Argument for Appellee. 215 U.S. amply paid, the commission may reduce the extra charge, even to a point below the cost of the pretended separate service. Southern Railroad Co. v. The St. Louis Hay & Grain Co., 214 U. S. 297, distinguished. The cost of a particular service is not a proper test of the reasonableness of the charge for it when the service performed is part of a larger transaction. Minn. & St. Paul R. R. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 267; St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. N. C. Corp. Com., 260 U. S. 1; Cov. & Lex. Turnpike Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 596; A. & V. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Com. of Miss., 203 U. S. 496; Railroad Co. v. Well & Neville, 96 Texas, 408. In the present case, even if one dollar per car be below the cost of the particular service, the railroads cannot complain, since the whole charge for the whole service is admittedly profitable. It is not shown that the commission's allowed charge of one dollar per car is less than cost of terminal service. The commission's order applies only to whole transaction from point of origin and as so considered the charge is not below cost. Every intendment of law and fact should avail to support the order of the commission. When questions of fact are submitted to executive or administrative officers of the Government their conclusions are final. When questions so submitted involve both fact and law the conclusion will not ordinarily be disturbed by the courts. Even when a question of law only is submitted to other departments the courts will make every presumption in favor of the interpretation reached. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106; Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473. Mr. William D. McHugh and Mr. Walker D. Hines for appellee: The railroad companies have divided their said rates and 215 U.S. Argument for Appellee. have made a distinct charge for transportation from the points of shipment to Chicago, and a separate terminal charge for delivery to the stock yards, a point beyond the lines of the respective carriers. The separate terminal charge of two dollars per car made by the railroad companies for the delivery by them of live stock to the stock yards, a point beyond the lines of their respective railroads, is not excessive since it is less than the actual cost to the railroads for the performance of such service. Each appellee had the right to divide the charge for transportation so as to have one rate from point of shipment to a point on its tracks in Chicago, and a separate charge thence to the stock yards. Walker v. Keenan, 73 Fed. Rep. 755; S. C., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 548; § 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce; Interstate Comm. Comm. v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 186 U. S. 320, 335. The commission's order is contrary to the Constitution. Amendment V, and see as to right of carrier to compensation for additional service, So. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Hay Co., 214 U. S. 297, 301. There is no authority for, nor do cases cited by appellant sustain proposition that in order to set aside a rate prescribed by the commission, the carrier must show confiscation as to all its business. The commission's order was made under clear error of law. The courts have power to set aside any order of the commission not conforming to the statute. As to the power conferred on the commission by the statute, see Vol. 2, Hearings Before Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, pp. 1662-1674. The power of the court to review on mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, may be exercised without regard as to whether a constitutional right has been violated. Judicial intervention is expressly contemplated by the act itself and in this case is especially appropriate because the regulation is of vested rights and not of matters wholly under power of Government. The right of owners of railroads to adequate protection exists independently of consent of the Government. MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The controversy as to this terminal charge has been of long duration. A history of it antecedent to the present litigation is to be found in Interstate Commerce Commission v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Company, 186 U. S. 320. It is well to understand the precise question which is presented in this case. That question is the validity of the terminal charge of two dollars per car. The report of the commission opens with this statement: "The subject of this complaint is the so-called terminal charge of $2 per car imposed by the defendants for the delivery of carloads of live stock at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago," and its order was in terms that the railroad companies be— "required to cease and desist on or before the 1st day of February, 1908, from exacting for the delivery of live stock at the Union Stock Yards, in Chicago, Ill., with respect to shipments of live stock transported by them from points outside of that State, their present terminal charge of $2 per car. "It is further ordered that said defendants be, and they are hereby notified and required to establish and put in force on or before the 1st day of February, 1908, and apply thereafter during a period of not less than two years, for the delivery of live stock at the Union Stock Yards, in said Chicago, with respect to shipments of live stock transported by them from points outside the State of Illinois, a terminal charge which shall not exceed $1 per car, if any terminal charge is maintained by them." The sixth section of the act known as the "Hepburn Act," (an act to amend the Interstate Commerce Act, passed on June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584), requires carriers to file with the commission and print and keep open to inspection schedules showing, among other things, "separately all terminal charges and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates." By § 15 the commission is authorized and required, upon a complaint, to inquire and determine what would be a just and reasonable rate or rates, charge or charges. This, of course, includes all charges, and the carrier is entitled to have a finding that any particular charge is unreasonable and unjust before it is required to change such charge. For services that it may render or procure to be rendered off its own line, or outside the mere matter of transportation over its line, it may charge and receive compensation. Southern Railway Co. v. St. Louis Hay Co., 214 U. S. 297. If the terminal charge be in and of itself just and reasonable it cannot be condemned or the carrier required to change it on the ground that it, taken with prior charges of transportation over the lines of the carrier or of connecting carriers, makes the total charge to the shipper unreasonable. That which must be corrected and condemned is not the just and reasonable terminal charge, but those prior charges which must of themselves be unreasonable in order to make the aggregate of the charge from the point of shipment to that of delivery unreasonable and unjust. In order to avail itself of the benefit of this rule the carrier must separately state its terminal or other special charge complained of, for if many matters are lumped in a single charge it is impossible for either shipper or commission to determine how much of the lump charge is for the terminal or special services. The carrier is under no obligations to charge for terminal services. Business interests may justify it in waiving any such charge, and it will be considered to have waived it unless it makes plain to both shipper and commission that it is insisting upon it. In the case in 186 U. S. supra, we sustained the decree of the lower court, restraining the reduction of the terminal charge from $2 to $1 as to all stock shipped to Chicago, although the commission had stated that there had been a reduction of the through rate from certain points by from $10 to $15, in reference to which reduction and its effect upon the order of the commission we said, speaking by Mr. Justice White, after quoting from the report of the commission (pp. 338, 339): "In other words, it was held that the rate, which was unjust and unreasonable solely because of the $1 excess, continued to be unjust and unreasonable after this rate had been reduced by from ten to fifteen dollars. This was based, not upon a finding of fact-as of course it could not have been so based-but rested alone on the ruling by the commission that it could not consider the reduction in the through rate, but must confine its attention to the $2 terminal rate, since that alone was the subject-matter of the complaint. But, as we have previously shown, the commission, in considering the terminal rate, had expressly found that it was less than the cost of service, and was therefore intrinsically just and reasonable, and could only be treated as unjust and unreasonable by considering 'the circumstances of the case;' that is, the through rate and the fact that a terminal charge was included in it, which, when added to the $2 charge, caused the terminal charge as a whole to be unreasonable. Having therefore decided that the $2 terminal charge could only be held to be unjust and unreasonable by combining it with the charge embraced in the through rate, necessarily the through rate was entitled to be taken into consideration if the previous conclusions of the commission were well founded. It cannot be in reason said that the inherent reasonableness of the terminal rate, separately considered, is irrelevant because its reasonableness is to be determined by considering the through rate and the terminal charge contained in it, and yet when the reasonableness of the rate is demonstrated, by considering the through rate as reduced, it be then held that the through rate should not be considered. In other words, two absolutely conflicting propositions cannot at the same time be adopted. As the finding was that both the terminal charge of $2 and the through rate as reduced when separately considered were |