The early practice of delivery in person.

The origin of the written message.

not to the judicial bench, but to those who might stand charged with such offences. The object of discussion should be, if we run out this notion to its natural extent, to enlighten the culprit himself how he ought to understand the law.

76. The Presidential Message

The Constitution imposes on the President the duty of giving to Congress from time to time information on the state of the Union, and also of recommending to its consideration such measures as he may think necessary and expedient. It does not prescribe whether this shall be done in person or by written communications. The early practice and the origin of the present custom are thus described by Senator Benton.

Under the first two of our Presidents, Washington, and the first Mr. Adams, the course of the British Parliament was followed in answering the address of the President, as. the course of the sovereign was followed in delivering it. The Sovereign delivered his address in person to the two assembled Houses, and each answered it: our two first Presidents did the same, and the Houses answered. The purport of the answer was always to express a concurrence, or non-concurrence with the general policy of the government as thus authentically exposed; and the privilege of answering the address laid open the policy of the government to the fullest discussion. The effect of the practice was to lay open the state of the country, and the public policy, to the fullest discussion; and in the character of the answer to decide the question of accord or disaccord of support or opposition-between the representative and the executive branches of the government.

The change from the address delivered in person, with its answer, to the message sent by the private secretary, and no answer, was introduced by Mr. Jefferson, and considered a reform; but it was questioned at the time, whether any good would come of it, and whether that would not be done irregularly, in the course of the debates, which otherwise would have been done regularly in the discussion of the address. The administration policy would

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17. Executive Influence m Impressional Legislation

Through his rower Det nesses and veto laws, the Presi at as the mantot sa peruence the course of age Base may gressure to bear in many ofer 17. He may he Tersage w instrument to rouse pusie

on in Congreg.

The in

terest of the

President in legislation.

Congress often counsels

with executive depart

ments.

The advice of the attorneygeneral is asked.

opinion; he may hold conferences with the directing party leaders in Congress; he may take private members into consultation. To some this extra-constitutional influence of the President seems entirely warranted by sound political practice, for it brings those who have to execute the laws in touch with those who make them, and, furthermore, it enables the President as representative of the whole nation to exercise his proper influence in the management of the nation's business. To others, however, this appears to be a wholly objectionable practice. Both sides of the case are thus stated in a recent debate in Congress:

MR. DOLLIVER. · I am not one of those who have been irritated by the interest which the President of the United States has taken in this controversy. His interest has been upon the broadest and highest national ground. He has stated his views and convictions to the American people in every section of the country, and not one line can be attributed to him having in it the trace of a partisan outlook upon this great national question. Therefore whatever interest he has taken in it can certainly not be attributed to a partisan design of any kind or character.

I have been familiar for a good many years with the attitude of the executive department of the Government toward the work of Congress. There is a member of the Senate now who, if he were disposed to give his experience, would be able to verify what I say, that it has been for many years the no uncommon practice for the Congress of the United States to take counsel with the executive departments in perfecting great acts of national legislation. There are at least five acts of legislation, all of them referring to this and similar questions, that were put through both Houses of Congress in the last five years practically without change, as they came from the office of the Attorney-General of the United States.

In the present controversy the Attorney-General has certainly had the invitation of the legislative branch of the Government to take an interest in the matter. Among the very first things the Committee on Interstate Commerce did was to invite him to

1 Over the regulation of railway rates.

give his opinion in writing to the Committee explaining to us our powers and making what suggestions he thought desirable in relation to this legislation. It is a difficult, a complex, almost impenetrable subject with which we have been called upon to deal, and I do not propose to be disparaged nor to allow anybody else to be disparaged by a sneering suggestion that we have consulted the Attorney-General or even the President of the United States. I count it just as respectable and just as perfectly in line with my public duty to take counsel with the President of the United States on these questions as for my colleagues and for others to hold sweet counsel with the presidents of railroad corporations. . . .

should not

be influenced

of the

MR. BAILEY. Mr. President, I belong to that very small Congress class of Senators and Representatives who do not believe that it is proper for them to be influenced in the performance of their leg- by views islative duties by the views of the executive department and it has never been my practice since I had the honor to occupy a seat in Congress to confer with any President, either of my own or of the opposition party, in respect to any legislation.

President.

tion.

The only exception I ever made and that more apparent An excepthan real-was in the case of the lamented and martyred McKinley, whose invitation I accepted to confer with him in the hope that we might find a way to avert the war with Spain. Upon a question like that, which was not legislative, I felt that any Member of Congress might properly confer with the Executive of the Republic. But, sir, I have so often seen and this applies not only to the present President of the United States, but to his predecessors in that great office - I have so often seen the judgment of Congress overruled or controlled by the executive influence that early in my service in the other House I resolved that it should never prevail with me.

I remember when a mere school boy reading of a great Vir- The ginia Democrat being invited to the White House by a President, separation of powers. of his own party and chosen from his own State, to confer upon an important question pending in the Congress, and I remember

Transmis

sion of a bill to Congress.

how my youthful blood was made to run faster when I read how that great Virginia Democrat said: "Mr. President, the Constitution of the United States has separated the executive and legislative departments of this Government, and, by the help of God, I intend to keep them separate." I adopted that as my creed and I have lived up to it from that day to this.

78. How Executive Departments May Draft Bills

While the initiation of legislation is theoretically left to Congress, the President may recommend such measures as he sees fit. These measures need not be limited to mere general statements; they often take the form of completed bills all ready for passage, which are sometimes adopted by Congress without alteration. This message of President Cleveland illustrates the practice.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a communication of the 15th instant from the Secretary of the Interior, submitting, with accompanying papers on the subject, a draught of a bill to amend section 5388 of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to timber depredations upon lands reserved or purchased for military, Indian, or other purposes, &c.

This is an important subject, and is commended to the early attention of Congress.

Executive Mansion, December 21, 1885.

GROVER CLEVELAND.