just and reasonable, and as the further finding was that as a consequence of the reduction of from ten to fifteen dollars per car, the rates, considered together, were just and reasonable, it follows that there can be no possible view of the case by which the conclusion that the rates were unjust and unreasonable can be sustained."

The tariff schedules of the appellees make clear the separate terminal charge for delivery from their own lines to the Union Stock Yards. We quote the schedule of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company:

"The live stock station and stock yards of this company in Chicago are located at Mayfair, and the rates named herein apply only to live stock intended for delivery at, or received and transported from the stock yards of the company at Mayfair, in Chicago.

"Upon all live stock consigned to or from the Union Stock Yards in Chicago, or industries located on the Union Stock Yards Railway or the Indiana State Line Railway, and transported and delivered to or received and transported from said Union Stock Yards or said industries located on said Union Stock Yards Railway, or the Indiana State Line Railway, aforesaid, a charge of two dollars ($2.00) per car will be made for the special and separate service of transporting such cars to said Union Stock Yards, or to said industries on said Union Stock Yards Railway, or the Indiana State Line Railway, from this company's own rails, or of transporting such cars from said Union Stock Yards, or said industries on said Union Stock Yards Railway, or the Indiana State Line Railway, to this company's own rails."

The others are equally specific. In some of them, as in those of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, it is provided:

"The attention of the shipper must be and is called to the fact that the transportation charge on live stock delivered at our own yards at Corwith in Chicago will be two dollars ($2.00) per car less than when delivered at the Union Stock Yards

at Chicago, or at industries located on the Union Stock Yards Railway or the Indiana State Line Railway, and the agent should ascertain definitely at which point the shipper desires delivery to be made. The live stock contract must then be filled out so as to show the correct destination and rate as provided by the tariff and amendments."

Further, it is shown by the affidavits that the amount of such terminal charge is not entered upon the general freight charges of the companies, but is kept as a separate item. The Union Stock Yards Company is an independent corporation and the fact, if it be a fact, that most or even all of its stock is owned by the several railroad companies entering into Chicago does not make its lines or property part of the lines or property of the separate railroad companies.

With reference to the reasonableness of the terminal charge, it was stipulated on the hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission that all the testimony taken in the former proceedings might be considered. It also appears that additional testimony was there offered. None of this testimony has been printed in the record presented to us. We have, however, our former decision as well as the report of the commission on the recent hearing, and also the affidavits filed on this application, and can consider them. It appears from the former case that, after some discussion, when testimony was being offered on the question of reasonableness, the commission suggested that it was probably unnecessary to offer further evidence, and said (186 U. S. 327):

“To remove all doubt upon that subject, however, if it is not clearly found, we now find that, looking entirely to the cost of service, and including as a part of that cost the trackage charge paid the Union Stock Yards and Transit Company and the unloading charge paid that same company, the amount of this terminal, if, under the circumstances of this case, it is proper to impose the charge is reasonable. If any modification of the present findings is necessary, they are hereby modified to that extent.""

And in the excerpt put into the margin in the opinion of this court is a statement of the actual and estimated expense to the different railroads for making such delivery, which makes it quite clear that the charge was a reasonable one. This finding as to the reasonableness of the charge was repeated again by the commission.

In its report in the present case it said:

"The original case did not show the cost of making delivery of other kinds of carload freight at this market, but the present record shows that the average cost to one defendant, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, of delivering all kinds of carload freight, including live stock, is $5.40 per car, while the cost of delivering live stock is not far from $2 per car. The testimony further indicates that the average cost of delivering all kinds of carload freight does not differ much in the case of the Santa Fe from that in the case of the other defendants, although it does not appear that several of the defendants are at greater expense than $2 per car in making delivery of live stock at the stock yards. We think it fairly appears upon this record that the total cost to these defendants of delivering live stock at the Union Stock Yards, including the trackage charge, is not much, if any, above onehalf the average cost of handling all carload freight in the city of Chicago."

Under those circumstances it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that, considered of and by itself, the terminal charge of two dollars a car was reasonable. If any shipper is wronged by the aggregate charge from the place of shipment to the Union Stock Yards it would seem necessarily to follow that the wrong was done in the prior charges for transportation, and, as we have already stated, should be corrected by proper proceedings against the companies guilty of that wrong, otherwise injustice will be done. If this charge, reasonable in itself, be reduced the Union Stock Yards Company will suffer loss while the real wrongdoers will escape. It may be that it is more convenient for the commission to strike at the terminal

charge, but the convenience of commission or court is not the measure of justice.

We are unable to find any error in the conclusions of the trial judges, and their order is, therefore,

Affirmed.

HANOVER NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK v. SUDDATH, RECEIVER OF AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK OF ABILENE.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 12. Argued April 20, 1909.-Decided November 29, 1909.

When a bank refuses to do the particular thing requested with securities delivered to it for that purpose only, it is its duty to return the securities and no general lien in its favor attaches to them. The fact that a bank has in its possession securities which were sent to it for a particular purpose and which it is its duty to return to the sender, does not justify its retaining them for any other purpose under a banker's agreement giving it a general lien on all securities deposited by the sender.

A banker's agreement giving a general lien on securities deposited by its correspondent will not be construed so as to give it a broad meaning beyond its evident scope and in conflict with the precepts of duty, good faith and confidence necessary for commercial transactions; nor will a printed form prepared by the banker be so extended by the construction of any ambiguous language.

In this case it was held that the retention by a bank of securities for a purpose different from that for which they were sent by its correspondent could not be predicated on the consent of the latter, and that inaction of the correspondent could not be construed as consent.

149 Fed. Rep. 127, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

215 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

Mr. Percy S. Dudley for plaintiff in error:

Plaintiff in error had the right to retain the notes under the express terms of the collateral agreement. Auten v. Bank, 174 U. S. 125, 145; Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28, and cases cited. As to scope of words "or otherwise" see Farr v. Nichols, 132 N. Y. 327. As bailee of the notes the Hanover Bank had a lien on them. Benjamin on Sales, § 2, Am. note. As to construction of the agreement, see Gillet v. Bank, 160 N. Y. 549; Sattler v. Hallock, 160 N. Y. 291, 297; Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 233; Hutchinson v. Manhattan Co., 150 N. Y. 250; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., 1016. Plaintiff in error had the right to retain the notes by virtue of its bankers' lien. 1 Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., 342; 1 Morse on Banks, 4th ed., § 324; Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 390; Biebinger v. Continental Bank, 99 U. S. 143; Bank of Montreal v. White, 154 U. S. 660; Petrie v. Myers, 54 How. Pr. 513, distinguished, and see Armstrong v. Chemical Bank, 41 Fed. Rep. 234; Continental Bank v. Weems, 60 Texas, 489.

The receiver of the Abilene Bank took the assets subject to the claim of the Hanover Bank and obligation existing when he took possession. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499; Rankin v. City Nat. Bank, 208 U. S. 541.

The Hanover Bank had the consent of the Abilene Bank to retain the notes. Mailing the letters was a delivery and had the Abilene Bank mailed cash it would have been subject to lien of Hanover Bank although not delivered until after the failure; it is so also as to these notes. McDonald v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 174 U. S. 610; Ruggles v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 114 N. Y. 415.

Mr. Edward B. Whitney, with whom Mr. Francis F. Oldham was on the brief, for defendant in error:

The Hanover Bank had no general lien on the notes involved. Brandao v. Barnett, 12 Cl. & Fin. 787; Story or Agency, § 381; 1 Morse on Banks, 4th ed., 597; Bank of Met.