As to the law of citizenship in various countries, the following references may be noted: Argentine Republic: For. Rel. 1882, 1. Colombia: For. Rel. 1885, 204. Costa Rica: Law of Dec. 20, 1886, For. Rel. 1887, 95. France Code Napoleon, For. Rel. 1873, 1276; Law of June 26, 1889, Great Britain: Report of Royal Commission, For. Rel. 1873, 1232. Guatemala: For. Rel. 1894, 317. Mexico: Law of May 28, 1886, For. Rel. 1886, 653; For. Rel. 1895, 1013; Netherlands: Law of July 1, 1893, For. Rel. 1893, 472. Norway: For. Rel. 1888, II, 1490–1495. Salvador: Law of Sept. 27, 1886, For. Rel. 1887, 69. Spain: Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III. 2454. Switzerland: For. Rel. 1876, 567; For. Rel. 1897, 557. Turkey Law of Jan. 19, 1869, For. Rel. 1893, 714. Venezuela: Constitution, June 12, 1893, For. Rel. 1893, 731; Moore, See, also, as to the law in many countries, Opinions of the Heads of the II. CITIZENSHIP. 1. BY BIRTH. Citizenship by birth may exist (1) by reason of birth in a particular place-i. e., jure soli, and (2) by reason of the nationality of the parents-i. e., jure sanguinis. See Cockburn on Nationality (London, 1869), 6-14; Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III. 2449 et seq. (1) BY RIGHT OF PLACE. $ 373. Common-law doctrine. "In reply to the inquiry which is made by you in the same letter whether the children of foreign parents born in the United States, but brought to the country of which the father is a subject, and continuing to reside within the jurisdiction of their father's country, are entitled to protection as citizens of the United States,' I have to observe that it is presumed that, according to the common law, any person born in the United States, unless he be born in one of the foreign legations therein, may be considered a citizen thereof until he formally renounces his citizenship. There is not, however, any United States statute containing a provision upon this subject, nor, so far as I am aware, has there been any judicial decision in regard to it." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, June 6, 1854, MS. Inst. France, As to the status of free men of color, see opinion of Mr. Marcy, in Moore, Children born in the United States of alien parents, who have never been naturalized, are native citizens of the United States. Bates, At. Gen., 1862, 10 Op. 321. See United States r. Rhodes, 1 Abb. See comment in Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. de Bounder, Belg. min., By Article III. of the convention with Great Britain of 1818 it was agreed that the Oregon territory should "be free and open 996 to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers;" and this convention was continued in force until 1846. It has been held that, during the period of joint occupation, the country, as to British subjects therein, was British soil, and subject to the jurisdiction of the King of Great Britain; that, as to citizens of the United States, it was American soil, and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and that a child born in the territory in 1823 of British subjects, was born in the allegiance of the King of Great Britain, and not in that of the United States. McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawyer, 118. "All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are Civil Rights Act. declared to be citizens of the United States.” Rev. Stats., § 1992; sec. 1, Civil Rights Act, April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject. Fourteenth amend- to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." ment. Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, pro- See Polit. Science Quarterly, V. 104; Doc. Hist. Constit. II. 783, 788. Adams, 1 Dillon, 344; Ex parte Reynolds, 18 Alb. L. J. 8; 15 Am. As to who are Indians, see In re Camille, 6 Sawyer, 541; Alberty v. As to the status of the Alaskan Indians under the modus vivendi of Oct. 20, 1899, see Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. French, Aug. 27, 1900, 247 MS. Dom. Let. 355. For the modus vivendi, see supra, § 107. See an article on Natural-born citizens of the United States, and Eligibility for the office of President, by Alex. Porter Morse, in 66 Albany Law Journal (April, 1904) 99. tions. "It results from inquiry that John Peter Harboro was born in Philadelphia, November 17, 1852, and that his father Variant construc- was not naturalized until November 6, 1860. The 14th amendment to the Constitution declares that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.' 66 This is simply an affirmance of the common law of England and of this country, so far as it asserts the status of citizenship to be fixed by the place of nativity, irrespective of parentage. The qualification, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' was probably intended to exclude the children of foreign ministers, and of other persons who may be within our territory with rights of extraterritoriality. It is, indeed, possible to read the language as meaning while or when they are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but this would denationalize all citizens, native or naturalized, the moment they entered a foreign jurisdiction. A contemporaneous exposition of this amendment was given by the 3d section of the act of Congress of July 27, 1868 (15 Stat. 224)." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Marsh, May 19, 1871, MS. Inst. Italy, I. 350. See, however, Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Willins, March 14, 1879, Ludwig Hausding was born in the United States, but during infancy was removed by his father, who was a Saxon subject, to Saxony, where he ever afterwards remained. The father subsequently became a citizen of the United States by naturalization. In 1884 Ludwig applied to the American legation in Berlin for a passport, but the legation refused to grant it on the ground that he was born of Saxon subjects, who were only temporarily in the United States, and was never" dwelling in the United States," either at the time of or since his parent's naturalization, and was not naturalized by force of section 2172, Revised Statutes. With reference to this decision the Department of State said: "Not being naturalized by force of the statute, Ludwig Hausding could only assert citizenship on the ground of birth in the United States; but this claim would, if presented, be untenable, for by section 1992, Revised Statutes, it is made a condition of citizenship by birth that the person be not subject to any foreign power. . . . Sections 1992 and 1993 of the Revised Statutes clearly show the extent of existing legislation: That the fact of birth, under circumstances implying alien subjection, establishes of itself no right of citizenship; and that the citizenship of a person so born is to be acquired in some legitimate manner through the operation of statute.' Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Kasson, min. to Germany, Jan. 15, 1885, For. Rel. 1885, 394. A youth applied to the American legation in Berne, Switzerland, in 1885, for a passport as a citizen of the United States. He was born in New York September 7, 1866, and was described as the illegitimate son of a widow originally from Switzerland, who appeared to have been residing in New York at the time of his birth. Whether her late husband was a citizen of the United States was uncertain, but when she returned to Switzerland, four years after her illegitimate son's birth, she obtained a passport from the American legation as a citizen of the United States. She resided in Switzerland till her death, and her son had also continued to live there up to the time of his application for a passport. The Department of State said that he was 66 so far a citizen of the United States" that he might, on reaching his majority, "elect which nationality he will adhere to, the United States or Switzerland," and that he was meanwhile to be considered as an American citizen residing in Switzerland, entitled to the protection of the United States and consequently to a passport. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cramer, min. to Switzerland, No inquiry seems to have been made in this case as to whether this ille- Richard Greisser was born in the United States in 1869. His father, a German subject, came to America in 1867, and in 1868 married there a Swiss lady, but in 1870, without having become a citizen of the United States or declared his intention to do so, returned to Germany, taking with him his wife and child. The Department of State said: "Richard Greisser was no doubt born in the United States, but he was on his birth subject to a foreign power and not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.' He was not, therefore, under the statute [act of 1866, R. S. § 1992] and the Constitution [XIVth Amendment] a citizen of the United States by birth; and it is not pretended that he has any other title to citizenship." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Winchester, min. to Switzerland, Decision of Supreme A child born in the United States, whose parents, though of Chinese descent and subjects of the Emperor of China, are domiciled in the United States, is a citizen of the United States by birth, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), 169 U. S. 649. For a review of the prior judicial dicta, to the effect that the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" included not only the children of diplomatic agents, but also children who bore a foreign allegiance jure sanguinis, see Moore's Am. Notes, Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 201. In the case of In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. 905, however, it was held that a child born in the United States to alien Chinese parents, who could not themselves become naturalized, was nevertheless a citizen by birth; and, if this were so, the child born of parents who were subject to no disability would a fortiori be a citizen. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wong Kim Ark, affirming the principle laid down in the case of Look Tin Sing, authoritatively settles the question as to the children of domiciled aliens. See, also, Gee Fonk Sing v. United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 146; Benny v. O'Brien (N. J.), 32 Atl. 696; Ex parte Ching King, 35 Fed. Rep. 354; Mr. Wharton, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Johnson, July 24, 1891, 182 MS. Dom. Let. 583; Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Runyon, amb. to Germany, April 19, 1895, For. Rel. 1895, I. 536; Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Denby, min. to China, May 26, 1898, For. Rel. 1898, 203. The laws restricting the immigration of Chinese are inapplicable to persons of Chinese descent who are, by birth in the United States, citizens thereof. (86 Fed. Rep. 553.) See, however, infra, § 570. In a memorandum of April 16, 1901, the Imperial German embassy drew attention to a decision of the Treasury Department of February 28, 1899, which seemed to be in conflict with the previous determinations of the Department of State, of the Attorney-General, and of the Supreme Court. By this decision it was held that a child. born in the United States of unnaturalized aliens and taken abroad by its father should, upon his return to the United States, be con |