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subsequently relieved by the 16th Massachusetts. phreys then received an order to send Burling's (Third) brigade to the support of Graham. About four p. m. Humphreys again received an order to move forward and occupy the Emmittsburg road with his first line under General Carr, while Brewster moved up in supporting distance. Birney faced south and Humphreys faced west. This position formed a salient angle at the peach orchard where Graham and Carr united.

The Fifth Corps had arrived and took a position on the right of the Twelfth. In that position Sykes could easily turn Ewell's left flank, while Slocum, with Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and the Twelfth, could attack him in front from Culp's Hill. Meade was seriously considering an attack on Ewell as he lay stretched along Rock Creek like a snake, with the head of Johnson's division well up in front of Culp's Hill. But Slocum and Warren both urged that the ground was too rough, and the idea was abandoned. If that plan had been fully developed before Sykes arrived, and he had been directed to form a line of battle, and advance over Wolf's Hill and Benner's Hill, he would have struck Ewell in the rear, and although the steep declivity down Culp's Hill to Rock Creek would have prevented any alignment of the troops under Slocum, yet Johnson would have had to hastily retreat back in the direction of the almshouse, where the Eleventh Corps fought on the previous day, which was a very poor position. It is but just to say that the Eleventh Corps, although it was compelled to make a hasty retreat from its position on the afternoon of the first day, fought bravely, considering the fact that it was enfiladed by the artillery on Oak Hill, and the infantry force in front occupied a far more advantageous position. Had Meade attacked Ewell, he would have been compelled to push him back from Oak Hill, or else have gained no permanent advantage by the moveIn that case the whole of Meade's army necessarily would have been advanced to Seminary Ridge, which would

ment.

have made the Union army the one to assault. It was a strange coincidence that while Meade was contemplating an attack on Ewell, Lee was studying the advisability of Ewell attacking Slocum on Culp's Hill. Both commanders abandoned their movements on that part of the field on the morning of the 2d. Then Lee, turning back, rode past his headquarters over to his right where Longstreet was posted, and carefully examined the Union line in his front. That seemed to him the best point to begin the main attack, though Ewell, when he heard the guns of Longstreet, was to assault Culp's Hill, and in that way threaten Meade's center from the rear and endanger his reserve artillery and ammunition on Powers' Hill, beyond the Baltimore pike. A. P. Hill was to watch the progress of the battle, and if he could strike a favorable blow, he was to attack in the center. Lee could see the depression in the ground between Little Round Top and the eminence where Gibbon lay, and there he resolved to strike, and if possible to carry Little Round Top, which had been pointed out to him by moonlight the night before by Ewell. Longstreet looked on the work before him with deep forebodings of disaster, and was opposed to it. He wanted to march around Big Round Top, and, moving to the left flank of the Union army, take a position behind Pipe Creek, which had just been abandoned by Meade, or some other strong position, and then, being between Meade and Washington, compel him to attack the Confederate army in a position where it would have the advantage. On that point Longstreet says:

As General Lee rode to the summit of Seminary Ridge and looked down upon the town he saw the Federals in full retreat, and concentrating on the rock-ribbed hill that served as a burying-ground for the city. He sent orders to Ewell to follow up the success, if he found it practicable, and to occupy the hill on which the enemy was concentrating. As the order was not positive, and left discretionary with General Ewell, the latter thought it better to give his troops a little rest, and wait for more definite instructions. I was following the Third Corps as fast as possible, and as soon as I got possession

of the road went rapidly forward to join General Lee. I found him on the summit of Seminary Ridge watching the enemy concentrate on the opposite hill. He pointed out their position to me. I took my glasses and made as careful a survey as I could from that point. After five or ten minutes I turned to General Lee and said, "If we could have chosen a point to meet our plans of operation, I do not think we could have found a better one than that upon which 'they. are now concentrating. All we have to do is to throw our army around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Washington. We can get a strong position and wait, and if they fail to attack us, we shall have everything in condition to move back to-morrow night in the direction of Washington, selecting beforehand a good position into which we can place our troops to receive battle next day. Finding our object is Washington or that army, the Federals will be sure to attack us. When they attack we shall beat them, as we proposed to do before we left Fredericksburg, and the probabilities are that the fruits of our success will be great."

'No," said General Lee, the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there."

I suggested that such a move as I proposed would give us control of the roads leading to Washington and Baltimore, and reminded General Lee of our original plans.

If we had fallen behind Meade, and had insisted on staying between him and Washington, he would have been compelled to attack, and would have been badly beaten.

Lee was not disposed. to accept the reasoning of Longstreet, although military men of far less fame would have recognized its force at once. That move would have placed the Confederate army between Meade and his supplies at Westminster and greatly jeopardized Baltimore and Washington. It is no wonder Meade kept a jealous eye on his rear and was fully prepared for a retrograde movement if circumstances dictated. I consider the criticisms on him, in view of Longstreet's persistent attempts to have Lee move around Meade's left and gain his rear, far from just or laden. with too much patriotism. Meade was anxious to meet Lee at Gettysburg or any other place where he could safely win a victory, but he did not desire to blindly have another defeat stamped on the escutcheon of the Army of the Potomac.

Lee well remembered the Peninsular campaign, First and Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, where he had been successful. Those victories inspired him with a confidence that he could win a victory wherever he met the Union army. His soldiers greatly shared his confidence and fully relied upon his judgment, and were ready and anxious for battle at his command. The firm opposition of Longstreet to attacking the Union position nettled Lee, and he resolved to discard the advice of his hitherto trusted lieutenant. Perhaps he feared it would be a token of doubt and would lessen the morale of his army. There was another move he could make, viz, withdraw to the passes in the South Mountain range and there await Meade's attack; but as he had just left Cashtown, where he desired to meet Meade, for him then to waver was to admit that disaster might follow a conflict between the two armies; therefore he resolved to attack the position occupied by the Third Corps, and Longstreet was accordingly ordered to prepare for action. The attempt was then made to move his two divisions, Hood's and McLaws', around to the left through the woods and behind a ridge, so as to conceal the movement from the Union signal station on Little Round Top. If that could be accomplished the attack would be made a surprise, for there was then no cavalry on the immediate left of the Union army to observe the movements of the enemy or to give warning of his approach. Buford, who had suffered so severely on the morning of the first day, had been ordered from near Big Round Top to Westminster on the morning of the second, while Merritt lay at Emmittsburg, miles away. Kilpatrick and Gregg were on the right flank. But another reason other than his concealed movement influenced the delay of the attack by Longstreet, namely, Law's brigade of Hood's division, for which he was waiting, had not yet arrived. Law arrived a little before twelve o'clock, and was at once directed to move to the extreme right of the Confederate line, which was to sweep up Plum Run. When Law moved to the