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school, will be admitted to Russian allegiance should they desire to do so within the succeeding year after they shall have attained their majority.'

“ This provision appears to be permissive, not compulsory, and to contemplate that persons born in Russia of alien parents, may, under certain specified circumstances, make election of Russian citizenship, and thereupon be admitted to such citizenship by some formal act of naturalization.

“ The precedents you have examined would seem to have led you into the misapprehension that the theory of dual allegiance during minority is involved, requiring formal option between two conflicting claims. This is, indeed, the case according to the municipal law of certain countries.

“ The French rule is typical, and under it'a person born in France of alien parents and domiciled in France at the time of reaching majority, is allowed one year after attaining majority to elect to retain the citizenship of his parents. In default of so doing at the expiration of that period, and if retaining French domicil, he is to be deemed a citizen of France. (Foreign Relations, 1891, pp. 493, 494.)

“ The contrast between the two rules is clear. In France, upon the expiration of the probationary year following majority, the domiciled alien loses his right to elect the status of his parents. In Russia, as explained to you by the Russian minister, if the election of Russian citizenship be not availed of within the prescribed year, the person loses his right to become a Russian subject.

“ The law of the United States does not, as you seem to suppose, provide for option of American citizenship by persons situated as you represent the Powers brothers to be circumstanced. By section 1993 of the Revised Statutes the children born abroad to citizens of the United States are declared to be citizens, with the sole exception that such citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States. The precedents you quote contemplate recognition of a formal option, only in the cases where a conflict of laws arises under the legislation of the foreign country of birth and sojourn. In Russia, however, it appears that such conflict does not arise, and that in the event of not acquiring Russian status in the permitted way, the persons in question will be regarded after attaining majority as lawful citizens of the United States."

Mr. Adee, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Coombs, min. to Japan, April 28,

1893, For. Rel. 1893, 401. Mr. Coombs, in a dispatch of March 21, 1893, to which Mr. Adee's instruc

tion is a reply, pointed out, as the result of a consultation with his Russian colleague, an error in the translation of the foregoing pro

vision of the Russian law, as printed in the Report of the British Royal Commission of 1869 on Naturalization and Allegiance, and reprinted in For. Rel. 1873, II. 1288. (For. Rel. 1893, 393.)

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An application having been made for a passport for a youth of seventeen, whose father desired to send him to Germany as a student, the Department of State said: “The young man referred to, under the Constitution of the United States, having been born in this country, is, while subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, a citizen of the United States notwithstanding the fact of his father being an alien. As such citizen he is entitled to a passport. This, of course, would be a sufficient protection to him in every other country but that of his father's origin-Germany. There, of course, as the son of a German subject, it may be claimed that he is subject to German military law, and that, not being then subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, he can not claim the rights secured to him by the 14th amendment to the Constitution. It is proper, therefore, that I should add, in the interest of young Mr. J that it will be perilous for him to visit Germany at present."

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. O'Neill, M. C., Aug. 8, 1892, 143

MS. Dom. Let. 270.
See, to the same effect, Mr. Hunter, Second Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr.

Ford, Nov. 18, 1881, 139 MS. Dom. Let. 604.

In Sept., 1878, M. S., the wife of J. A., of the canton of Luzerne, Switzerland, came to the United States with Joseph H., also a Switzer. In April, 1879, she gave birth to a son, who was baptized as the son of Joseph H. Meanwhile, divorce proceedings were instituted in Switzerland by J. A., who obtained a decree of divorce from M. S., in contumaciam, shortly after the birth of the son. In August, 1880, M. S. died, and Joseph II. took the child to his home, in the canton of Aargau, Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Council held that the child was a citizen of Luzerne, presumably because it was born before the decree of divorce was granted. The canton of Luzerne, however, suggested that the child was a citizen of the United States, and the question was referred to the American legation, with a view to the issuance of a passport to the child as an American citizen. The legation declined to issue a passport, and its action was approved.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cramer, No. 36, June 4, 1883,

MS. Inst. Switz. II. 178.

“I have received your No. 418, of the 8th ultimo, respecting an application for a passport made by Ludwig Henckel, who states he was born in St. Louis, Mo., January 10, 1874. He was taken in 1875 to Venezuela by his father, who claims to have previously declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and who, on January 13, 1882, was appointed consular agent of the United States at San Cristobal, Venezuela. After thirty years' absence, the father returned to Hanover, his native city, taking the son with him. The latter, it appears, is now serving an apprenticeship at Hamburg, and at its expiration, three years hence, ' declares it to be his intention to return to America to reside.'

"Notwithstanding the alienage of the father the son is by birth a citizen of the United States. His absence from the country during minority and while under the control of his father should not be counted too strongly against him, “especially in view of the fact that he declares his intention of returning to this country to reside after the completion of his apprenticeship. If he will take the necessary oath to that effect he would seem to come substantially within this rule and a passport may be issued to him. In issuing him a passport, however, it is proper that the legation should inform him that it does not guarantee him against any claim which may be asserted to his allegiance or service by the Government of Germany while he remains in that country. Ilaving been born of a German father, conflicting claims with respect thereto may arise, which it is not the purpose of this Government by the issuance of a passport to in anywise prejudice."

Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, min. to Germany, May 3, 1892,

For. Rel. 1892, 189. See Mr. Phelps' No. 418, id. 184.
Similar views were expressed in the case of Alexander Block, id. 184,

188, 191.
The child born to an alien in the United States loses his citizenship on

leaving the United States and returning to his parent's allegiance, (Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. O'Neill, Nov. 15, 1881—139 MS. Dom. Let. 572.)

While a person born in the United States, though of alien parents, is by the laws thereof a citizen, yet, should he be taken by his parents while a minor to the country of which they are subjects, he becomes amenable to the laws of that country and subject to a claim of allegiance thereunder jure sanguinis. On this ground the Department of State refused to issue a passport for the protection of a minor, born in the United States, whose parents proposed to return with him " for a brief period” to the country (Russia) of which they were subjects.

Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Seely, March 9, 1893, 190 MS. Dom.

Let. 553.

On the other hand, a passport was issued to a minor, born in the United

States, whose father had been naturalized as a Russian subject, with a warning that he too might be regarded by the Russian Government as its subject should he voluntarily enter that country. (Ur. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Foote, Jan. 14, 1894, 200 MS. Dom. Let. 247.)

O. H. R., was born in Baltimore, Md., August 21, 1860, of German parents, who four years later returned to Germany, taking him with them. He remained in Germany till 1881, when he was examined for military service, and, being found then to be unfit for it, was ordered to appear the next year. He then left for America, where he had since resided. The Department of State said: “Upon this state of facts you are under our laws a citizen of the United States, by reason of your birth in this country, but by the German law you are a subject of Germany. Should you voluntarily place yourself again within German jurisdiction, this Government would not be warranted in intervening to protect you from trial and punishment for violation of the military laws of that country.”

Mr. Uhl, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Rudolph, May 22, 1895, 202 MS. Dom.

Let. 298.
Roberto J. J. Pinto was born of Costa Rican parents at San Francisco,

Cal., in 1879. His parents resided in California about six years.
When he was three years of age they returned to Costa Rica, where
they had ever since remained and where the son was reared and
educated. He did not speak English and had never been registered
at the United States consulate as a person claiming its protection.
In 1899, when twenty years of age, he was called upon, in accordance
with the law of Costa Rica, to perform military drill. On these
facts it was held by the Department of State that the youth was
entitled to a passport and protection as a citizen of the United
States, as well as to exemption from military service, under article 9
of the treaty between the United States and Costa Rica of 1851,
which exempts the citizens of the one country in the territory of
the other from all compulsory military service whatsoever. This
decision was placed by the Department of State on the following
ground : “ He [Pinto] was born in the United States, and no prin-
ciple is better settled than that birth in the United States, irrespec-
tive of the nationality of the parents, confers American citizenship.
The right of election of nationality, which it is generally conceded
a person born under such circumstances has, cannot be exercised
until he attains his majority. The father cannot by any act of his
alter the status conferred upon the son by his birth in this country.
The United States circuit court in Ex parte Chin King (35 Fed. Rep.
35+) said : “In my judgment a father cannot deprive his minor child
of the status of American citizenship impressed upon it by the cir-
cumstances of its birth under the Constitution and within the juris-
diction of the United States. This status, once acquired, can only
be lost or changed by the act of the party when arrived at majority,

and the consent of the Government.'" (Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to

Mr. Merry, min. to Costa Rica, Oct. 25, 1889, For, Rel. 1899, 588, 589.) As the statement above quoted, from the opinion in Ex parte Chin King,

formed in Pinto's case, as it seems to have done less pointedly in certain nearly contemporaneous but less obvious instances, the basis of a departure from what had seemed to be the settled law in regard to double allegiance, it is proper to point out that the statement of the court contained nothing new, unless indeed the court intended, by the phrase " consent of the Government,” to deny the force in the United States of the act of Congress of 1868. It is possible, however, that the phrase was somewhat loosely employed, and if so, the statement contains nothing of special moment, so far at least as the present question is concerned. On the contrary, the legal inability of the parent to deprive his child of his natural allegiance or natural allegiances is itself the foundation of the doctrine of double allegiance in such cases. The father, however, as the head of the family—an institution which it is the policy of all civilized states to preserve-possesses, under normal conditions, as a necessary incident of the parental relation, the power to control the movements and regulate the domicil and national character of his minor children; and if the child, while living under the protection of his home government, is required to perform the duties of allegiance to it, there is in such requirement no denial, express or implied, that he may possess a double nationality. By the laws of the United States the minor children of a naturalized citizen are, if dwelling in the United States, citizens thereof by virtue of the parents' naturalization. It is believed that no objection has ever been made to the United States enforcing, within its own jurisdiction, either this legislation or the rule, also embodied in its laws, of citizenship

by birth jure sanguinis. For the use, on other occasions about the same time, of language similar

to that employed in Pinto's case, see For. Rel. 1899, 760, 762 ; 1901, 532. These rulings stand, together with that in Pinto's case, by

themselves, and have not since been followed. It may be remarked that the question of protection in cases of double

allegiance cannot be determined off-hand by fixed presumptions, since by the law of the particular country in which the question arises a preference may be given during minority to the one source of nationality over the other.

Dec. 31, 1896, the American ambassador at Berlin requested the discharge from the Prussian military service of one Alfred Meyer. He stated that Meyer was born at Baltimore, Md., Dec. 16, 1875, and that his father was a naturalized citizen of the United States.

The German Government, March 14, 1897, denied that the elder Meyer was naturalized in the United States, and stated that as Alfred Meyer had returned with his father to Germany in 1879 and had since resided there, with the exception of a visit to Switzerland in 1895, he was to be considered a Prussian subject, even though he was by birth also an American citizen. Reference was made to a note of Jan. 15, 1886, in the case of Henry Rabien, as showing that

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