7. Federal; equity jurisdiction; effect of absence of parties.
In this case the absent party was not of the same State as complainant
and had no interest in common with complainant and while a
proper, was not an indispensable party, as his interests were
separate and could be protected by retention of his legacy by the
executors subject to adjudication in another suit. Ib.

3. Federal and state; when decisions of latter courts binding upon former.
Rules of law relating to real estate, so established by state decisions
rendered before the rights of the parties accrued, as to have be-
come rules of property and action, are accepted by the Federal
court; but where the law has not thus been settled it is the right
and duty of the Federal court to exercise its own judgment, as it
always does in cases depending on doctrines of commercial law
and general jurisprudence. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 349.

9. Federal and state; comity.

Even in questions in which the Federal court exercises its own judg-
ment, the Federal court should, for the sake of comity and to
avoid confusion, lean to agreement with the state court if the
question is balanced with doubt. Ib.

10. Federal and state; when former should exercise independent judg-
ment on questions concerning real estate.

When determining the effect of conveyances or written instruments
between private parties, citizens of different States, it is the right
and duty of the Federal court to exercise its own independent
judgment where no authoritative state decision had been ren-
dered by the state court before the rights of the parties had ac-
crued and become final. Ib.

11. Federal and state; when former not bound by decision of latter in
construction of deed of real estate.

The Federal court is not bound by a decision of the state court, ren-
dered after the deed involved in the case in the Federal court was
made and after the injury was sustained, holding that there is no
implied reservation in a deed conveying subsurface coal and the
right to mine it to leave enough coal to support the surface in its
original position. Ib.

12. Federal; conclusiveness of state decisions and statutes on.
Notwithstanding the conformity act, §914, Rev. Stat., decisions
and statutes of States are not conclusive upon the Federal courts
in determining questions of jurisdiction. Mechanical Appliance
Co. v. Castleman, 437.

13. Conflict with Interstate Commerce Commission-Paramount power
of commission in respect of regulation of interstate commerce.
Regulations which are primarily within the competency of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission are not subject to judicial super-
vision or enforcement until that body has been properly afforded
an opportunity to exert its administrative functions. Texas &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, ap-
plied, and Southern Railway Co. v. Tift, 206 U. S. 428, distin-
guished. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 481.

14. Interference in matters within competency of Interstate Commerce
Commission-Regulation of distribution of coal cars.

The distribution to shippers of coal cars including those owned by
the shippers and those used by the carrier for its own fuel is a
matter involving preference and discrimination and within the
competency of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the
courts cannot interfere with regulations in regard to such dis-
tribution until after action thereon by the commission. Ib.

15. Limitations on, under court review provisions of § 15 of act to regulate
commerce as amended in 1906.
Under the court review provisions of § 15 of the act to regulate com-
merce as amended in 1906, the courts are limited to the question
of power of the commission to make the order and cannot con-
sider the wisdom or expediency of the order itself. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad, ante, p. 452.)
Ib.

1. Right of defendant as to production of witnesses against him-Direction
of verdict against accused.

When the Government prosecutes by indictment for a penalty that it
might sue for in a civil action the person proceeded against is
entitled to all constitutional protection as to production of
witnesses against him and a verdict cannot be directed against
him as might be the case in a civil action. United States v. Steven-
son, 190.

2. Conspiracy to commit offense against United States within meaning
of § 5440, Rev. Stat.

Where Congress has made an act a crime and indictable it follows that
if two or more conspire to commit the act they conspire to com-
mit an offense against the United States within the meaning of
§ 5440, Rev. Stat.; and so held in regard to conspiring to assist
immigration of contract laborers in violation of 8 4 of the Im-
migration Act of February 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898. United
States v. Stevenson (No. 2), 200.

3. Intent; how charged; when its existence is and is not question for jury.
Where intent is an essential ingredient of a crime it may be charged

in general terms and its existence becomes a question for the jury,
excepting only where the criminal intent could not as a matter
of law have existed under any possible circumstances. United
States v. Corbett, 233.

4. Intent to injure national bank as incident of offense defined by § 5209,
Rev. Stat.

Under Rev. Stat., § 5209, false entries as to the condition of a national
bank may be made with intent to injure the bank even though
they show the bank to be in a more favorable condition than it
actually is, and the question of intent to injure is one for the
jury. Ib.

See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 1;
CUSTOMS LAW, 1;

STATUTES, A 2-7, 9.

CUSTOMS LAW.

EXTRADITION;
INDIANS, 2, 3, 5;

1. Administrative act of 1890 construed-Weigher within provisions of
§ 9.
Under § 9 of the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, c. 407,
26 Stat. 131, 135, providing punishment for making and aiding
in false entries, the words "owner, importer, consignee, agent
or other person" include a weigher representing the Government,
and his acts come within the letter and purpose of the statute.
United States v. Mescall, 26.

2. Departmental construction entitled to great weight—Similitude classifi-
cation of sake.
The construction given by the Department charged with executing
a tariff act is entitled to great weight; and where for a number
of years a manufactured article has been classified under the
similitude section this court will lean in the same direction; and

so held that the Japanese beverage, sake, is properly dutiable
under § 297 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, c. 11, 30 Stat. 151,
205, as similar to still wine and not as similar to beer. Komada
v. United States, 392.

3. Departmental classification of article; effect on, of subsequent legisla-
tion of Congress.

After a departmental classification of an article under the similitude
section of a tariff law, the reënactment, by Congress, of a tariff
law without specially classifying that article may be regarded
as a qualified approval by Congress of such classification. Ib.

DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

DRY-DOCKS.

See ADMIRALTY.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 5.

DURESS.

See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY;
LOCAL LAW (OKLA.).

EJUSDEM GENERIS.

See STATUTES, A 11.

ELECTION.

See CONTRACTS, 8.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.

1. Effect of decision in 207 U. S. at p. 463 on validity as to District of
Columbia and Territories.

This court did not in its decision of the Employers' Liability Cases,
207 U. S. 463, hold the act of June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 Stat.
232, unconstitutional so far as it related to the District of Columbia
and the Territories, and expressly refused to interpret the act as
applying only to such employés of carriers in the District and
Territories as were engaged in interstate commerce. El Paso &
Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 87.

2. Intent of Congress as respects District of Columbia and Territories
-Act constitutional when applied to District and Territories.
The evident intent of Congress in enacting the Employers' Liability
Act of June 11, 1906, was to enact the curative provisions of the
law as applicable to the District of Columbia and the Territories
under its plenary power irrespective of the interstate commerce
feature of the act, and although unconstitutional as to the latter
as held in 207 U. S. 463, it is constitutional and paramount as to
commerce wholly in the District and Territories. Ib.

3. Effect to supersede prior territorial legislation.

The Employers' Liability Act of June 11, 1906, being a constitutional
regulation of commerce in the District of Columbia and the
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