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naturalization, it must be obvious that the obligations of the United States to protect and defend the interests of such a person, in controversies originating in foreign countries, and against the rights of their jurisdiction, can not be supposed to bind them to the same extent at which it might be proper to interpose in behalf of our resident or native citizens. Whatever imperfections may be supposed to exist in the modes of administering justice at Tunis, a merchant who, in the exercise of his own discretion, engages in commercial speculations there must be prepared to take the chances of arbitrary decision to which they are liable, nor is it consistent with any principle of natural or national law, that a country, with which a merchant has no other relation than that of his having once obtained an act of naturalization from its records, should be involved in contest and perhaps entangled in war with another nation for the settlement to his satisfaction of his private transactions of trade."
Mr. John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Shaler, (onsul-general to
Algiers, No. 1, Jan. 13, 1818, 2 MS. Desp. to ('ousuls, 85). “ They [the United States] have no means of judging of the merits of
the controversy, as a question between individuals; neither is it understood that a foreigner, altho' once naturalized as a citizen of the United States but having long since finally left this country without intention of returning to it, can claim the protection of this nation in the tates of Barbary. Should any question in this case hereafter OC'e'ur', it is to be distinctly stated that it is one in which the Gorernment of the United States has taken no part, has no concern, and will not suffer to be made the occasion of any demand from the Bey whatever." (Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Stith, consul :t Tunis, May 27, 1819, 2 MS. Desp. to (onsuls, 164.)
"After his naturalization here, if indeed he was naturalized, he returned to his native country to reside (for Cuba is a part of Spain), went into public employment there, and reestablished his domicil. His native allegiance may therefore be considered as having reverted. Spain could well claim him as one of her subjects, and treat him is such, without the United States being in a condition, if they had the disposition, to question her right to do so."
Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Gadsden, min. to Mexico, No. 51, Oct. 22,
1855, MS. Inst. Mexico, XVII. 54.
“ Mr. Webster states: “It can admit of no doubt that the naturalization laws of the United States contemplate the residence in the country of naturalized citizens, unless they shall go abroad in the public service or for temporary purposes. In this opinion I fully concur.
Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Marshi, min. to Italy, Jan. 21, 1863, US.
Inst. Italy, I. 171, referring to the return of naturalized American citizens of Italian origin to their native country “with the evident intention of taking up their abode" there.
The passage quoted from Mr. Webster is in Mr. Webster, Sec. of State,
to Mr. Porter, min. to Turkey, Aug. 26, 1842, MS. Inst, Turkey, I. 295.
“If a Prussian subject after having been naturalized as an American citizen resumes his permanent residence in his native land we cannot deny that he also resumes his original allegiance and loses his quality of American citizen. If it is his intention permanently to reside in Prussia the obligations of a Prussian subject attach to him the moment he touches the Prussian territory. What the intention is must be gathered from facts."
Mr. E. Peshine Smith, examiner of claims, to Mr. Hance, Jan. 21, 1867, 75
MS. Dom. Let., 185.
“ Naturalization is intended for the benefit of those who have the intention of residing at present and not prospectively in the United States.”
Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Redinond, April 3, 1869, 80 MS. Dom. Let.,
“ If Mr. Medina was ever a citizen, which appears to be doubtful from the records of this Department, he has lost his citizenship by accepting office from his native country. The passport cannot be renewed."
Mr. J. C. B. Davis, Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Weile, consul at Guaya
quil, April 18, 1870, 57 MS. Desp. to Consuls, 300.
“In respect to naturalized citizens of the United States, resident in Ecuador, but not natives of that country, who left this country under circumstances indicating that they obtained naturalization, not with a view to permanent residence here, but for the purpose of claiming the protection of this Government in foreign countries, the reasoning and the instructions contained in the circular of October 14, 1869, are applicable in a general sense. They have not, however, quite the same force and emphasis as in the case of naturalized citizens returning to the country of their native allegiance. There is not the same presumption that when they go to their native land it is with the intention of establishing an abiding domicil. Moreover, the Government under whose jurisdiction they dwell cannot claim, as in the other case, that they revert to their native allegiance, but can only claim that local and temporary allegiance which every one owes to the Government whose protection he enjoys." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Wing, Apr. 6, 1871, MS. Inst. Ecuador,
For an extract from the circular of Oct. 14, 1869, see Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Motley, min. to England, infra, $ 475.
Where the subject is not regulated by treaty, no distinction can be made, with respect to protection abroad, between naturalized and
H. Doc. 551—vol 3- 17
native-born citizens of the United States. The domiciliation of a naturalized citizen of the United States in his native country would not of itself deprive him of his right to the protection of this Government.
Williams, At. Gen., 1873, 14 Op. 295.
Phillimore, Int. Law (3d ed.), 451; Lawrence, Com. sur Droit Int.,
“ Continuous absence from this country does not necessarily presume expatriation. It has always been held to be consistent with a purpose of returning; and in the case of a natural-born citizen, or of a naturalized citizen, so residing in any country, except the country of his nativity, this Department would require its agents to extend the protection of the Government to all citizens, except in the presence of strong affirmative proof of a purpose of expatriation. But when a naturalized citizen returns to his native land to reside, the action of the treaty-making power above referred to would seem to require that such agents be jealous and scrutinizing when he seeks their intervention. Even in such case the purpose of not renouncing the adopted citizenship might be manifested and proved in various ways, such as the payment of an income tax when such a tax was imposed, the maintenance of a domicil, and the payment of taxes on personal property within the United States, or other affirmative action.
It is the duty of the diplomatic and consular agents of the United States to listen to all facts which may be produced tending to exclude the presumption of expatriation, and to give to them the weight to which in each case they may be entitled.”
Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Washburne, min. to France, June 28, 1873,
For. Rel. 1873, I. 256, 260. “I am of opinion that the entrance into the civil service of the country of his nativity by a naturalized citizen of the United States, who has returned to that country, and continues his residence there beyond the length of time at which, by convention between the two States, the intent not to return to the country of adoption may be held to exist, must be taken to be very strong evidence of the absence of intent to return,' and must raise a presumption, which might, and probably would, make it very difficult for the country of adoption to assert the continued citizenship of the party thus taking service and continuing to reside in the country of his nativity."
Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Müller, Jan. 28, 1874, 101 MS. Dom. Let. 222.
A naturalized citizen of the United States can not be regarded as renouncing his United States citizenship merely because he returns to his native land. To sustain such renunciation, there must be either an
express declaration of renunciation, or acts from which it may be logically inferred.
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Osborne, June 19, 1882, MS. Inst.
Arg. Rep. XVI. 238; same to same, July 18, 1883, id. 275.
Payment of taxes in the United States by a naturalized absentee, on his interest in a business agency there, such payment being made by him as a trader and not as a citizen, will not sustain a claim of retention of American nationality.
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cramer, No. 12, Nov. 14, 1882,
MS. Inst. Switz. II. 152.
“ There may be circumstances that amount to a renunciation of the citizenship acquired by naturalization; returning to the country of one's nativity to reside there and continuing such residence there for an indefinite time, without manifesting any intention to return to the United States, would be evidence tending to show an intentional surrender of the rights of American citizenship.”
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Herdocia, Dec. 8, 1882, 144 MS.
Dom. Let. 623
Abandonment of naturalization in the United States may be inferred from a protracted stay in the country of origin after returning there, coupled with proof of animus manendi, and of entering on political duties in the latter country.
Mr. Davis, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Taft, Jan. 18, 1883, MS. Inst.
Austria, III. 224.
In 1883 "a native-born citizen of the Argentine Republic who had come to the United States many years before and been naturalized here, returned to his native country and resided there for a number of years without intention, expressed or manifested, of returning to this his adopted country. He sought the protection of this Government, but it was held that the facts were sufficient to show that he had resumed his native allegiance to the Argentine Government and he was not entitled to the protection of this country.”
Mr. J. Davis, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Barnett, consul at Paramaribo,
Aug. 20, 1884, 111 MS. Inst. Consuls, 413.
“Nor does this Government concur in the proposition that a naturalized citizen of the United States can have such citizenship extinguished solely by residence, however protracted, in the country of his origin. The question of his loss of such citizenship is to be determined by the intent of the party, to be in ferred from his acts and all the surrounding circumstances of the case, and is not to be conclusively settled by mere lapse of time or term of residence in the country of his origin. We maintain this as a rule of international interpretation of naturalization treaties, and in the case of Germany have lately held that two years' stay creates only a presumption of abandonment of the acquired citizenship, which is open to rebuttal."
Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Winchester, May 17, 1886, MS. Inst.
Switzerland, II. 311. See, also, Mr. Porter, Acting Sec. of State, to
“ Your dispatch, No. 193, of the 1st instant, in reference to the application of Albert Landau for a passport, has been received.
“ In the attached memorial Mr. Landau alleges that he was duly naturalized in Philadelphia during the year 1854, and that subsequently in the same year, having obtained a passport from this Department, he returned to Europe. During the following year, it is alleged, he lost both his record of naturalization and his passport, but obtained another passport from the legation at Constantinople. This was subsequently canceled when a new passport was given him by the consul-general at Alexandria, Egypt, in 1863; the latter passport he is unable to produce. He has not, apparently, visited the United States since 1854. He now desires a new passport to be issued to him by your legation.
“It is not necessary to consider whether naturalization can be proved by parole, in case of destruction of the record, for in this case there is no adequate proof that the record of naturalization ever existed. But even supposing that Mr. Landau's naturalization were duly proven, I hold that he is not now entitled to a passport. He was naturalized, so he claims, in 1854, at Philadelphia. He was in the Levant in 1857, and there amassed a fortune, with which, about 1868, he retired to Vienna. During the whole of this period, according to his own statement, he was absent from the United States. This absence, therefore, commencing almost at the instant of his naturalization, continued over thirty-four years, during which time he performed none of the duties, nor made any of the contributions, of a citizen to the support or welfare of the country of his adoption, although during a portion of that time all the resources of that country were severely drawn upon. Had he paid an income tax, as by law he should have done if he retained his citizenship during the period when that tax was imposed, it would be easy for him to establish such payment. No attempt has been made to do so, and we must therefore presume that no such tax was paid. Had he paid taxes to the State of Pennsylvania, in which it is to be in ferred from his statements he claims to have been domiciled, this also could be easily proved; and that no such proof is offered justifies the presumption that none of such taxes were paid. He keeps exempt from all taxation in this country the wealth he has accumulated, under