This account of the steps taken by Lincoln and Stanton in preparation for the fateful battle of Gettysburg illustrates the manner in which the President and Secretary of War may coöperate in directing the military forces:

Stanton

It was night in Washington. The President wore a gloomy face Lincoln and as he entered the War Department by the urgent request of Secre- counsel tary Stanton. Neither spoke for a while. Mr. Lincoln at last on the coming said: "Stanton, you want to speak to me; you have something to battle. communicate; let us calmly counsel with each other: I am ready to listen." The Secretary replied: "Yes, I do want to say something to you. I want to tell you the trouble that oppresses me at this time; I'll not mince words, for I feel you want to know the worst." "I do," said Mr. Lincoln; "speak out then, I'll be listener." Mr. Stanton in brief language told him that he dreaded the issue of the coming battle, with Lee's conscious ability and the animating spirit of his army, on the one side, and Hooker, the beaten general, commanding men who still remembered their defeat in Virginia on the other side. "In short," said Mr. Stanton, "I have not confidence in General Hooker, though his personal courage I do not question." "I don't disagree with you,” said the President, but you recollect the old saying, 'While crossing a stream it is too late to swap horses.' Stanton, have you any other general to suggest?" He replied: "I have thought of General Sedgwick, but you know he will not accept. I have thought of others and arrived at the same conclusion. The best of them are not without detractors. There is one that I would suggest, General Meade, with whose record and ability I could find no fault; and as a Pennsylvanian he has patriotism enough to draw out all the latent energies of his nature. . . ." "Stanton, there is no time to be lost. You must have conceived a plan. If you can satisfy my judgment that this expedient will prove a master stroke, and lead to success, I will co-operate with you, and give it my approval." Secretary Stanton then detailed his plans. The orders. and papers, all written out, were taken up seriatim and discussed, and the papers executed.

The plans carried into execution.

A locomotive engine was in readiness, fired up; orders were placed in the hands of a tried officer of the regular army, who had precise instructions how to proceed. The first was to go forward to the headquarters of General Meade who was ordered by a paper delivered to him to take command of the army; the second was to deliver to General Hooker orders which informed him that he was superseded by General Meade; and all conditions were fully arranged to give simultaneous intelligence to the corps and division commanders in the field, of the President's order for the change, so that immediate intelligence to all subordinate officers might be given to the soldiers under their command. These orders were announced and acquiesced in, and a new spirit wakened among the rank and file of the army. All the world knows the story of Gettysburg.

The lengths to which the President as Commander-in-Chief and his immediate subordinates at Washington may go in prescribing the exact movements of the army and navy in the war on land and sea must, of course, always be determined by circumstances. This order issued in connection with the Spanish-American war serves to illustrate the process of direction only in a very general

way.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, May 30, 1898. (Sent in cipher, May 31, 1898, 2.30 A.M.)

Instructions Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

to General Shafter to

proceed to

Cuba (1898).

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it on to the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there; and cover the Navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or with the aid of the Navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprize, and the Government relies upon

your good judgment as to the judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscades or surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will coöperate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprize, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, reëmbark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Port de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future important service. This with the understanding that your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and convoys. When will you sail? By command of Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

131. Use of Troops in Domestic Disturbances

In 1894, on the occasion of local disorders in Chicago in connection with a strike, President Cleveland employed federal troops and issued this proclamation to the citizens of Illinois:

action.

Whereas, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations and Reasons for assemblages of persons, it has become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States within the State of Illinois, and especially in the city of Chicago within said State; and

Whereas, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution of the laws of the United States and protecting its property and removing obstructions to the United States mails in the State and

Rioters ordered to disperse.

Troops will act with

firmness.

city aforesaid, the President has employed a part of the military forces of the United States:

Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, do hereby admonish all good citizens, and all persons who may be or may come within the City and State aforesaid, against aiding, countenancing, encouraging, or taking any part in such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages; and I hereby warn all persons engaged in or in any way connected with such unlawful obstructions, combinations and assemblages to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes on or before twelve o'clock noon of the 9th day of July instant. Those who disregard this warning and persist in taking part with a riotous mob in forcibly resisting and obstructing the execution of the laws of the United States, or interfering with the functions of the Government, or destroying or attempting to destroy the property belonging to the United States or under its protection, cannot be regarded otherwise than as public enemies.

Troops employed against such a riotous mob will act with all the moderation and forbearance consistent with the accomplishment of the desired end; but the stern necessities that confront them will not with certainty permit discrimination between guilty participants and those who are mingling with them from curiosity and without criminal intent. The only safe course, therefore, for those not actually participating, is to abide at their homes, or at least not to be found in the neighborhood of riotous assemblages. While there will be no vacillation in the decisive treatment of the guilty, this warning is especially intended to protect and save the inno

cent.

132. Use of Troops in Domestic Disasters

The Report of the War Department in 1906 thus described the way in which federal soldiers were employed on the occasion of the great earthquake in San Francisco:

On April 18, the city of San Francisco was visited by a series of earthquake shocks which demolished many buildings. This

tion of

cisco.

was followed by a fire which, due to the rupturing of the principal Concentrawater mains of the city, was soon beyond control. The disaster forces at was so far-reaching and overwhelming that it was entirely beyond San Franthe capacity of the local authorities, and the United States forces in the vicinity, both of the Army and of the Navy, rendered immediate assistance. Authority was given to concentrate at San Francisco all forces within the Pacific Division, and later this force was supplemented by troops from other divisions, resulting in a final concentration of 2 regiments of cavalry, 15 companies of coast artillery, 5 batteries of field artillery, 5 regiments of infantry, and detachments of the engineer, signal, and hospital corps, and 132 additional officers.

The following summary, taken in large part from a general order published early in July by the commanding general, Pacific Division, is a succinct statement of the general situation.

The work done by this force readily falls into two phasesthe struggle to save the city of San Francisco from complete destruction by fire, and the succoring of more than 300,000 suffering and destitute people. The work of the Army and Marine Corps in the heart of the city, supplemented by the labors of the Navy along the water front, saved the residential western addition and practically all the wharves fronting the bay. The efforts of the troops from daybreak of April 18 to midnight of April 20 taxed to the utmost the physical strength, the nervous energy, and the good temper of every officer and man. Yet in this fearful

disaster, with its accompanying confusion and excitement, no life was taken by any man of the Army or Navy.

Fighting fire.

relief

The labor of relief, recognized as beyond the law and assumed General by the division commander from a sense of obligatory public duty, services. became regular by the official call for troops. This duty necessitated the care of nearly 350,000 people, destitute in one way or another, in a city without local transportation, without food, with scant water, and without sanitary facilities, while about one-half its population had lost houses, clothing, furniture, and bedding. It likewise involved repression of theft and violence by the vicious,