the names of the sons, or indorsed to them, is not sufficient
evidence of a delivery of the instruments. Id.
10. To constitute a valid gift inter vivos there must be a gratuitous
and absolute transfer of the property from the donor to the
donee, taking effect immediately and fully executed by a
delivery of the property by the donor and an acceptance
thereof by the donee. Garrison v. Union Trust Co., 345.
11. That deceased gave plaintiff a ring, which she delivered and he
accepted, that she requested that he let her wear it until she
died, and he consented, warranted a finding that plaintiff had
title to the ring. Id.
12. Possession of the ring by the donor until her death, is not con-
clusive that she did not intend a gift. Id.
13. Declarations and admissions of a decedent that she had made a
gift of her ring to plaintiff are admissible as corroborative
evidence of her intent. Id.
14. Defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed that if
plaintiff was not to have the ring until the death of the
donor, and she should meanwhile have the use of it, the gift
was not valid. Id.
See JUDGMENT (1); WITNESSES (1).
GOOD FAITH-See INTOXICATING LIQUORS (4); TRUSTS (5).
GOOD FAITH PURCHASER-See DEEDS (1); REAL PROPERTY.
GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENTS OF-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
(2)
GUARANTY - See CONTRACTS (2); DAMAGES (3, 5); MECHANICS'
LIENS (3); TRIAL (1).
GUARDIAN AND WARD-See FRAUDulent ConvEYANCES.
GUESTS-See INTOXICATING LIQUORS (1, 2).
HABEAS CORPUS-See CRIMINAL LAW (8, 9).
HEALTH-See TRIAL (2, 8).
HEARING-See EQUITY (5).
HEATING CONTRACT-See ASSIGNMENTS.
1. In going upon an ornamental grass plat between the sidewalk
and curb line of a street, and coming in contact with a broken
electric wire hanging there, the infant plaintiff did not
commit a trespass. Johnson v. City of Bay City, 251.
2. In the absence of testimony tending to show that plaintiff
meddled with the wire, except the position and character
of the injuries she received, she was not chargeable with a
trespass for playing with it. Id. 252.
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS-Continued.
See APPEAL AND ERROR (10); AUTOMOBILES; EMINENT
DOMAIN (1); INFANTS (1); MANDAMUS (1); MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (5, 7, 9); PUBLIC OFFICERS (2).
1. The provisions of section 2, Art. 16, Const. 1850, and of section
2, Art. 14, Const. 1909, with the statute (3 Comp. Laws, § 10362),
creating the homestead exemption, limit the amount of land
to forty acres, and cannot be construed to exempt the entire
purchase price of a parcel, claimed to constitute a homestead,
consisting of forty-one acres of land; and the additional one
forty-first portion of such purchase price may be levied upon
in garnishment proceedings against the vendee by a creditor
of the homestead owner, who has sold the property on a land
contract. Holley v. Horton, 31.
2. And it is a sufficient and timely selection of the homestead
right, where the owner, who had conveyed the premises by
land contract, filed a bill of complaint to enjoin the proceed-
ings at law, and claiming her homestead, at the first oppor-
tunity after learning that the unpaid purchase price had
been garnished. Id.
3. The owner of real estate including a homestead is not obliged
to select the exemption until the officer who levies on the
land makes and presents an appraisal. Id.
Furnishing liquor in one's home as an act of, see INTOXICATING
LIQUORS (1, 2).
1. In an action for the alienation of the affections of plaintiff's
wife, testimony of the husband relating to the presence of
defendant at his home late at night with the wife, and their
conversation together, and the testimony of other witnesses
as to similar acts, was erroneously excluded, since adultery
would not be necessarily inferable from the facts. Barnes v.
Tibbitts, 217.
2. Evidence was admissible on behalf of defendant to show plain-
tiff's prior treatment of his wife, and the state of her affec-
tions towards the husband, although no special notice was
pleaded with the general issue alleging that her affections
had been previously withdrawn from her husband. Id.
3. And it was error to permit the introduction of evidence, on
cross-examination of plaintiff, to show that his wife aban-
doned him after a quarrel over a request of plaintiff, to their
daughter, to quit work and to go to school; as it was not an
unreasonable request on plaintiff's part, and not sufficient
cause for her leaving, and occurred after the affections of
the wife had been alienated. Id. 218.
4. It was error to strike out plaintiff's testimony, as a conclusion,
that there was a change in the wife's feelings towards him
about seven years previously, and she always acted more
sociable towards defendant than towards plaintiff. Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Continued.
5. Evidence of a quarrel between plaintiff and his wife nearly 30
years before was too remote, in view of the policy of the law
to encourage the settlement of marital disputes, and upon
the uncontradicted evidence that plaintiff and his wife had
adjusted that grievance and lived together. Id.
6. A verdict should not be directed against a married woman, in
an action for lumber and building materials delivered to her
husband on his credit and used by him in constructing houses
upon her property, with the knowledge, but not under the
directions of the wife, who furnished him money for the pur-
pose, but never ordered or inspected materials or examined
the completed buildings; and the question of the husband's
agency for defendant is for the jury. Detroit Lumber Co. v.
Cleff, 276.
7. A married woman can make no obligation except on account
of her own property, and there can be no presumption of her
husband's authority to act for the wife. Id.
8. A married woman is not responsible for improvements made
on her real property by her husband, without any extension
of credit to her from one furnishing materials. Id.
9. The husband is primarily liable for the ordinary funeral ex-
penses of his wife. Stone v. Tyack, 550.
10. And where the wife's stepfather undertook to pay the funeral
expenses, he may recover the amount thereof, if reasonable,
from the husband who had deserted the deceased.
11. It is not a sufficient defense to the action that he did not first
notify the husband of her death, although he took the best
course known to him to advise defendant, who had knowl-
edge that the wife was in an asylum, and who had made no
provision for notifying himself of her condition. Id.
12. Nor was it necessary that plaintiff should have expected to
be reimbursed at the time he paid the expenses. Id.
13. No demand was required to fix defendant's liability before
suit. Id.
14. The husband being required by law to afford his wife support
reasonably consistent with his means and station, is entitled
to her services and society. Root v. Root, 639.
15. While the wife may, with her husband's consent, conduct a
business upon her own account, she may not compete with
him against his consent, if he is willing and able to support
her. Id.
See APPEAL AND ERROR (22); CRIMINAL LAW (4); DEEDS
(2); FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES; MECHANICS' LIENS (1);
MORTGAGES (2); WITNESSES (2).
Injunction by husband to restrain wife's engaging in competi-
tive business, see EQUITY (8).
IMPEACHMENT-See EVIDENJE (8).
IMPLIED CONTRACTS-See CONTRACTS (5, 6); WORK AND LABOR.
IMPLIED TRUST-See PARTNERSHIP (5).
IMPRISONMENT See CRIMINAL LAW (6); INTOXICATING LIQUORS
(9).
IMPROVEMENTS-See HUSBAND AND WIFE (6, 8).
INCONSISTENT CLAIMS-See EQUITY (3).
INCORPORATION, VALIDITY OF See Corporations.
INDEMNITY CONTRACTS - See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (10).
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR · See MASTER AND SERVANT (8);
NEGLIGENCE (5).
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-See CRIMINAL LAW (13).
INFANTS.
An infant of five years and four months is not chargeable with
contributory negligence for coming in contact with a live
electric wire, broken and hanging in a public street. John-
son v. City of Bay City, 251.
See CONTRACTS (6); DAMAGES (6); HIGHWAYS AND STREETS.
INITIATIVE-See CONSTITUtional Law (8).
1. Complainant, a corporation, is engaged in the business of sell-
ing teas, coffees, spices, etc., in the city of Detroit, by means
of wagons and drivers, which go to all parts of the city. The
drivers secure orders for future delivery, deliver goods al-
ready ordered, collect therefor, and retain 20 per cent. as
compensation. They secure the customers themselves except
that they are assisted by general canvassers of the company.
Each driver keeps a list of the customers on his route and
calls on them regularly. Defendant was a driver on one of
these routes, and, while still employed by complainant, agreed
with a competing firm to leave complainant's employ and
transfer his services, together with his route and customers,
to such competitor. When he turned in his order cards to
complainant he had erased the names of the old customers,
and neglected to turn in the names of new ones. The order
card is the only record which complainant has of its custom-
ers and patrons. In a suit to perpetually enjoin defendant
from using such lists of customers and canvassing on such
routes, it was held, that the routes and lists were valuable as-
sets of complainant, and that he should be required to furnish
complainant with lists of the customers which he fraudulently
withheld; also that defendant be restrained from using such
lists or copies of such, or giving or showing them to others.
Grand Union Tea Co. v. Dodds, 50.
2. Defendant will not be restrained from selling his commodities,
for himself or his employer, in any part of the city, or to
any person, so long as he does not use any property belong-
ing to complainant, or copies thereof that were surrepti-
tiously made. Id. 51.
3. A taxpayer may, by bill in equity, restrain a threatened mis-
use of city funds in two classes of cases; where his interest
in the fund or threatened damage to his property interests by
its misuse amounts to $100; where he has land worth $100
which is threatened with sale, or liable to a lien for a tax, in
consequence of the proposed misuse. 1 Comp. Laws, § 435.
McManus v. City of Petoskey, 390.
4. The fact that the municipality intends to use money on hand
improperly, so that taxation must be increased by a corre-
sponding amount, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, if the
amount in controversy is within the jurisdiction of chancery.
Id.
See EQUITY (8); MANDAMUS (4); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(14); RECEIVERS (1).
Restraining action already performed, see APPEAL AND ERROR
(9).
INJURY TO BUSINESS-See INJUNCTION (1).
See CARRIERS (1); MASTER AND SERVANT (6);
MINES AND MINING.
INSTRUCTIONS See COMPRomise and SETTLEMENT (3); CONTRIB-
UTORY NEGLIGENCE; CRIMINAL LAW (11); DAMAGES (7, 9, 10,
16, 19); GIFTS (14); MASTER AND SERVANT (12); NEGLIGENCE
(6); NUISANCE; TRIAL (12, 13).
Under the provisions of a Michigan standard fire insurance
policy, permitting the insurer to cancel the contract on five
days' notice, the pro rata part of the premium paid to be re-
turned on surrender of the policy, a notice of cancellation by
the insurer to insured terminates the obligation after the
specified time, without any tender of the unearned premium.
Webb v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 139.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (10).
INTENT-See ABUSE OF PROCESS (2); CONTRACTS (3); CRIMINAL
LAW (7); GIFTS (1, 12, 13).
INTEREST-See DAMAGES (10); TRUSTS (10).
INTERESTS IN LAND-See DEEDS (2).
INTERFERENCE WITH WIRES-See HIGHWAYS AND STREETS
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS-See RECEIVERS (2).
INTERPRETATION OF WILLS-See TRUSTS (2).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-See CARRIERS (5); EVIDENCE (6).
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