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tion as citizens of the United States from military service, the Department of State said: "As the immigration of the persons in question and the acceptance by them of a land grant from the Haytian Government appears to have been expressly conditioned upon their becoming citizens of Hayti, the transaction must be regarded as a voluntary contract whereby the immigrant settler renounced his American citizenship and became merged in the body politic of the Haytian Republic. You will test each individual case by this rule and act accordingly, withholding the passport if the fact of the acquisition of Haytian citizenship appear."

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Powell, min. to Hayti, Dec. 1, 1899, For.

Rel. 1899, 403.
In a previous instruction to Mr. Powell, Sept. 2, 1899, Mr. Hay said :

“ It appears that the persons you describe are either persons who
have emigrated from the Southern States of the Union as settlers
in Hayti under grants of land, or the children of such settlers born
in Hayti. It therefore becomes pertinent to ascertain, if possible,
whether the grants to these colonists were conditioned upon the
assumption by them of full or qualified Ilaytian allegiance. Such
a condition is common in grants of land to immigrant settlers.
If these persons immigrated to Hayti and took up land under a con-
tractual tenure, whereby; they shared in the political concerns of the
Republic, that circumstance would, prima facie, establish an adop-
tion of a new status and an abandonment of their original status,
which would operate to give their children born in Hayti the
character of Hlaytian allegiance, but to what extent, if at all, would
depend upon the terms of their grants.” (For. Rel. 1899, 400.)
In response to this instruction Mr. Powell sent the information on
which the instruction of December 1, 1899, was based.

3. COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION.

(1) BY POLITICAL INCORPORATION.

$ 379.

The “nationality of the inhabitants of territory acquired by conquest or cession becomes that of the government under whose dominion they pass, subject to the right of election on their part to retain their former nationality by removal or otherwise, as may be provided."

Opinion of Ch. Jus. Fuller, concurred in by Justices Blatchford, Bradley,

Lamar, and Brewer, Boyd 1. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, citing United
States v. Ritchie, 17 Ilow. 525, 539; Inglis v. Trustees, 3 Pet. 99; Mcll-
vaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch, 209; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242 ;

Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303.
For examples of the collective naturalization of American Indians, see

Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94.

On the transfer of territory by one sovereign to another, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the Government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it, and while the law which may be denominated political is necessarily changed, that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals remains in force until altered by the newlycreated power of the state.

American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542; United States v. Repen

tigny, 5 Wall. 211.
As to the annexation of territory, see supra, $ 83 et seq.
See, also, Mors Status of Inhabitants of Territory acquired by Discovery,

Purchase, Cession, or Conquest, according to the Usage of the United
States, 39 Am. Law Reg. (June, 1900), 332.

By a principle of international law, on a transfer of territory by one nation to another, the political relations between the inhabitants of the ceded country and the former Government are changed, and new ones arise between them and the new Government. The manner in which this is to be effected is ordinarily the subject of treaty. The contracting parties have the right to contract to transfer and receive, respectively, the allegiance of all the native-born citizens; but the naturalized citizens, who owe allegiance purely statutory, are, when released therefrom, remitted to their original status.

Tobin v. Walkinshaw, McAllister, 186.

66

In truth, we must divide the people of the United States into two classes: those in the full enjoyment of all the rights of citizenship, and those deprived of some or all of those rights; and then we must distinguish between such of the inhabitants of the country as are citizens, and such as are subjects only, and whether capable or not of becoming citizens, yet not so at the present time. I allude, in the latter case, to the Indians, who, in some of the States, are the subjects of the State in which they exist, but who are in general subjects of the United States; and to the Africans or persons of African descent, who, being mostly of servile condition, are of course not citizens, but subjects, in reference as well to the respective States in which they reside as to the United States."

Cushing. At. Gen., Oct. 31, 1856, 8 Op. 139, 142.
Many illustrations "from the practice and legislation of Great Britain and

other foreign countries might be adduced to show that the status of the islanders as nationals, but not as citizens, has in it nothing anomalous, and that it is far more logical, as well as more just and expedient, to consider them as such rather than to treat them as

aliens. The Attorney-General of the United States in his argument in the Insular Cases suggested and ably maintained that the islanders were American subjects. That term, however, is one which is foreign to our legal system and alien to our trend of political thought. The term 'national' fits the case more accurately and bears with it no unpleasant inference of political inferiority or servitude to an individual.” (Frederic R. Coudert, jr., Our New Peoples : Citizens, Subjects, Nationals, or Aliens; Columbia Law Review, January, 1903.)

On the admission of a State into the Union, as has been done in various cases, “a collective naturalization may be effected in accordance with the intention of Congress and the people applying for admission."

Opinion of Fuller, C. J., concurred in by Justices Blatchford, Lamar, and

Brewer, Boyd r. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 170, citing Minor v. Happersett,

21 Wall. 162, 167.
See also State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682.
As to the annexation and admission of Texas, see infra, $ 103.

Inhabitants of the Territory of Nebraska at the time of its admission as a State into the Union, who had previously declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, were by the enabling act admitted to such citizenship.

Bahuaud v. Bize (1901), 105 Fed. Rep. 485, citing Boyd 1. Thayer, 143

U. S. 135.

By Art. III. of the treaty of April 30, 1803, by which France

ceded Louisiana to the United States, it was stipuLouisiana cession.

lated that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory should "be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States."

By this stipulation, citizenship of the United States was conferred on the inhabitants of the territory.

Opinion of Fuller, C. J., concurred in by Justices Blatchford, Lamar, and

Brewer, Boyd v. Thayer, 143 C. S. 135, 164, citing Dred Scott v. San-
ford, 19 How. 393, 525; Desbois' Case, 2 Martin, 185 ; United States

v. Laverty, 3 Martin, 733.
As to the annexation of Louisiana, see supra, $ 101.

All persons, inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans, at the time of its admission as a State into the Union, became thereby citizens of Louisiana and of the United States. Desbois' Case, 2 Martin, 185; United States v. Laverty, 3 Martin, 733.

Hennen's La. Dig., ed. 1861, I. 246.

“ This form relates only to those born in some foreign country who claim to be citizens solely by virtue of a residence in Louisiana at the time of the cession, or at the period when the Constitution was adopted, leaving the cases of citizenship by nativity in the United States, in Louisiana, before the cession, with residence afterwards, and by naturalization, to be proved in such other manner as may be legal and satisfactory to the public agent whose protection is required.”

Mr. Livingston, Sec. of State, to Mr. Robertson, consul at Tampico, June

29, 1831, enclosing a notice in regard to the issuance of evidences of citizenship. (3 MS. Desp. to Consuls, 341.)

By Art. VI. of the treaty of.Feb. 22, 1819, by which certain cessions

of territory were made by Spain to the United States, Florida treaty. it was stipulated that the “ inhabitants ” of the ceded territories should be “ incorporated in the Union of the United States, as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States."

See, as to the effect of this stipulation, Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511;

Contested Elections, 1834, 1835, 38 Cong. 2 sess. 41; Boyd v. Thayer,

143 U. S. 135, 168.
As to the annexation under the treaty of 1819, see supra, 102.

All persons who were citizens of Texas at the date of annexation,

viz, December 29, 1815, became citizens of the United Annexation of

States by virtue of the collective naturalization ef-
Texas.

fected by the act of that date.
Akerman, At. Gen., 1871, 13 Op. 397.
As to the annexation of Texas, see supra, & 103.

A person born in Texas and removing therefrom before the separation from Mexico remains a citizen of Mexico, though a minor when the separation took place.

Jones v. McMasters, 20 How. 8.

Inhabitants of Texas who, at the time of the annexation, were not citizens thereof, could thereafter become citizens of the United States only by the usual process of naturalization. This rule was held to apply to a minor alien, a German subject, residing in Texas at the time of the annexation, who, although he was separated from his parents, had not become a citizen of the State; and, as it did not appear that he was afterwards naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it was held that he could not assert a claim in that character.

Contzen v. United States (1900), 179 U. S. 191, affirming the judgment of The constitution of Texas provides that “all persons (Africans, the

the court below.

descendants of Africans, and Indians excepted) who were residing in Texas on the day of the declaration of independence shall be considered citizens of the republic.” The date of the declaration of independence was March 2, 1836. Held, that an alien who became a resident in 1815, a few months before the annexation of Texas to the United States, did not thereby become a citizen of the United States. (Contzen 1. United States, 33 ('t. CI. 475.)

By section 4 of the act of Congress of April 30, 1900,“ to provide

a government for the Territory of Hawaii," "all perAnnexation of

sons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on Hawaii.

August 12, 1898," the day of the formal transfer of sovereignty to the United States, were “ declared to be citizens of the United States and citizens of the Territory of Hawaii; " and it was further provided that “all citizens of the United States resident in the Hawaiian Islands who were resident there on or since August 12, 1898, and all the citizens of the United States who shall hereafter reside in the Territory of Hawaii for one year, shall be citizens of the Territory of Hawaii.

31 Stat. 141.
By section 100 of the same act, the naturalization laws of the United

States are extended to Hawaii.

Under sec. 4 of the act of April 30, 1900, Chinese persons born or naturalized in the Hawaiian Islands previously to Aug. 12, 1898, and who have not since lost their citizenship, are citizens of the United States; and the wife and children of such persons are entitled to enter the United States by virtue of the citizenship of the husband and father.

Griggs, At. Gen., Jan. 16, 1901, 23 Op. 315; Griggs, At. Gen., Jan. 16, 1901,

23 Op. 352. This opinion is followed in Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. (onger, min. to

China, Dec. 21, 1901, For. Rel. 1901, 1:30–132.

By Art. IX. of the treaty of peace between the United States and

Spain of Dec. 10, 1898, it was provided that “the Porto Rico and the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitPhilippines.

ants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.” Pending legislation by Congress on the subject, it was held that native inhabitants of Porto Rico temporarily sojourning abroad might be registered as such in the legations and consulates of the United States, and were when so registeret entitled to “ official protection ” “ in all matters where a citizen, of the United States similarly situated would be entitled thereto,” care being taken to have it appear that they were“ protected

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