Ford on the left; and Sigel on the extreme right. Such was the position of Pope's army when he faced again to confront the advancing foe. The majority of McClellan's troops were to land at Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, twelve miles north of Fredericksburg, where Burnside was then in command. From Aquia Creek they could be conveyed by rail to Fredericksburg, where they would take the route up the Rappahannock; the last command all the time serving as Pope's left.

This was a dangerous move; the line was entirely too long, reaching from Fredericksburg to Sulphur Springs, opposite Warrenton; the line was weak and liable to be pierced at any point by either Longstreet or Jackson; but that was the plan decided upon by Halleck, and orders from him had to be obeyed. He was managing the battle from his office at Washington. It was frequently observed by military men that he ought to take command in person on the field.

On the 21st the forces of Longstreet and Jackson lined the right bank of the Rappahannock. Soon cannonading commenced, and was continued for some time, but no strong attempt was made to cross the river. There were one or two advances, as if they intended to force a passage, but subsequent events proved that they were simply feeling our position. On the 22d Longstreet extended his lines. up the river to cover the space which Jackson occupied the day before, Jackson having already begun his flank movement of Pope's army. At Hazel River Milroy attacked his rear, but did not delay him much. Finding Freeman's Ford well guarded, he passed on to Waterloo Bridge, where only a light guard was posted; this was brushed aside by General Early, who crossed to the same side with Pope, who had anticipated that move, and really welcomed it, for he wanted a part of their forces to get far enough over to crush them before they could receive assist

ance.

In the mean time Pope changed his mind, and was going

to cross to the right side of the Rappahannock and attack Longstreet while Jackson was seeking a crossing higher up the river. He thought there were enough troops coming from Washington to take care of Jackson, as Halleck had written him on the 21st: "Do your best to keep possession of the Rappahannock. To-morrow large rëenforcements. Defend every inch of ground; fight like the devil until we can rëenforce you. In forty-eight hours you shall have all

the troops you want."

On the night of the 22d a terrible storm raged in that part of the State. The Rappahannock is a short river at best, and the two armies lay at the foot of the mountains on either side of the river, so that in a few hours the rushing torrents from the mountain sides began to swell the quiet little river into a roaring stream of power and force. It struck the Waterloo Bridge and swept it away; which left Early in a bad predicament. He could neither get back, nor could they assist him. If Pope could grapple him before the river fell he would have been captured; but Pope had arranged his forces with reference to crossing the river and attacking Longstreet; so it took some time to countermand the orders and have them march on Early. Sigel was ordered to Waterloo Bridge to cut off his retreat, or prevent any assistance being rendered him by Jackson. Reno and Banks were to closely follow him, while McDowell and Reynolds were ordered to Waterloo.

Sigel had the hardest part of the work to perform, as his route was parallel with the river, and he was compelled to cross its tributaries, which were so swollen that it greatly retarded his progress. Jackson knew Early's perilous position, and hastily constructed a trestle bridge, by which communication was reestablished between the forces during the night, and at daybreak Early recrossed the river.

Buford arrived there a few hours later, only to meet with a sad disappointment. But there was a superabundance of that on hand during that campaign. It was just then learned that Stuart was at Catletts Station, and had

captured General Pope's papers, which contained information valuable to the enemy. It sent a shudder through our forces, for there seemed to be lurking in every move some disaster to our armies. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad had to furnish our supplies, and Stuart, as a matter of course, would tear up the track, and destroy the telegraph, leaving us completely cut off from Washington. It was a gloomy state of affairs, yet the soldiers kept in good spirits, hoping for the best.

We were yet holding on to the line of the Rappahannock with powerful tenacity, anxiously looking for the promised reënforcements Halleck said would arrive within fortyeight hours.

The Rappahannock was still very high, and the artillery of both armies kept up a constant fire without producing any material results.

On the 24th, Pope's command was as follows: Sigel at Waterloo Bridge, with Banks on his left; Reno at Sulphur Springs, Ricketts was east of Waterloo Bridge, and King was near Sulphur Springs. Porter's corps was marching up the river from Fredericksburg, while Heintzelman, who landed on the 22d at Alexandria, sent forward Kearny's division to Manassas by rail. The next day the remainder of his corps, and a division under General Sturgis, followed Kearny.

The Stuart raid, in Pope's rear, caused great consternation; the trains were cautiously run, fearing at any time to suffer from Stuart's removing a rail to wreck and capture them.

Jackson was aware of the great alarm that Stuart had caused, and knew his cavalry would be defeated if met by the Federal forces; he therefore hurried forward to assist in the great destruction in Pope's rear, following the Hedgeman River (the Rappahannock assumes that name above Waterloo) until he reached Hinson's Ford, where he crossed and passed through Orleans.

The range of the Bull Run Mountains lay between him