CARRIERS-Continued.
acceptance of the plums, and demanding a reduction of $50
in the price, and plaintiff neglected to inquire of the bank
handling the draft for the purchase price as to whether it
had been paid, the defendant is not estopped to deny deliv-
ery, in an action for consequent loss, by reason of a telegram
to its agent that the car had arrived and been delivered, be-
ing merely a reply to the telegram giving information of
shipment and directions to notify consignee. Id.
3. A carrier of passengers may agree with one of several persons
engaged in the business of transferring baggage and passen-
gers by vehicle at the terminus of the railway, to furnish a
pass on its trains and permit him to solicit business thereon,
refusing like privileges to his competitors, without violating
the statute forbidding discrimination. 2 Comp. Laws, § 6266.
Dingman v. Duluth, etc., R. Co., 328.
4. The carrier has a right to provide facilities for the transfer of
baggage for its passengers, and to protect them against an-
noyance from solicitation of competing agents. Id. 329.
5. Only undue or unreasonable discrimination is unlawful with-
in the provisions of 24 U. S. Stat. 379 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
p. 3154). Id.
6. It was not a fatal variance under a declaration charging that
after plaintiff stepped on the lower step of the car the de-
fendant's servants suddenly started the car forward and
threw him off, to show by the testimony that the car had
started in the usual way, and, as he was stepping on the sec-
ond step, it suddenly increased the speed and threw him to
the ground. Formiller v. Detroit United Ry., 653.
7. Whether plaintiff's injury resulted from the sudden accelera-
tion of the car or from the starting of it, was for the jury,
under evidence which might support conflicting inferences.
Id. 654.
8. A request defining the act of boarding a car was unnecessary,
and was also properly refused as incorrect. Id.
9. The court did not err in charging the jury that plaintiff was
entitled to an opportunity to come to a place of safety on the
car, before it was started. Id.
See EVIDENCE (8); RAILROADS (1, 3).
CASE MADE-See APPEAL AND ERROR (4).
CERTIORARI-See APPEAL AND ERROR (10); EMINENT DOMAIN
(2); JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (2, 3, 5); MANDAMUS (1, 2).
CHANCERY PRACTICE-See APPEAL AND ERROR (15, 16, 20);
EQUITY (5).
CHANCERY RULES-See APPEAL AND ERROR (16).
CHARGE OF COURT-See DAMAGES (19); NUISANCE; TRIAL (12).
CHARTER REVISION See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9); ELEO-
TIONS (1); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1, 2).
CHARTERS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8, 9); MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATIONS (1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 12).
CHEMICAL ANALYSIS-See CRIMINAL LAW (16).
CHOSES IN ACTION-See GIFTS (2, 3).
CIRCUIT JUDGES See ELECTIONS (2).
CITIES-See ELECTIONS (1).
CIVIL-DAMAGE LAW-See DAMAGES (11-17).
CLAIMS-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (2); MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS (6, 15).
CLEAN HANDS-See DIVORCE (4).
CLERKS-See INTOXICATING LIQUORS (12, 13).
CLERKS OF COURTS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (4).
CLOSING ESTATES-See TRUSTS (8).
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.
1. Under sections 7 and 8, Art. 11, Const. of 1909, the State board
of agriculture has exclusive control of the general funds of
the Michigan agricultural college. Per OSTRÄNDER, C. J., and
MOALVAY and BLAIR, JJ. Bauer v. State Board of Agri-
culture, 415.
2. It is within the power the board to appropriate such general
funds for the purpose of constructing a building upon the
college grounds, to be leased to the United States for a post
office. Per OSTRANDER, C. J., and MCALVAY and BLAIR, JJ.
Id.
See MANDAMUS (5).
COMMISSIONER OF STREETS-See PUBLIC OFFICERS (2).
COMMISSIONS-See ACCOUNTING; BROKERS.
COMMITMENT-See CRIMINAL LAW (8).
COMMON COUNCIL-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3, 4, 14, 17).
COMMON LAW See APPEAL AND ERROR (11); CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1).
COMPENSATION-See MASTER AND SERVANT (3).
COMPETENCY See CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS (1); Evi-
DENCE (1, 4); WITNESSES (1).
COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT.
1. In an action of assumpsit for breach of a contract, an offer of
compromise which was shown by the evidence, and which
was a substantial compliance with the contract alleged in
plaintiff's declaration, but was not treated by the party mak-
ing the offer as a tender, and was made only for the purpose
COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT-Continued.
of avoiding litigation, being accepted by plaintiff and then
withdrawn by defendant, did not constitute a tender, or a
sufficient defense to plaintiff's cause of action. McIntire v.
Carr, 37.
2. The trial court did not err in refusing to decide, as a matter
of law, whether rent which defendant sought to recoup had
been paid by plaintiff and his deceased partner, where the
evidence tended to show that defendant executed a mortgage
to deceased containing a clause by which deceased was
authorized to collect the rent of the premises and apply on
the mortgage debt, that deceased and his partner went into
possession, and that subsequently a settlement took place,
whereby defendant deeded the premises to decedent for a
specified consideration, greater in amount than the debt re-
maining due. Trudeau v. Boivin, 665.
3. Although the court technically erred in charging the jury
that they were to determine whether the defendant had sus-
tained, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the rent
was not included in the settlement, the testimony showing a
compromise, tended to raise a presumption of fact that the
rent was taken into consideration in the settlement, and as
it was not contradicted by other evidence, the error was
not prejudicial when considered with the remainder of the
charge. Id. 666.
COMPUTATION OF LIENS See MECHANICS' LIENS (4).
CONCLUSIONS-See EVIDENCE (2); HUSBAND AND WIFE (4);
MASTER AND Servant (19).
CONDEMNATION-See EMINENT DOMAIN (1).
CONDONATION-See DIVORCE (2); HUSBAND AND WIFE (5).
CONDUCT OF ACCUSED-See CRIMINAL Law (1).
CONDUCT OF PROSECUTOR-See CRIMINAL LAW (15).
CONFESSIONS-See CRIMINAL LAW (2).
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS See CANCELLATION OF INSTRU-
MENTS (2); INJUNCTION (1); QUIETING TITLE.
CONSENT-See TENANCY IN COMMON (8).
CONSEQUENT DAMAGES—See DAMAGES (1).
CONSIDERATION See CONTRACTS (2); MASTER AND SERVANT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, pre-
serves to the people rights which were enjoyed under the
common law, and guarantees such exercise of governmental
power as is sanctioned by settled maxims of law, under such
164 MICH.-46.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those
maxims prescribe. People v. Dickerson, i48.
2. The preparation for and conduct of criminal proceedings by
the prosecuting attorney are acts executive and administra-
tive in character. Id. 149.
3. The prosecuting attorney is a constitutional officer whose
executive duties may not be conferred by the legislature on
the judiciary. Id.
4. Section 3 of Act No. 175, Pub. Acts 1905, providing for the ap-
pointment of expert witnesses by the court in cases of homi-
cide, is unconstitutional, since the act of appointment is in
no sense a judicial act, is carried out without notice to re-
spondent or the prosecuting attorney, since the names of the
witnesses are not indorsed on the information, and the ac-
cused is prevented from knowing the names of witnesses who
will testify against him, and since the experts receive a cer-
tificate of candor, ability, and truthfulness not given to any
other witnesses in the case. Id.
5. Under sections 23 and 24, Art. 8, Constitution of 1909, munici-
pal corporations are permitted to issue bonds for the pur-
chase or acquisition of public utilities in excess of the limi-
tation upon general bonded indebtedness, the excess to be
secured only by the property purchased, without creating
a debt against the municipality. Attorney General, ex rel.
Hudson, v. Com. Council of City of Detroit, 369.
6. None of the provisions of the Constitution prohibit the use
of both kinds of bonds, within the limitations prescribed. Id.
7. Unless the bonds issued upon such public utility create an in-
debtedness on the part of the city, in excess of the prescribed
limit, they violate no provision of the Constitution and there-
fore Act No. 279, Pub. Acts 1909, permitting the issuance of
such nonliability bonds, without limit, is valid. If, however,
they should become an indebtedness of the city, the extent
of such indebtedness is limited by the act to four per centum
of the assessed value of the property. Id.
8. Act No. 279, Pub. Acts 1909, is not unconstitutional for failing
to give the electors of municipalities part in framing amend-
ments to the charter; for the Constitution does not purport
to point out the method by which amendments shall be
framed, and, although it delegates the power to electors to
amend their charter, indirect means of proposing the amend-
ment were properly provided for by the act, which permits
twenty per centum of the electors to initiate amendments. Id.
9. No test forbidden by section 2, Art. 16, Const. of 1909, is im-
posed by a statutory requirement that members of a municipal
charter commission shall have a residence of three years in
the municipality (Act No. 279, Pub. Acts 1909), such require-
ment being merely a special qualification. Attorney General,
ex rel. Selby, v. Macdonald, 590.
See COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1).
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS-See TRUSTS (4).
CONTRACTS.
1. Allegations of a declaration state a cause of action where the
pleading shows that defendant agreed with plaintiff to form
a corporation and transfer certain stock to plaintiff, and give
him an interest in other stock in consideration of his associ-
ating himself in the enterprise, that plaintiff entered upon
the performance of his part of the agreement, and that the
business had been conducted profitably, but defendant had
refused and neglected, although often requested, to perform
the said contract. McIntire v. Carr, 37.
2. Where defendants, while constructing sidewalks for plaintiff,
were notified that the work was being improperly done, and
on presenting a bill for same were refused payment, and later
secured acceptance of the work and payment by giving a writ-
ten guaranty; held that there was a good consideration for
the guaranty. A. M. Campau Realty Co. v. Lenhardt, 83.
3. A contract is not made so long as both parties contemplate the
doing of something in addition to what they have done, to
establish contract relations; nor does the law make a con-
tract when the parties intend none, or regard as complete an
arrangement which the parties regard as incomplete. Central
Bitulithic Paving Co. v. Village of Highland Park, 224.
4. Under the provisions of 1 Comp. Laws, § 2836, requiring the
collection of special assessments before making the improve-
ment for which it is levied, where a village, by resolution,
accepts a bid for paving and directs the mayor to execute a
contract in accordance therewith, but fails to provide by a
sufficient assessment for the cost of the improvement, and,
on finding that such assessment would exceed the legal limit,
rescinds its previous action, no valid contract is shown to
have been intended by the parties or completed, although the
contractor thereafter proceeded to complete the work under
its contract. Id.
5. A contract will not be implied to pay for care and services
rendered without expectation of recompense by one member
to another member of the family, who was incompetent to
make a valid contract. Heller Aller Co. v. Ries, 501.
6. It was error to direct a verdict for defendant, in an action of
assumpsit for the support and education of defendant's
daughter, which plaintiff testified that he provided on the
assurance of defendant that plaintiff should be repaid. Boyer
v. Joyal, 662.
See APPEAL AND ERROR (9); ASSIGNMENTS; BROKERS (1);
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES; COMPROMISE AND SETTLE-
MENT (1); DEEDS (2); DRUGGISTS (2); Frauds, StatUTE OF
(1, 2); HUSBAND AND WIFE (6-8); MECHANICS' LIENS (1-3);
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (7, 13, 14, 16); NEGLIGENCE (5);
PARTNERSHIP (6); PUBLIC OFFICERS; WORK AND LABOR.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
A request to charge that plaintiff could not recover if her in-
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