them from, except a little around the Crater, which a small force of ours still hold." The small force here referred to was that occupying still some fifty feet of our main line to the south of the traverse, butting up against it at the junction of the main line and the Crater, for the Crater was yet cram full of the enemy and from which there was subsequently taken eleven hundred and one prisoners.

It was now to clean up the job and to restore the full integrity of our line and to remove absolutely the peril to which General Lee's army had been fearfully exposed by the success of the mine, (for as General Warren says in his dispatch to General Meade, at 6 a. m., the enemy has been running from his first line in front of General Burnside's right for some minutes," and at the same time General Meade notified General Burnside 'that prisoners taken say that there is no line in their rear and that their men are falling back when ours advanced") that the Georgia Brigade, after having explained to it thoroughly the duties before it was ordered to charge and retake that small part of our main line still occupied by the enemy to the left of the traverse.

The terrific fire of the enemy to which this brigade was subjected while passing over the intervening open ground caused it to slide to the north and fail of the object the charge was designed to accomplish.

A general of the Federal artillery (C. W. S.) overlooking the scene at this moment says: The canister, pieces of shell and other missiles striking the slope (over which this charge was made) produced an effect upon it similar to the heavy drops of rain in a thunder shower falling upon a placid sheet of water.”

Still I realized that we were masters of the situation, while eager to remove any lingering danger to it, which might come from a reenforced effort by the enemy to regain the breach in our lines, which he had so successfully effected.

At this juncture Gen. Bushrod Johnson came upon the ground in the depression on which my brigades had formed for the charge, and agreed that he would have his men in the main line to the south of the traverse to push down upon the enemy occupying the fifty feet, between them and the traverse when I should renew the assault upon it by the Alabama Brigade, now arriving, and fixed one o'clock as the hour when he would be ready so to coöperate. Meanwhile Colonel Haskill, a brilliant officer of our artillery, always hunting the place where he could strike a blow at our adversary, presented himself for any service I could advise. There were two Cohorn mortars which had been located in the bottom on which my brigades formed for the charge, and I suggested that if he could serve them I would have them taken up to the outside of the Crater,

where he could amuse himself till one o'clock, and perhaps no such opportunity had ever occurred or would likely occur for the effective employment of these juvenile implements of death.

Quickly Colonel Haskill was emptying the contents of the two Cohorns upon the crowded mass which had been left in and confined to the horrible pit, which I estimated was, at this time, in the shape of a goose egg, cut half in two-120 feet long, So feet wide and 60 feet deep. While this deadly work of the Cohorns was going on, sharpshooters sent back to the pit, dead or wounded, every man who attempted to scale its sides and get away, and bayoneted muskets of the dead, were, like javelins, hurled into the pit by those who could do nothing more to hasten the completion of the work all were anxious to close out.

Meanwhile, the Alabama Brigade having been formed on the line from which the Georgia Brigade had proceeded to retake that portion of our main line south of the traverse, yet occupied by the enemy, and the hour of one having come, that brigade, commanded by Colonel Saunders, imitating the steady and resolute step of the Virginia Brigade, and its magnificent alignment all the way, completed the restoration of General Johnson's line to the control of General Lee's army, leaving the enemy now occupying only the Crater, or pit, and because he could not safely retreat.

At this moment I called for one hundred volunteers to go into the pit, not content that any of the enemy should remain so near, subordinated though I felt he was to our control, when a white flag or handkerchief was raised in the pit, and upon the response to come in, eleven hundred and one, like swallows out of a chimney, came pouring over the crest, and in passing to our rear, over the dreadful slope, were hurried on-many to the grave-by the mistaken fire from the guns of the Federal batteries that had previously so fearfully blistered all the ground in our rear.

The Federal loss in this well-conceived undertaking to cut in twain General Lee's army may be fairly stated at not less than 5,640 in killed, wounded and missing, with many flags, and the loss in my brigade was 250, and the larger share of the loss fell to the lot of the Georgia Brigade. Among the large number of officers that came out of the Crater was General Bartlett, of Massachusetts, who, while in the dreadful pit had his wooden leg exploded by a bomb from the Cohorns, and his perilous trip to the rear was made by the support of one of his comrades on either side. I gave him my horse to ride out and away from the field, which I left later in the day and only after I had seen that every proper disposition of my two brigades had been made and to make certain their ability to hold against any force, that portion of General Johnson's line which they had

gallantly reclaimed. During the night my ambulance corps, with a detail of the prisoners taken, was employed in removing the wounded and in burying the dead of their respective sides—all that were within reach. Although General Lee had directed that my brigades should be relieved that night, they were not till the second night thereafter.

Taking the average estimate given by several authorities on the Federal side, the troops congregated for this assault upon General Lee's lines may be safely stated at not less than 45,000, while that of my brigades did not exceed 1,800.

It was fortunate for General Lee's army that the Federal assault, after the mine had proved a signal success, did not receive that polarity and energy of action to which immediate presence and supreme direction are essential, for through the ample breach, which had been so suddenly made in his main line and the consternation which for the moment followed, there was nothing to arrest the steady projection of the Federal column fully and destructively into his rear, exposing to capture fairly that of his army from the breach to the Appomattox on the one side, and on the other to capture and rout that part of his army from it to his right flank, and by the capture of Petersburg compel the hasty withdrawal of his forces more directly covering the Confederate Capital.

MAHONE.

CHAPTER XXII.

WILSON'S RAID ON THE SOUTH SIDE AND WELDON RAILROADS AND BATTLE AT REAM'S STATION.

WHILE Hampton and Fitz Lee were fighting Sheri

dan, it was thought desirable that a raid be made by Wilson and Kautz to cut the Weldon and South Side Railroads.

Mahone was the president of the railroad, and he had directed his superintendent to run some cars loaded with cotton to a station on the South Side Road, about midway between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as he heard of the raid he directed the cars to be returned to Petersburg, which was barely done in time to escape capture; in fact, the car with Mahone's personal effects was captured. Being deeply interested in the movements of our cavalry, he at once began planning to intercept their return, while Gen. W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry was directed in pursuit. Wilson going to Ream's Station, on the Weldon Railroad, destroyed it; thence to a point on the South Side Road about fourteen miles from Petersburg. Kautz's division reached Ford's Station about four p. m. and at once began burning the depot buildings, water tanks, ties, wood, and other property. The advance was so sudden that two locomotives and sixteen cars were still at the station. Wilson's division moved more slowly to complete its work. Coming to a large sawmill used by the road to prepare ties it was burned.

It was near midnight when Wilson's division completed its work at that point. Chapman's brigade, constituting the rear guard, was attacked by Lee, but repulsed him. At two

a. m. on the 23d Kautz proceeded to Burkesville Junction, where he arrived that afternoon, and at once proceeded to destroy the depots, water tanks, and other property. It seems that Kautz was misled in approaching this place, which caused Wilson's division to leave the direct road and cross the Nottaway River. This gave Lee a chance to interpose between Kautz and Wilson, when a most stubborn battle began. Chapman's brigade was at once deployed and ordered to attack the enemy.

With his usual gallantry he forced Lee back and got possession of a battery, but was compelled to retire and leave it. Wilson, in his report, says the conflict lasted "from one p. m. until nearly nine p. m." Chapman stood the brunt of it. He was an able and courageous officer, possessed of a natural genius for that arm of the service, and he divided the laurels with officers of a higher rank as a cavalry leader. Wilson directed Captain Whitaker to take a squadron and find Kautz so the two divisions could unite. Finding that Kautz had already destroyed Burkesville Junction and was ready to move on the Danville road, he was directed to wait until the two divisions could be united, as Lee might interpose between them again and perhaps fall on Kautz, who had a weak division of two small brigades, which would seriously cripple the command and destroy its further progress.

When Wilson's division came up, the march on the Danville line was resumed.on the 25th, destroying the road and burning the sawmills along its line, to prevent new ties being sawed by which to rebuild the track. The iron was heated by rail fires, then bent so it could not be used again. At six o'clock in the evening of the 25th the advance of Kautz's division arrived at Roanoke Station, and attempted to reach the north end of the bridge across Staunton River so as to fire it, but the enemy had a battery of six guns posted in fortifications on the south side, supported by militia from eight counties, with a small force from Danville. Kautz continued his attack on the bridge