The reason assigned by Meade for consolidating the corps was the reduced strength of the regiments. As Meade had served in the First Corps in the battles of second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam (where he commanded the corps after Hooker was wounded) and Fredericksburg, it seemed strange to the officers and men of that corps that it should be selected to lose its place among the corps, when it had fought so valiantly on so many fields, and had particularly distinguished itself when Meade had led it into action. At Gettysburg it held in check, with the assistance of two divisions of the Eleventh Corps, two-thirds of the Confederate army, until the other corps of the Army of the Potomac arrived. It had in reality closed the battle of Gettysburg with the charge of General Stannard. No prouder record was ever made in the military history of the world than the First Corps had. While Meade was popular with the officers and men, yet there has ever been a sincere regret in the minds of the gallant soldiers of that corps that it was blotted out as a distinctive organization. That it was a mistake is manifest from the statement of General Humphreys, in his history of "The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,” in which he says:

But it caused some dissatisfaction with both officers and enlisted men, owing to the spirit of rivalry between the several corps, the divisions of a corps, and the brigades of a division. The history and associations of these organizations were different, and when they were merged in other organizations their identity was lost and their pride and esprit de corps wounded.

But the old First Corps submitted without a murmur, and in the battles until the final surrender at Appomattox it maintained its former record on the field. Many valuable officers were left without commands. General Newton, who was in command of the corps then, and after Hancock was wounded at Gettysburg was put in command of the First, Second, and Third Corps until the close of that battle, was one of those who had suffered by the consolida

tion. The three divisions of the First Corps, commanded respectively by Gens. James C. Rice, John C. Robinson, and John R. Kenly, were consolidated and formed two divisions of the Fifth Corps. In the new organization of the Fifth Corps, three of the four divisions came from the First Corps; for Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Reserves was one of the original divisions of the First Corps, when the corps was so designated under McDowell in the spring of 1862. It was detached at Fredericksburg to join McClellan on the Peninsula, and there fought in the Fifth Corps. When McClellan's army came to the assistance of Pope, it rejoined the First Corps, and fought the battles of second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg in it; then it was again put in the Fifth Corps. Under the reorganization it was the Third Division of the Fifth Corps. John C. Robinson was given the Second Division, of three brigades. The Third Corps was made the Third and Fourth Divisions of the Second Corps.

When Grant visited Meade on the 10th, he informed him that Butler was directed to move up the right bank of the James at the same time that the Army of the Potomac would, so as to sever the communications between Richmond and the South. This would cut off supplies and reënforcements. He also informed Meade that General Sigel would be directed to move his forces with a view to a concentration near Lynchburg. Sigel, who was in the Shenandoah Valley, would ascend it, while General Crook, commanding the other column under Sigel, was to march from the Great Kanawha through Lewisburg, when the latter would join the Army of the Potomac by the way of Gordonsville and become its right wing.

Grant had already seen the necessity of remaining with the Army of the Potomac. To remain in the West in command of all the armies would be to neglect the Army of the Potomac, which had the most important work to do; if the latter failed what the other armies did would be of no avail. Besides, Grant knew that Halleck would still exercise a

great influence over the Army of the Potomac if he (Grant) remained in the West. Grant and Halleck had had differences in the West, and Halleck had made serious blunders in directing the Army of the Potomac. But for his stubbornness Miles' force would never have been surrendered, and his blind folly again came very near stranding the Army of the Potomac in its pursuit of Lee, when he was marching on Harrisburg and Philadelphia. His refusal to permit Hooker to direct French temporarily to abandon Harper's Ferry and unite with the Army of the Potomac, caused Hooker to ask to be relieved. Grant first settled where his headquarters would be with the Army of the Potomac; next the route he would take. There were four from which to choose. He could turn Lee's left flank and take the Gordonsville line; that had the advantage of having Sigel's command unite with him and swell the size of the Army of the Potomac. It would necessarily have to be a short campaign to enable the men to carry their rations; and Grant believed that to supply the Army of the Potomac by wagons would make such an immense train that it would be cumbersome. He could take the line up the south bank of the James, but Butler was already there with two corps. Then there was the old route up the Peninsula between the James and York Rivers, which McClellan had stranded on. The two latter routes would not have protected Washington. The last and fourth route was to turn Lee's right flank, which would prevent a countermovement on Washington, and force him back on Richmond and destroy his army as soon as possible.

At midnight on the 3d of May the army was put in motion to cross the Rapidan. Warren with the Fifth Corps was directed to cross at Germanna Ford. Wilson's cavalry division had preceded him and taken possession of the ford so that a bridge could be thrown across. Warren's corps arrived at six a.m. and began crossing at seven. By one o'clock the whole corps was across. Wilson's cavalry, leading the way for some distance, turned off to the right

in the direction of Robertson's Tavern in order to see if the enemy was advancing. Griffin's division followed Wilson's cavalry. Warren kept on to old Wilderness Tavern road, with Crawford's, Wadsworth's and Robinson's divisions in the order named. Not seeing the enemy Wilson withdrew and moved on to Parker's Store, in front of Warren. Hancock, preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, crossed at Ely's Ford and took the road to Chancellorsville, where he encamped for the night. Sedgwick was ordered to follow Warren, while Torbert's division of cavalry was left to protect the rear. When the troops had crossed the Rapidan, Grant sent orders to Burnside to unite with the army south of the Rapidan. Making a forced march, he arrived there the next day, some of his troops having marched forty miles. When Warren crossed Grant left his headquarters at Culpeper and proceeded to the front.

On the 2d of May Lee summoned his corps and division commanders to him at the signal station on Clark's Mountain. He then said to them that he thought the enemy would cross at the lower fords on the Rapidan and turn his right flank. When Warren crossed the Rapidan and moved to old Wilderness Tavern, Ewell, who was aware of the movement, by reports from the 1st North Carolina Cavalry, which he had sent down in the direction of Germanna Ford, sent Major Campbell, of his staff, to inform General Lee. Ewell received an order to regulate his advance so as to keep abreast with A. P. Hill on the plank road, but not to bring on an engagement, if possible, until Longstreet could come up. Johnson's division was leading, with Jones' brigade thrown forward to skirmish. Griffin encountered the advance of Johnson's division and pushed Jones back, when the brigades of Battle and Doles were ordered to his assistAs Ewell was ordered to simply hold the Union army in check and observe its movements, these three brigades slowly fell back, pressed by Griffin, supported by Wadsworth on his left with the Third Brigade of Robinson's division. Crawford's division was formed on the extreme

ance.