions about it. "We say black is black," remarked Gen. Cass, "but we think that you say that black is white." Besides, said Gen. Cass, it was a mere question of the interpretation of the English language, concerning which no foreign government was so competent to decide as the United States and

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