Imprisonment of Kilbourn therefore unlawful.

Article VI of the federal

the Constitution to the judicial and not to the legislative department of the government. We think it equally clear that the power asserted is judicial and not legislative.

We are of the opinion, for these reasons, that the resolution of the House of Representatives authorizing the investigation was in excess of the power conferred on that body by the Constitution; that the committee, therefore, had no lawful authority to require Kilbourn to testify as a witness beyond what he voluntarily chose to tell; that the orders and resolutions of the House, and the warrant of the speaker, under which Kilbourn was imprisoned, are, in like manner, void for want of jurisdiction in that body, and that his imprisonment was without any lawful authority.

58. The Supremacy of Federal Law*

The federal Constitution expressly declares in the following clauses the supremacy of federal law:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or Constitution which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

It was thus clearly established that within its sphere, the federal government was supreme, but it was not expressly stated what authority should have the power to decide when any particular act of the government was within its prescribed limits of power. The supremacy of the federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the last instance was forcibly asserted by Chief Justice

Taney in a long opinion delivered in connection with a fugitive slave case, from which only a few passages can be given here.

The Constitution was not formed merely to guard the States against danger from foreign nations, but mainly to secure union and harmony at home; for if this object could be obtained, there would be but little danger from abroad; and to accomplish this purpose, it was felt by the statesmen who framed the Constitution, and by the people who adopted it, that it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General Government; and that, in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should be supreme and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State or from State authorities. And it was evident that anything short of this would be inadequate to the main objects for which the Government was established; and that local interests, local passions or prejudices, incited and fostered by individuals for sinister purposes, would lead to acts of aggression and injustice by one State upon the rights of another, which would ultimately terminate in violence and force, unless there was a common arbiter between them,' armed with power enough to protect and guard the rights of all, by appropriate laws, to be carried into execution peacefully by its judicial tribunals.

The necessity for a

common

arbiter.

supremacy

The supremacy conferred on this Government could not Why judicial peacefully be maintained, unless it was clothed with judicial is essential. power, equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution, for if left to the courts of justice in the several States, conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and

Supreme

Court must

have appel

tion over

state courts.

another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very existence as a Government, that it should have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws; and that a tribunal should be established in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States should be finally and conclusively decided. Without such a tribunal, it is obvious that there would be no uniformity of judicial decision; and that the supremacy (which is but another name for independence), so carefully provided in the clause of the Constitution above referred to, could not possibly be maintained peacefully, unless it was associated with this paramount judicial authority.

Accordingly, it was conferred on the General Government, in clear, precise, and comprehensive terms. It is declared that its late jurisdic- judicial power shall (among other subjects enumerated) extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that in such cases, as well as the others there enumerated, this court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. The appellate power, it 'will be observed, is conferred on this court in all cases or suits in which such a question shall arise. It is not confined to suits in the inferior courts of the United States, but extends to all cases where such a question arises, whether it be in a judicial tribunal of a State or of the United States. And it is manifest that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of action assigned to it; to make the Constitution and laws of the United States uniform, and the same in every State; and to guard against evils which would inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts of a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter authorized to decide between them.

1 P. 140.

bound to submit to

of the Su

preme Court.

The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached States are to such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives this the decisions court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose this Union, when a controversy arises between them. Instead of reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to submit to the decision of this court, and to abide by its judgment. And it is not out of place to say, here, that experience has demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the States; for in the time that has already elapsed since this Government came into existence, several irritating and angry controversies have taken place between adjoining States, in relation to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened to end in force and violence, but for the power vested in this court to hear them and decide between them.

decisions

take the

As the final appellate power in all such questions is given to Judicial this court, controversies as to the respective powers of the United States and the States, instead of being determined by military place of war. and physical force, are heard, investigated, and finally settled, with the calmness and deliberation of judicial inquiry. And no one can fail to see, that if such an arbiter had not been provided, in our complicated system of government, internal tranquillity could not have been preserved; and if such controversies were left to the arbitrament of physical force, our Governments, State and National, would soon cease to be Governments of laws, and revolutions by force of arms would take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions.

59. The Suffrage under the Federal Constitution

character of federal suffrage

The federal Constitution does not state who shall have the right The negative to vote in the United States. The problem was discussed in the convention, but the original instrument left the matter to the states. Representatives in Congress were to be chosen by the persons provisions. entitled under state law to vote for members of the most numer

Aliens admitted to

ous branch of the state legislature; senators were to be elected by the legislatures; and presidential electors were to be chosen as the legislatures of the state should determine. The later amendments designed to secure the vote for negroes were merely negative statements restricting the right of the state to regulate the suffrage. Subject to the limits of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,1 the states may fix their own suffrage qualifications and, as a result, there is a great variety of practices, some of the states going so far as to enfranchise persons not yet full citizens of the United States. This anomalous situation was discussed by Mr. Lincoln in the New York state convention of 1894.

We have had placed in our hands, at the expense of the State, the suffrage. the Constitutions of all the States in the Union. In examining these Constitutions, with a view, possibly, of borrowing some ideas therefrom, which we might find useful, I find that in sixteen of these States [1894], named in the resolutions, persons are permitted to vote before they become citizens of the United States.

Citizen suffrage

should be

rule.

Now, the State of New York has steadily adhered to the principle of citizen suffrage. We do not believe in permitting people the national to become voters and to participate in the affairs of government until they are at least citizens. In getting at the matter, to see what could be done, so far as this Convention is concerned, it seemed to me that we might very properly call the attention of Congress to this matter by resolution of this Convention; not in the sense of discourteous criticism of the Constitutions of other States, as is suggested in the report of the Suffrage Committee; that was not intended by these resolutions at all; but that we might ask Congress to take some action, with a view to implanting the principle of citizen suffrage in the Constitution of the United States. That instrument does not now regulate this question. It is left to the States themselves, and, I believe, the time has come in our history when the Constitution of the United States ought to define the rules of suffrage, or at least that it should go to the extent of limiting the right of suffrage to people 1 See below, p. 393.