Territories necessarily supersedes prior territorial legislation on
the same subject and non-compliance by the plaintiff employé
with a provision of a territorial statute (in this case of New
Mexico) cannot be pleaded by the defendant employer as a bar
to an action for personal injuries. Ib.
ENTRYMEN.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
1. Interference by injunction to enforce policy of State as to conservation
of natural resources.
Where the remedy at law is of doubtful adequacy and the policy of
the State is clearly indicated for the protection of an important
industry, equity may interfere, although under different circum-
stances an injunction might be denied; and so held as to an in-
junction against cutting or boxing timber on pine lands in Georgia.
Graves v. Ashburn, 331.
2. Of suit to remove cloud on title to land in absence of allegation of
possession.
Possession of unenclosed woodland in natural condition is a fiction
of law rather than a possible fact, and can reasonably be assumed
to follow the title; and, in this case, held that a suit in equity
could be maintained to remove cloud on title and cancel a fraudu-
lent deed of timber lands in Georgia notwithstanding there was
no allegation of possession. Ib.
3. Jurisdiction of suit to cancel deed valid on its face.
A suit in equity may be maintained to cancel a deed improperly given
where the invalidity does not appear on its face, and under
which by the state law, as in Georgia, possession might give a
title. Ib.
4. Jurisdiction of suit to cancel deed; effect of commission of waste by
defendant.
The fact that the defendant has, during the pendency of an equity
action to set aside a deed, continued to waste the property does
not destroy the jurisdiction of the court; the bill may be retained
and damages assessed. Ib.
5. Reformation of instruments; scope of inquiry.
In a suit in equity to have a deed declared a mortgage and in which
fraud, oppression and undue influence are charged, the court is
not concluded by what appears on the face of the papers but may
inquire into the real facts of the transactions. (Russell v. Southard,
12 How. 139.) Wagg v. Herbert, 546.
6. Reformation of instruments; effect on status of parties.
A court of equity may decree that a deed given in settlement of a
mortgage debt, no new consideration moving, was, by reason
of fraud, oppression and undue influence, merely a new mort-
gage, and by such decree no new contract is created by the court,
and the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee originally existing
is not disturbed. Ib.
7. Laches barring recovery; analogy to statute of limitations.
Though laches may be the equitable equivalent of the legal statute of
limitations, there is no fixed time that makes it a bar, and in this
case a delay of a little over two years (the statutory period) in
bringing an action to have a deed declared an equitable mort-
gage did not amount to laches. Ib.
8. Specific enforcement of right to apply for patent to lands.
A right to an instrument that will confer a title in a thing is a right to
the thing itself, and a statutory right to apply for a patent to
mining lands is a right that equity will specifically enforce.
Reavis v. Fianza, 16.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
EXPLAINED CASES.
See CASES EXPLAINED.
1. Rights of accused-Not entitled to notice of executive consideration of
The executive of a State upon whom a demand is made for the surren-
der of a fugitive from justice may act on the papers in the absence
of, and without notice to, the accused, and it is for that executive
to determine whether he will regard the requisition papers as
sufficient proof that the accused has been charged with crime in,
and is a fugitive from justice from, the demanding State, or
whether he will demand, as he may if he sees fit so to do, further
proof in regard to such facts. Marbles v. Creecy, 63.
2. Surrender of fugitive; effect on legality, of notice in requisition that
demanding State not responsible for expenses of extradition.
A notice in the requisition papers that the demanding State will not
be responsible for any expenses attending the arrest and delivery
of the fugitive does not affect the legality of the surrender so far
as the rights of the accused under the Constitution and laws of
the United States are concerned. Ib.
3. Considerations not affecting judgment of executive of surrendering
State.
The executive of the surrendering State need not be controlled in the
discharge of his duty by considerations of race or color, or, in
the absence of proof, by suggestions that the alleged fugitive will
not be fairly dealt with by the demanding State. Ib.
4. Requisition; assumption of fairness and good faith in making.
On habeas corpus the court can assume that a requisition made by an
executive of a State is solely for the purpose of enforcing its
laws and that the person surrendered will be legally tried and
adequately protected from illegal violence. Ib.
5. Foreign; sufficiency of complaint.
In foreign extradition proceedings the complaint is sufficient to au-
thorize the commissioner to act if it so clearly and explicitly
states a treaty crime that the accused knows exactly what the
charge is; nor need the record and depositions from the demand-
ing country be actually fastened to the complaint. Yordi v.
Nolte, 227.
6. Foreign-Hearing before commissioner; admissibility of depositions.
In this case held that depositions in the possession of the officer of
the demanding country making the complaint, which showed
actual grounds for the prosecution and of which the commis-
sioner had knowledge, from their use in a former proceeding,
were admissible on the hearing before the commissioner and
were also admissible for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction in
him to issue the warrant. Ib.
7. Foreign; sufficiency of evidence to establish extraditable crime of
forgery under treaty with Mexico, for purpose of holding accused
for extradition.
In this case this court, reviewing the evidence, reverses the territorial
court and finds that there is evidence to show, with sufficient
certainty, that an extraditable crime was committed by the
person benefited thereby, and thus to satisfy the extradition
procedure statute and justify the order of the commissioner
committing the accused to await the action of the Executive
Department on a requisition made for forgery under the treaty
with Mexico. Elias v. Ramirez, 398.
8. Foreign; admissibility of evidence before commissioner.
Although the statements of certain witnesses were unsworn to and
therefore might not, under the state law, be admissible before a
committing magistrate, under the extradition statute they are
receivable by the commissioner to create a probability of the
commission of the crime by the accused. Ib.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 6, 10, 12;
REMOVAL OF Causes, 5.
FALSE ENTRIES.
See STATUTES, A 2.
Absence of Federal question in case involving title derived under Federal
authority, where decision based on general law.
The determination by a state court that a purchaser pendente lite from
the trustee of a bankrupt is bound by the decree against the
trustee in the action of which he has notice gives effect to such
decree under the principles of general law; and if, as in this case,
it does not involve passing on the nature and character of the
rights of the parties arising from the transaction of purchase and
sale, no Federal question is involved. Kenney v. Craven, 125.
See JURISDICTION;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 15.
FIRE DAMAGE.
See ADMIRALTY, 1.
FOLLOWED CASES.
See CASES FOLLOWED.
FOREIGN EXTRADITION.
See EXTRADITION, 5-8.
FORGERY.
See EXTRADITION, 7.
Delay in completing work under statutory permission; effect of injunction
The fact that for a time work was enjoined at the instance of the
Government does not excuse the delay in completing work under
statutory permission within the time prescribed where the delay
exceeds the limit after deducting all the time for which the in-
junction was in force. Rio Grande Dam &c. Co. v. United States,
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;
CORPORATIONS, 1–4.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3, 4.
FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.
See EXTRADITION, 1-3.
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