civil procedure to the supreme court, for the settlement of a bill of exceptions, should set forth the exceptions taken, and the evidence in support thereof. Notice of the application should also be given to the judge of the trial court. In re Estate and Guardianship of H. and E. Hawes. Cal., 202.

2. SETTLEMENT OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-TIME FOR JUDGE TO ACT.-The time within which a judge is required to act in reference to the settlement of a bill of exceptions, after the same has been presented to him, is not limited to any definite period. It is the duty of the judge, however, to act promptly in such cases. Ah Lep v. Gong Choy. Or., 272.

3. FAILURE TO PRESENT IN TIME. Where a bill of exceptions is not tendered to the trial judge until after the term, and the expiration of any extension of the time for the filing of the same, the power of the court or judge over the matter is lost. Mogan v. Thompson. Or., 440.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PRESUMED TO BE INSERTED.-All the evidence tending to explain an objection taken is presumed to have been inserted in a bill of exceptions. If from such evidence it appears that the court below erred in ruling against the appellant as to a material matter, this is ground for reversal. Wilson v. Atkinson. Cal., 689. 5. ERRORS OF TRIAL COURT.-Alleged errors of the court below upon the trial of an indictment for murder, will not be considered by the supreme court, unless the record contains a bill of exceptions. Booth v. Territory. Wy., 860.

BILL OF LADING.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 1, 2.

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION.

1. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION-EQUALIZATION MAY AFFECT TAXES FOR COUNTY PURPOSES. Under sections 3692 et seq. of the political code, the state board of equalization has the power to increase or lower the assessment-rolls of the several counties so as to affect taxes for county purposes. Baldwin v. Ellis. Cal., 360.

BOUNDARIES.

See MINES AND MINING, 3, 11-14.

BRIBERY.

1. BRIBERY-SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION.-An information for bribery is sufficient if its allegations are substantially in the language of section 68 of the penal code. People v. Edson. Cal., 688.

2. THE SAME INSTRUCTION AS TO CHARACTER OF WITNESSES.-In a prosecution for bribery the court charged the jury that they might "take into consideration the character, vocation, and profession of witnesses for two purposes: 1. In the consideration of their credibility as witnesses; and 2. Where the witnesses are shown to have been active parties to the transaction that is the subject of inquiry. You can consider their character, profession, and vocation in judging of the probability of their being parties to a transaction as has been detailed. You can judge whether these parties would have been likely to offer a bribe to an officer, and in determining that as a fact you can judge of the character of the party who, it is alleged, made that approach." Held, that such instruction was erroneous, because it was susceptible of the interpretation that the jury could infer that the witnesses for the prosecution would be likely to approach an officer with a bribe, from the fact that they were persons of bad character; and that from such probability of conduct on the part of those witnesses the jury could draw a further inference of the defendant's guilt. Id.

BRIDGES.

1. CANAL CORPORATIONS-DUTY OF CONSTRUCTING BRIDGES OVER HIGHWAYS.-Section 551 of the civil code, imposing the duty upon every ditch company to construct and keep in good repair, over their canals at points where they cross a public highway, the bridges which the board of supervisors may require, was not repealed by section 2737 of the political code, which authorizes the road overseer to construct such bridges upon the neglect of the persons excavating such ditches so to do, and to recover the cost of constructing from such persons. County of Fresno v. Fowler Switch Canal Co. Cal. 79. 2. THE SAME-MANDAMUS LIES TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE OF DUTY.-Upon the refusal of a ditch company to construct such bridge, it may be compelled so to do by mandamus. Id.

BROKER.

1. BROKER TO SELL REAL ESTATE-WHEN ENTITLED TO COMMISSION.-A broker to sel
real estate is entitled to his commissions upon producing a purchaser able to make
the purchase, and ready and willing to do so on the terms proposed by the sellers,
although the latter capriciously refuses to complete the sale. Fisk v. Henarie. Or,
172.

2. SALE OF REAL ESTATE-EMPLOYMENT OF BROKER-WRITTEN CONTRACT SHOWN BY
LETTERS. -Under a statute requiring the contract for the employment of a broker to
sell real estate to be in writing, signed by the party to be charged, exact formality a
not required. Such contract may be proved by letters between the seller and the
broker. The letters sought to be introduced herein examined and held to establis
a contract by which the plaintiff was engaged to effect a sale of certain land, and
that he was to be paid a commission if made upon terms acceptable to the owners. I

CANAL CORPORATIONS.
See BRIDGES.

CANCELLATION.

See MARRIAGE, 5; PUBLIC LANDS, 13-15,

CERTIORARI.

See WRIT OF REVIEW.

CHALLENGE.
See JURY, 1, 4, 5.

CHARTER PARTY.

See ADMIRALTY, 2, 3.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

See MORTGAGE, 13-19.

CHEATING.

See CONSPIRACY, 7.

CITIZENSHIP.

1. CITIZENSHIP.—Citizenship is a status or condition, resulting from both act and intent;
and no one can become a citizen of any state of the Union by merely intending to,
nor by residence therein without or contrary to such intent; but the former is evi-
dence more or less cogent, according to circumstances of the latter. Sharon v. Hill,
(U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal., 1.

2. IDEM-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-The first clause in section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment is a restraint on the power of a state, so that it cannot exclude a citizen
of the United States, resident therein, from the citizenship thereof; but such amend-
ment does not have the effect to make such resident a citizen of such state against
his will and intention. Id.

See ABATEMENT, 1.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY.

1. DEFENDANTS HAVING SEPARATE LIENS CANNOT JOIN.-In an action of claim and de-
livery, defendants having separate and distinct liens on the property sought to be
recovered, arising out of separate contracts, cannot join in setting up such liens to
defeat the plaintiff's right to the possession. Underwood v. Birdsell. Mont., 623.
See MORTGAGE, 18.

COHABITATION.

See UNLAWFUL COHABITATION.

COMMISSIONS.

See BROKER.

COMMON CARRIERS.

1. SALE-DELIVERY TO COMMON CARRIER.-BILL OF LADING.-Delivery of goods by consignor to a common carrier prima facie vests the right to the immediate possession thereof in the consignee, and the effect of a consignment of goods by a bill of lading is to vest the property in the consignee. Walsh v. Blakely. Mont., 657. 2. THE SAME TRANSFER OF BILL OF LADING CHANGES POSSESSION.-A bill of lading is a symbol of the ownership of the goods covered by it, and the transmission of such bill of lading transfers the possession of the property described in it, and is a compliance with the statute of frauds, as to the sale and delivery of property. Id.

3. STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-WHEN SELLER MAY HAVE.-Seller, on discovering that the buyer is insolvent, may stop the goods while in transit before the buyer acquires possession, if the purchase price remains unpaid. Id.

4. THE SAME-TRANSIT, WHEN BEGINS AND ENDS.-When the carrier takes possession from the seller as carrier, the transit begins; when he divests himself of possession in such capacity to the buyer, the transit ends; and the stoppage by the seller, to be effective, must occur between these two points. Id.

5. THE SAME POSSESSION BY BUYER DEFEATS RIGHT OF STOPPAGE.-Buyer has the right to break the original transit and intercept the goods, personally or by means of an authorized agent, at any intermediate point on the route. By taking the goods into his personal custody, or that of his exclusive agent, either before the transit begins or midway or at the end, he assumes an entire control of possession, in such a sense as utterly extinguishes the seller's right to stop them as his own. Id. 6. EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE REVIEWED, and held not to justify the finding that, at the time of the stoppage of the goods, the consignee was insolvent, and to show that, at such time, the goods had been taken possession of on behalf of the consignee by his authorized agent. Id.

COMMON LAW.

1. HOW FAR ADOPTED IN NEW MEXICO.-Section 10 of the organic act of the territory of New Mexico, providing that "the supreme court and the district courts respectively shall possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction," was not intended to bring into existence there the common law of England in all its fullness. It merely created courts of general jurisdiction, in which all rights of persons and things, whether arising under the civil law as it obtained in Mexico prior to the treaty of cession, or under the common law, the acts of congress, or the statutes of the territory, should be protected and enforced. Browning v. Estate of Browning. N. M., 789.

CONCEALED WEAPON.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPON-INDICTMENT.-An indictment for carrying a concealed weapon upon the person need not contain an averment negativing the exception contained in the statute, providing that the act shall not apply to peace officers in the discharge of their official duties. Territory v. Burns. Mont., 235.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.

See PLEADINGS, 3.

CONFESSION.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 25.

CONSENT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 5; ESTOPPEL, 2; Incest, 1.

CONSIDERATION.

1. CONSIDERATION FOR PROMISE.-Services to be rendered in procuring a loan is a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay. Barley v. Buell. Cal., 367.

2. CONSIDERATION FOR WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS IMPLIED.-Under sections 1614, 1615, it is not necessary that a written agreement for the sale of land should show an

adequate consideration, in order to entitle it to be reformed or enforced. And in an
action on such instrument no consideration for its execution need be alleged. Id.
See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 1; GUARANTY, 2; PLEADINGS, 2.

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE

See COMMON CARRIERS.

CONSPIRACY.

1. HOUSE OF ILL-FAME DEFINED-OFFENSE OF KEEPING.-A house of ill-fame is a house
kept for the convenience and shelter of persons desiring unlawful sexual intercourse
and in which such intercourse is practiced. To constitute the offense of keeping
such house it need not be kept for lucre. People v. Hampton. Utah, 441.

2. THE SAME CONSPIRACY TO KEEP-INSTRUCTIONS.-Refusal to give instructions re-
quested is not error, if the same have already been given in substance. The instrac
tions given in a prosecution for conspiracy to keep a house of ill-fame reviewed and
held to be substantially identical with the instructions requested and refused. H
3. THE SAME--LETTERS OF CO-CONSPIRATORS AS EVIDENCE.--On the trial of such eca-
spiracy, after evidence tending to establish it has been given, letters of one con-
spirator showing the character of the house are admissible against the other. Id.
4. THE SAME EVIDENCE OF MOTIVE OF DEFENDANT.--In such prosecution, where the
defense relied upon is that the defendant was acting upon high moral grounds, for the
purpose of detecting and punishing sexual crimes, evidence tending to show that
his real motive was to inveigle prominent men, not Mormons, into a disreputable
house for the purpose of injuring their character, is admissible. To this end the
prosecution may show that the defendant hired prostitutes, other than those alleged
as conspirators. Id.

5. INDICTMENT IN THIS CASE EXAMINED, and held to be sufficient. Id.

6. CRIMINAL LAW--CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT COUNTY-INDICTMENT.-An indictment, under
section 187, division 3, of the revised statutes, for a conspiracy to cheat and defraud
a county, must allege the means by which the conspiracy was to be accomplished
An allegation that the defendants conspired "to cheat and defraud " is not sufficient.
Territory v. Carland. Mont., 414.

7. RESTRAINING FRAUDULENT JUDGMENT-BOND-HOLDERS WHEN MAY MAINTAIN AC-
TION.-Bond-holders are entitled to maintain a bill in equity to restrain the enforce-
ment of a judgment against the mortgaged property, alleged to have been fraudu-
lently obtained by means of a conspiracy to which the trustees for the bond-holders
were parties, without having first called upon the trustees to act in their behalf.
Lamb v. San Pedro & Canyon del Agua Co. N. M., 260.

See LARCENY, 7.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. STATE AND CIRCUIT COURTS.-The supreme court of the state, and the United States
circuit court have concurrent original jurisdiction on habeas corpus to inquire into
the constitutionality and validity of a city ordinance alleged to have been passed in
contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.
But the circuit court should not overrule the solemn judgment of the supreme court
of the state upon this question where there is reasonable ground for doubt. In such
cases the question should be referred to the supreme court of the United States for
an authoritative decision of the doubtful point. In re Wo Lee. (U. S. Cir. Ct.)
Cal., 81.
2. SAME LAUNDRY ORDINANCE-CONSTITUTINAL LAW.-On this ground the circuit
court declined to hold a city ordinance invalid, as being in contravention of the
fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which ordinance
made it an offense "for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a
laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco, with-
out having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be
located in a building constructed either of brick or stone." Id.

3. LAUNDRIES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.- An ordinance, which makes it an offense, for any
person to maintain, or carry on a laundry, wherein clothes are cleansed for hire,
within the habitable portion of the city of Stockton, is unconstitutional, and void.
In re Tie Loy. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal., 387.

4. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-Such ordinance violates the fourteenth amendment of the national constitution, in the following particulars: 1. It abridges "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States;" 2. It violates the personal liberty of the citizen; 3. It operates to deprive the citizen of property without due process of law; 4. It deprives citizens of the equal protection of the laws. Id.

5. POLICE POWER. The ordinance is not within the legitimate scope of the police power of the state, invoked to sustain it. Id.

6. SECTION 753, Revised StatutES, authorizes the discharge of the petitioner. Id. 7. INSTITUTIONS FOR SUPPORT OF AGED INDIGENTS-STATE AID FOR.-The first and second provisos of section 22, article 4, of the constitution, providing for the maintenance of aged persons in indigent circumstances, have reference to institutions of a private character, as distinguished from public institutions; and after authorizing state aid to such institutions, the section declares, in the third proviso, that whenever any county, city and county, city, or town, shall provide for the support of aged persons in indigent circumstances, such county, etc., shall be entitled to receive the same pro rata appropriation as may be granted to the institutions referred to in the first and second provisos: Held, that upon an appropriation being made to the institutions mentioned in the first and second provisos, the third proviso became selfexecuting, and no further legislative action was required. San Francisco v. Dunn. Cal., 822.

See CITIZENSHIP, 2; GRAND JURY; HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY; MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER, 21; SUPREME COURT, 1.

CONTEMPT.

1. CONTEMPT-Agreement to INFLUENCE COURT.-In a proceeding for contempt, the complaint charged that in certain cases, to wit, in Bonnet v. San Francisco and Parker v. San Francisco, pending in the supreme court, the defendant, well knowing that such cases had been decided by the court in favor of the plaintiffs, for and in consideration of the sum of five hundred dollars, which Bonnet agreed to pay him, agreed and undertook with Bonnet that he, the respondent, would procure to be given and made by the supreme court a judgment in favor of Bonnet and Parker; that Bonnet was at the same time assured by the respondent, and was made to believe, that he possessed such influence with the court and the members thereof that he could procure through his influence said judgments to be given and made respectively in favor of said Bonnet and Parker: Held, that conduct such as that charged is a contempt of the supreme court. In re Buckley. Cal., 720.

2. THE SAME EVIDENCE OF CONTEMPT MUST BE CLEAR AND SATISFACTORY.-Proceeding to punish for contempt of court is criminal or quasi criminal; and before a person charged can be punished, his guilt must be established as a fact by clear and satisfactory evidence. A mere preponderance of evidence is not enough. The evidence in this case examined at length, and held not to establish the guilt of the defendant clearly or satisfactorily. Id.

3. PROCEEDINGS DISMISSED ON AUTHORITY of In re Buckley, ante, p. 720. In re Taylor. Cal., 739.

CONTINUANCE.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL-ABSENCE OF WITNESSES.-The granting or refusing of a continuance of a trial on account of the absence of a witness in a criminal case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. State v. O'Neil. Or., 151. 2. THE SAME-AFFIDAVIT FOR CONTINUANCE.-An affidavit for continuance on account of the absence of such witness in another state or county must state facts showing whether or not there is reasonable ground for believing that the future attendance of the witness can be procured. A statement by the defendant in his affidavit that he is confident" that he can procure such attendance is not sufficient. Id.

3. ABSENCE OF WITNESSES-AFFIDAVITS-PROSECUTION CANNOT DENY.-Under sections 2050 et seq. of the compiled laws of 1884, where, in a criminal prosecution, a motion and affidavit for a continuance, upon the ground of the absence of material witnesses, are filed, the party opposing cannot deny the truth of the matters alleged in the application by filing contradictory affidavits. In such case, where a proper showing is made, the trial court must grant the continuance. It has no discretion. Territory v. Kinney. N. M., 268.

See MARRIAGE, 4.