Sergeant Laurence M. Baker, of Company F, fell mor tally wounded. On hearing of it his brother Isaac went to him. He had scarcely got there when the bugle sounded, indicating that a new movement was to be made. "Leave me and rush to the front!" shouted the dying sergeant; and in a short time he was numbered with the dead.

The roll of honor of the 76th New York is quite lengthy, and I will content myself with giving some of their names: Thomas H. Hoffman, Albert Olin, James J. Card, Captain Fox, Captain Sager, and Captain Swan, are among the noted ones; though there was scarcely a member of the regiment who was not a true soldier, deserving of honorable mention. The firing ceased, after dark, almost simultaneously, and both armies occupied the ground upon which they fought until half-past ten o'clock. General Hatch, hearing the firing, returned to ascertain the cause, and like a true soldier went to the sound of battle. He reached the field about the time the action was over, having countermarched his brigade.

Gen. John F. Reynolds, who commanded the Pennsylvania Reserves, heard the firing and came to us, attended only by an orderly. He said he would return and bring up his division. General King in the mean time had assumed command and called a council of war on the side of the pike in the evening perhaps between nine and ten o'clock, at which the four brigade commanders were consulted as to what should be done.

General Gibbon being the junior brigadier, was first asked his opinion. He decided that General King should withdraw from the field towards Manassas Junction.

General Patrick was then asked for his opinion, who inquired what General King's orders were. On being informed that they were to move to Centerville, by the way of the pike, said "Then I should go to Centerville, sir."

General Doubleday expressed himself decidedly of General Patrick's opinion. General Hatch said in 1892, "that

he did not understand it was a regular council of war, but that they got together and gave their opinions. He says he advised King to go to Centerville by the way of Manassas for the reason that he would avoid a heavy force of the enemy and obtain rations at Manassas." McDowell was in command of Pope's left wing; he did not delegate his powers to King or any other officer when he rode ahead to consult Pope, so King had no authority to act except as he did. McDowell did not return to his command until ten o'clock the next day, then Longstreet was arriving on the field and McDowell's opportunity forever gone.

If McDowell, who had ridden on ahead, had returned like Hatch when he heard the battle commence, he could have held his ground, and not only have fought Jackson, but have won a victory over him. Only six of his regiments had been engaged against six brigades of the enemy, and the Comte de Paris says, "They held their ground until darkness put an end to the conflict."

It is true those two brigades, with the exception of the 95th New York, were badly cut up. But there were Patrick's magnificent brigade and Hatch's; neither had been engaged, and they were in splendid condition. The Pennsylvania Reserves were close at hand.

Sigel's Corps opened the fight next morning at half past six, with Reno and Heintzelman at Greenwich to be hastened forward, as they never lagged when there was a chance to engage the enemy. McDowell was in good condition to go at his work next morning. Here is McDowell's view of it. At a conference at the Riggs House, after the war, when Major Halstead told him of the council of war, the night of the 28th, and what transpired at it, he turned to Halstead with a look of surprise and indignation, and said "Major, this is the first I ever knew that King called a council of war, and I never knew before why the division went to Manassas Junction. I always felt very hard at my brigadiers, who were all West Point graduates for leaving the field unless they came to Centerville according

to orders. I feel aggrieved that Gibbon should have disappointed me so, after I promoted him from captain of a battery and made him a brigadier, and otherwise greatly supported him, which" McDowell said "was a permanent benefit to Gibbon." I listened closely when this conversation took place, and took note of it at the time, so as to give McDowell the benefit of his statement.

No officer or veteran will be written up or down in this work; it shall be as correct, after years of study, as I can make it. This was but a short time before McDowell died, and he seemed to be greatly hurt over Major Halstead's statement. From that conversation he gave us to fully understand that he did not presume the division would leave its position after the battle that evening. He said: "Two brigades had held their ground against two of Jackson's divisions and, at the close of a severe action were in good spirits. We were feeling for Jackson, and when his real position was developed that evening, the division should have remained there and renewed the battle early next morning."

While McDowell felt thus toward his generals, for leaving the field after the battle on the 28th, which resulted, as he said, in King's division abandoning the position, which was the key of the whole field, yet he was just ahead of Hatch when the firing began, and said to me that he distinctly heard it, yet he kept on, although he was in command of the left wing, two-thirds of Pope's army. It certainly was his bounden duty to return and assume command.

Hill's

The enemy had thrown two out of three divisions on Doubleday and Gibbon, and were badly handled. division alone had not been engaged.

If McDowell had returned, on the evening of the 28th, and assumed command of his troops, and directed

* In answer to my question, if he heard the battle of Gainesville, he said he did. I asked him where he was? "Not far from the Stone Bridge." In answer to my question why he did not return and assume command, he said he wanted to see Pope.