Seeing that Kautz had given back, Mahone took his Third Brigade and made a detour through the woods to the right, and gave orders that when he had had sufficient time to get on Kautz's flank his other two brigades and the section of artillery were to advance. Wilson coming up, was not long in taking in the situation, and knowing his perilous position, directed Captain Whitaker of his staff to take 40 men, charge through the Confederate lines, and carry the news to Grant or Meade. Whitaker was successful in getting through, but he lost 23 men. Taking the highest rate of speed he could, he reached Meade's headquarters twenty minutes after ten o'clock. Whitaker was unable to make Meade realize the great peril Wilson was in, so no attempt was made to immediately move a heavy body to his relief, and Wilson was compelled to fight it out "on that line" without help, although he had been promised aid at Ream's Station on his return.

Mahone told me when we went over the field recently, that Wright was not over three miles distant, and had he moved at once could have crushed him between his (Wright's) forces and Wilson's cavalry, so he attacked Kautz without delay. Moving in the woods, he was entirely concealed from view; and bringing the Third Brigade into line, he began the attack in front and flank. Wilson could not retire on the

road, for Hampton was close in his rear. His only way to save his command was to leave the road in the woods, which compelled him to abandon his artillery and train, and that had to be done without hesitation or he could not have saved his troopers, who were so worn out that they fell asleep in their saddles.

Some 16 pieces of artillery and an immense train fell into Mahone's hands, but Wilson brought his command off, and taking a circuitous route gained the Union lines in safety. It was one of the most brilliant cavalry expeditions which had been conducted by either army, and but for the unfortunate disaster which closed it, the Capital of the Confederacy would have quaked with fear. Captain

Whitaker, who had so faithfully executed Wilson's orders, and had cut his way through the enemy's lines at Ream's Station to inform Meade of Wilson's peril, was promoted to major for gallantry. Wilson highly praises him for his services during all the expedition, and Whitaker seems to have been the staff officer he constantly relied on. His charge through the enemy's lines near Ream's Station and taking the news to Meade was one of the most brilliant and successful acts that a cavalry officer ever did in the war with a small command.

It seems to me when Wilson was fighting so desperately near Ream's Station, the sound of battle could have been distinctly heard by Meade, and should have induced an immediate attempt for his relief. The cavalry had by that time raised the standard of valor to such a height that the other two arms of the service, artillery and infantry looked on with admiration, and welcomed Wilson back with joy.

Grant said of that expedition that though the losses were heavy it was fully compensated for by the destruction of the enemy's communications and demoralization.

ΟΝ

CHAPTER XXIII.

DEEP BOTTOM AND WELDON RAILROAD.

N the 13th of August Hancock was directed to take the Second and Tenth Corps, the latter under D. B. Birney, with Gregg's cavalry division, and proceed to the north bank of the James River and then move in the direction of Richmond. Grant wanted to make that movement for three purposes: to prevent Lee from reënforcing Early in the Shenandoah Valley; to give Warren a chance to seize and tear up the Weldon Railroad; and thirdly, if Hancock could take them unawares, he might capture Richmond, or if found too weak, to oppose him.

Lee felt himself so well intrenched around Petersburg that he could spare a part of his forces to reenforce other armies, and as Early was most convenient, and could with a large army threaten Washington and Baltimore, Kershaw had been sent to him. Parties had informed Grant that three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry had been sent to Early; if such were the case Hancock with two corps could have captured Richmond and produced consternation in all the Southern armies.

Hancock advanced, with Birney on the left, close to the James, Mott was on his right; then Barlow, in command of two divisions of Hancock's corps. Barlow's right was to be protected and assisted by Gregg's cavalry division. Barlow was to bring on the engagement, and if successful was to move to the left and assist Mott, while Gregg was to watch his opportunity and, if he could, make a dash on Richmond. When Barlow moved forward he found Fields'

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division at Deep Bottom, which was soon reenforced by Wilcox from Chapin's Bluff, while Mahone had been ordered from Petersburg with W. H. F. Lee's and Hampton's divisions of cavalry. As a result, the enemy was found too strongly posted to be forced out of his works; but the information thus obtained was that Early had not been heavily reënforced. Birney alone had been able to make any progress, for when Wilcox weakened his lines to assist Fields, Birney took four of his guns, though unable to carry his works. During the night Birney was directed to move in the rear of Mott and Barlow and endeavor to turn the enemy's left, but he took such a wide circuit that he did not reach the enemy's front until late the next afternoon.

The next morning, the 16th, he was directed to attack, while Miles was to move up the Charles City road to make a diversion in his favor. Terry and William Birney, the latter commanding colored troops, advanced against the enemy's works above Fassett's Mill and carried them, but was unable to hold them, only retaining possession of the advanced line of rifle-pits. Hancock remained on the north side of the James until dark of the 20th, when he recrossed and took his old position in front of Petersburg. In the mean time, Warren, on the 18th, had been directed to move to the left and take possession of the Weldon Railroad. He was to move at four o'clock in the morning and strike the railroad near the Gurley House, which was not over two miles from the enemy's lines. Griffin struck the railroad at the Globe Tavern and began tearing it up. Ayres' division moved up the railroad a mile or more from Griffin in the direction of Petersburg, with Dushane's Maryland Brigade on the left and Hays on the right. Crawford came up on the right of Ayres, with his right resting in dense pine woods, while in front of his left and Ayres' right a field of corn shut out only a short view; thus Warren's position was very precarious. I have recently visited the field in company with General Mahone, who followed this track when he crept up on Bragg the second day. But to

go on with the narrative. Cutler's division was held as a support on the 18th, when Warren moved out. In the mean time, Deering, in command of a brigade of cavalry, was holding the railroad when Warren approached. Retiring in the direction of Petersburg, he notified Beauregard, who directed Heth, with the brigades of Walker and Davis, to go to Deering's assistance. Heth struck the Maryland Brigade with such force that it was compelled to yield ground. Ayres drew back his line of battle some distance, then he attacked Heth and drove him from the field. Only Lyle's brigade, on Crawford's left, assisted Ayres. Warren's move in capturing the Weldon Railroad greatly discomfited the Confederates, and that night arrangements were made to dislodge him on the following day. In order to protect Crawford's right, for Warren was some distance from the left of the Ninth Corps, Bragg's brigade, of Cutler's division, was ordered to form a skirmish line to connect with the Ninth Corps, but it seems the connection was not well made, for Mahone, who had been returned to Petersburg, marched up a ravine until he reached a dense growth of young pine, thence south until he pierced Bragg's right, then faced west, rushed on the gritty little Badger, and knocked him from the field, struck Crawford's right, rolled it up on its left, and captured some 1,600 prisoners.

When Mahone went over this field he pointed out to me where he marched to strike Bragg. You cannot see one hundred feet in the thick pine undergrowth. This was in Mahone's favor, for he knew well the ground.

Our lines were rectified and prepared to meet him, so he knew he could not surprise us again at that point. That closed the battle for the second day. Mahone then suggested to Lee that he could withdraw his division, pass near enough to Petersburg to be unobserved by the Union forces, from there march west until after he had passed Warren's left, then turning south could reach a point where by facing east he could fall on Warren's left, surprise it, and roll it up as he had the right two days before. While doing