Hooker's command, but three were engaged, as the following telegrams fully state: NEW YORK, May 6, 1863-3 p. m. Nothing will so cheer the hearts of all good men as the immediate reënforcement of General Hooker by troops from around Washington, Fort Monroe and Suffolk. E. D. MORGAN, Governor of New York. To His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States. WASHINGTON, D. C., General Hooker has had, has now, and will have, everything he asks for by telegraph, which is always in full connection with the War Department. He knows best what he wants, and when and where, and directs everything according to his own plans. He reports confidentially that only three corps of his army, all told, have been engaged. You need not be told that this is less than half the army in his command and actually with him. Further accumulation of troops, not called for by him, would exhaust his supplies and endanger his plans. Be patient. Governor MORGAN, New York. WILLIAM H. Seward, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of 11 a. m. and 12:30. The army had previously recrossed the river and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above I see no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing. JOSEPH HOOKER, His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States. Major General. This dispatch of Hooker's states it in full, "There is a better place nearer at hand." That position was held by Sedgwick until five o'clock on the evening of the 4th, then he was forced down to Banks' Ford, which he crossed under cover of darkness. Gen. Martin McMahon, Sedgwick's chief of staff, superintended the crossing of the troops under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. Hooker closes his dispatch by an expression of gladness that the cavalry had finally turned up. Hooker made a mistake when he placed Stoneman in command of the cavalry. He lacked dash and foresight in such a degree, qualities so necessary for a cavalry leader, that his circuit around Lee's army really was a failure. If Hooker had held him closer, he might have made better use of him and, when Lee began to retreat, have ordered him to throw his cavalry in the advance to destroy the railroads, and intercept supplies and reënforcements for the Confederate army. Hooker knew that Longstreet might suddenly return from Suffolk with Pickett's and Hood's divisions, and his idea for Stoneman to approach as near Richmond as possible and destroy the railroad for several miles, would have not only prevented supplies being sent to Lee, but would have prevented reënforcements either by Longstreet or by any other command that might be convenient to move forward to Fredericksburg. The dispatches of Hooker and Sedgwick crossed each other, which produced great confusion. When Hooker found that Sedgwick was on the left bank of the Rappahannock, and the Confederate forces were in full possession of Marye's Heights and the plain west of Chancellorsville, the only place where a great battle could be fought, and knowing that he was hemmed in on the right bank, where he could not maneuver his army without risk, he decided to withdraw immediately. Then he resolved to call a council of war, composed of his corps commanders, to decide the question whether battle should be offered to the enemy, or retire across the Rappahannock. But it seems that the matter was not fully settled at that consultation. Reynolds, Meade and Howard were for attacking the enemy, while Couch had not studied the situation full enough to desire to give a positive opinion, but inclined to support the position taken by Reynolds, Meade and Howard. Hancock testified before the com'mittee on the conduct of the war: "I understood from him (Couch) always that he was in favor of fighting them." Slocum came in late and apparently did not receive his notice in due time. Sickles was the only corps commander who seriously opposed an attack on the enemy. He was the only volunteer in command of a corp. All the others were West Point graduates, though none had fought more skillfully or valiantly than he (Sickles). His night fight against Jackson was one of the most gallant efforts of the war, and was certainly one of the most brilliant moves recorded in history. As a volunteer officer he modestly refused to pit. his opinion against officers whose scientific training had especially fitted them to judge, but he based his reason on a political standpoint. He was fearful, if they persisted in still further keeping up the battle on a field where there had been four days of solid disaster to the Union army, that it would have a very depressing effect throughout the country. It seems that this fear was shared by Governor Morgan, from his telegram to the President: HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, GENERAL :—An issue having been raised between the commanding general and myself in regard to the construction to be placed on the language I used at the consultation of corps commanders held on the night of May 4, I would esteem it a personal favor if you would, at your earliest convenience, state your recollection of what I said, and the impression it made on you at the time. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. G. MEADE, Major General. HDQRS. FIRST ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF POTOMAC, May 24, 1863. GENERAL :--Your note of the 22d instant has been received. My recollection of the substance of the remarks made by you at the consultation of the corps commanders, held on the night of the 4th of May, is that you were decidedly in favor of an advance in the direction of Fredericksburg at daylight the next morning; that you considered this army had already too long been made subservient to the safety of Washington, and you threw that out of the question altogether. This drew the remarks from General Sickles. I simply said, as my corps was the only one which had not been engaged, I could not urge my opinion, but that I agreed with you. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, To Major General GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Fifth Army Corps, Army of Potomac. If Hooker needed encouragement from his generals to attack the enemy, he most assuredly had it. Sickles alone opposed an advance. But if it had been decided to make an assault on the enemy, Sickles would have led the Third Corps as gallantly as Marshal McDonald did his at Wagram, when he pierced the Austrian center and won the victory. Hooker was discouraged, and decided to retire across the Rappahannock. But it was not advisable to begin the movement in daylight, lest the enemy might observe it and attack him when his columns were breaking to the rear and illy prepared to repel an attack; so every preparation was made to recross the river that night. In the mean time the heavy rain in the mountains had so swollen the Rappahannock that the bridges were greatly endangered and, but for the good judgment of Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of artillery, it is probable that all three would have broken from their moorings and left Hooker's army on the south bank. But there was no immediate danger, even if his bridges had been swept away, for Lee made no great haste to press Hooker. It is true he made every preparation to strike him if an opportunity presented itself. After Sedgwick crossed to the Stafford side of the Rappahannock at Banks' Ford, and Gibbon had retraced his steps over the bridge at the Lacy House, opposite Fredericksburg, Barksdale was placed in command of Marye's Heights, and Early was directed to take a position opposite Banks' Ford; while Lee returned to Hooker's front at Chancellorsville, with McLaws and Anderson forming his right wing as before, and Stuart's corps was moved to the left, and the whole line strengthened. On the morning of the 5th the fog was so dense that it was impossible for Lee to make a good reconnoissance of Hooker's position, as his line mainly occupied a dense wooded front, and the heavy clouds retained the fog until late in the day. No attack was made that day, and at seven o'clock in the evening the artillery began to cross. When darkness came on the army was crowded around United States Ford, in a drenching rain, with the river rising at the rate of a foot an hour. Soon the bridges were entirely submerged and a delay occurred before the bridges could be repaired enough for the artillery to resume crossing. Meade, who had favored attacking the enemy in the council of war, and who had been charged with covering the rear, attempted to get the order countermanded when the bridges. were submerged, and have the corps return to their position and be ready to meet Lee in the morning. But no communication could be had with Hooker, as his headquarters were on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and the attempted signals of Meade failed to be understood at Hooker's headquarters-at least they were not responded to. When the morning dawn of the 6th came the Army of the Potomac had nearly passed over the river, with the Fifth Corps bringing up the rear, and marched over with Sykes' Regulars, the last division to cross. The Confederate skirmishers soon appeared on the opposite bank and made but little resistance to the taking up of the bridges by the Engineer Brigade, and at four o'clock in the afternoon they were removed. The storm still raged with unabated fury, and Lee seeing no chance farther to harass Hooker, marched his army back to Fredericksburg with the prestige of another battle in his favor. |