DAMAGES-Continued.
17. Without the offer of substantive proof that she suffered actual
damages, or damages from injury to feelings, the plaintiff
should be limited to the minimum fixed by statute. Id.
18. Where plaintiff offered evidence that deceased could do no
more during the second year after his injury than the first,
and his testimony on a prior trial tended to show the extent
of his damages, and where the court charged that no recov-
ery could be allowed for the period after the death of dece-
dent, or for disability caused by his last sickness, which did
not result from his injuries, or for shortening his life, or for
pain and suffering caused by his last sickness, it was not
error to permit the jury to determine the loss subsequent to
the first trial of the cause. Rouse v. Michigan United R. Co.,
476.
19. That instructions to the jury on the question of damages were
of a general character, does not require the reversal of the
case, if they were correct and no requests for more specific
instructions were presented. Lewis v. Detroit Vitrified
Brick Co., 490.
20. A proper rule for determining the present worth of plaintiff's
damages was that the damages should not exceed a sum
which, put at five per cent. simple interest for the period de-
termined as the expectancy of decedent, would amount to
the damages which they might find plaintiff entitled to;
when the charge was illustrated by an example based upon
the sum of $1,000, divided by 1.05 for one year, 1.10 for two
years, 1.15 for three years, etc. Rivers v. Bay City Traction
& Electric Co., 697.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (6); TRIAL (8).
DAMS-See NAVIGABLE WATERS (3-6).
DEATH-See ABATEMENT AND Revival; Damages (10); HUSBAND
AND WIFE (9-11); MASTER AND SERVANT (1, 16); NEGLIGENCE
(2); RAILROADS (5).
DEATH ACT-See ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.
DECREE-See APPEAL AND ERROR (20); COURTS (1); FORECLOS-
See GIFTS (9); HOMESTEADS (1);
URE.
DECREE MODIFIED-See COSTS.
DEED AS MORTGAGE - See MECHANICS' LIENS (2); MORTGAGES
(1, 2).
DEEDS.
1. The grantee in a quitclaim deed is not a bona fide purchaser
and takes no more interest than the grantor has to convey.
Pellow v. Arctic Iron Co., 89.
2. An oral agreement between a wife and her husband that if he
DEEDS-Continued.
would secure $200 for her use, she would deed to him certain
real property, under which arrangement he borrowed money,
caused the wife to deed her property to the parties making
the advancement, and caused them to execute a land con-
tract to him, is void and conveys no title to the husband
under 3 Comp. Laws, § 9509. Ferry v. Miller, 429.
3. A clause in a warranty deed reserving a life estate to the
grantor, the instrument "not to become operative in any
way until her death," makes the conveyance testamentary
in character. Gragg v. Maynard, 535.
See CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS; EQUITY (2); MORTGAGES
(3); PARTITION (1, 3); QUIETING TITLE; SPECIFIC PERFORM-
ANCE (1); TENANCY IN COMMON (4, 6, 8, 10).
DEFAULT-See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (1, 2).
DEFECTIVE APPLIANCES-See MASTER AND SERVANT (5, 18).
DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION-See ELECTRICITY (1).
DEFECTIVE CROSS-WALK-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5).
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM-See TRIAL (6).
DEFENSE BY THIRD PARTY-See SALES (4).
DEFENSES See DAMAGES (3, 4); HUSBAND AND WIFE (11);
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (3).
DEFICIENCY-See FORECLOSURE (2-4).
DELAY-See HOMESTEADS (2)
DELIVERY-See CARRIERS (1, 2); EQUITY (3); GIFTS (1, 3–6, 8–10).
DEMAND-See HUSBAND AND WIFE (13); LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
(1).
DEMURRER See APPEAL AND ERROR (14); CANCELLATION OF
INSTRUMENTS (2); EQUITY (3).
DEPOSITIONS.
The deposition of a witness taken in a separate action, brought
by different counsel, in which one of the defendants was not
a party, was properly excluded as incompetent. Larsen v.
Home Telephone Co., 296.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-See ADVERSE POSSESSION (3);
ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (1); REAL PROPERTY.
DETROIT CHARTER-See MANDAMUS (4); MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS (11); TAXATION (13).
DEVISES-See DEEDS (3).
DILIGENCE-See TRUSTS (6).
DIRECTED VERDICT - See APPEAL AND ERROR (23); CRIMINAL
LAW (5); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5); TRIAL (2, 9).
DIRECTING VERDICT ON STATEMENT OF COUNSEL - See
APPEAL AND ERROR (2).
DISCONTINUANCE-See JUDGMENT (2).
DISCRETION—See AMENDMENTS; APPEAL AND ERROR (19); CRIM-
INAL LAW (6, 10); TRUSTS (4).
DISCRETIONARY ACTION—See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (4).
DISCRIMINATION—See CARRIERS (3, 5).
DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT — See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (5);
PARTNERSHIP (1).
DISORDERLY CONDUCT-See LIBEL AND SLander (2, 5).
DIVORCE.
1. On appeal from the amount of alimony awarded by a pro con-
fesso decree of divorce, which gave the wife substantially all
of defendant's property, and which might have been affected
by statements of counsel on the hearing to the effect that de-
fendant was willing that complainant should have the prop-
erty, the cause is remanded for rehearing as to the amount.
Des Champlain v. Des Champlain, 511.
2. By a reconciliation and a resumption of marital relations,
after the filing of a bill for divorce by the wife on the ground
of cruelty, the acts relied on in her bill were condoned. Root
v. Root, 638.
8. Evidence that husband and wife quarreled over business mat-
ters, whereupon the wife resolved to leave him, and in an
ensuing dispute he struck her, accompanied by proofs tend-
ing to show that the difficulty between them originated in
the wife's desire to control the business of her husband, is
insufficient to justify a decree of divorce in her favor on the
ground of extreme cruelty. Id. 639.
4. In divorce, as in other causes in equity, a complaining party
must come with clean hands. Id.
See EQUITY (8).
DRAINS-See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; NUISANCE; TRIAL (2).
DRUGGISTS.
1. Within the meaning of the pharmacy law (2 Comp. Laws, g
5303 et seq., as amended by Act No. 332, Pub. Acts 1905), a
person in charge of a country store, where drugs and other
merchandise are retailed, is required to be a registered phar-
macist, although the stock of drugs is small and the sales few.
In re Reidy's Estate, 167.
2. And a person, not a registered pharmacist, may not recover
for services rendered a decedent in conducting such drug
business, since a contract founded on an act prohibited by
statute, under penalty, is void, although not expressly de-
clared by the law to be invalid. Id.
See ESTATES Of Decedents (2); INTOXICATing Liquors (3–5).
See CRIMINAL LAW (7); INTOXICATING LIQUORS
DRUNKARDS
(3).
DUE PROCESS OF LAW-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1).
DUPLICITY-See EQUITY (3).
DUTIES OF MASTER-See MASTER AND Servant (1, 4, 13, 16, 20,
21).
DUTY TO PASSENGERS-See CARRIERS (9).
DUTY TO PAY TAX-See TAXATION (5).
EASEMENTS-See NAVIGABLE WATERS (1).
EJECTMENT-See APPEAL AND ERROR (6).
ELECTIONS.
1. Although the highest number of votes cast at a municipal
election was 2,749, and the question of charter revision, un-
der Act No. 279, Pub. Acts 1909, received only 1,246 votes in
its favor and 1,049 votes against, a majority of the votes
cast on the question of revision was sufficient to carry the
proposition. Attorney General, ex rel. Graves, v. Mayor, etc.,
of Adrian, 143.
2. It was the intention of the legislature, by Act No. 281, Pub.
Acts 1909, to fix the first Wednesday in March for the nom-
ination of candidates for county offices by primary petition;
and the offices of circuit judge and county auditor of Wayne
county were included, so that mandamus lies to compel the
county clerk of Wayne county to accept and file the petitions
of candidates for such offices. Act No. 345, Local Acts 1905,
construed. Mandell v. Farrell, 585.
See MANDAMUS (4, 8).
ELECTRICITY.
1. So constructing a line of electric wires carrying a current of
about 2,200 volts, that limbs of adjacent trees come in con-
tact with the wires and cause a short circuit and burn them
off, cannot be said, as a matter of law, to constitute due care.
Johnson v. City of Bay City, 252.
2. Although the jury found, in answer to a special question, that
the wires did not come in contact with each other, the court
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the limbs did not other-
wise cause a short circuit in the wet weather shown by the
testimony to have existed. Id.
See DAMAGES (6); HighwayS AND STREETS; INFANTS; MASTER
AND SERVANT (2, 3).
EMINENT DOMAIN.
1. Proceedings to condemn lands are summary in character, and,
while subject to judicial review, are not judicial proceed-
ings. Hartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 231.
2. While a review by writ of error cannot be had in such proceed-
EMINENT DOMAIN-Continued.
ings, certiorari may issue to review them, not only as to the
jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, but also as to the man-
ner of exercising it and any errors of law committed in so
doing. Id.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (7, 9).
ENGINEERS-See RAILROADS (1).
EQUIPMENT See MASTER And Servant (17).
EQUITABLE RELIEF-See TAXATION (10).
EQUITY.
1. Defendant who has not filed a cross-bill or asked affirmative
relief in its answer is, at most, entitled to the dismissal of the
bill. McManus v. City of Detroit, 390.
2. Equity has not jurisdiction to cancel a deed testamentary in
nature, executed with due formality to constitute a will, and
may only determine its character or strike it from the record
as a deed. Gragg v. Maynard, 535.
3. A demurrer is not sustainable to a bill in equity for presenting
the case in a double or inconsistent manner when it avers
that a deed was obtained by fraud and undue influence, and
was executed without consideration, and was never delivered
during the lifetime of the grantor. Id.
4. And whether the defendant obtained the deed by fraud before
or after the death of the grantor, the averments of the plead-
ing were sufficient. Id.
5. Evidence offered in chancery proceedings should not be re-
jected by the trial court at the hearing. Davis v. Wardow
ski, 562.
6. The court, on appeal, may not accept defendants' claim, as
stated in their cross-bill, as true, because evidence in support
of their contentions, offered at the hearing, was rejected by
the trial judge. Id.
7. A cross-bill can be sustained only on matters growing out of
the original bill and embraced in it. Root v. Root, 638.
8. In a suit by a husband to restrain his wife from engaging in
business in competition with him, wherein the wife filed an
answer to the bill and asked by a cross-bill for a divorce on
the theory that he had, by extreme cruelty, compelled her to
leave him, and she was obliged to compete with his business
in order to support herself, the matters averred in the cross-
bill were germane to the bill. Id.
See LACHES; PARTITION (1); PARTNERSHIP (2); SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE (3); TAXATION (1, 3); TENANCY IN COMMON
(4-7, 9-11); WITNESSES (2).
EQUITY JURISDICTION-See FORECLOSURE (3); INJUNCTION (4);
QUIETING TITLE.
ESTATES-See REAL PROPERTY.
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