always been able to keep up with the army.

But the soldiers

Forage for the horses landed proprietors who

never used force to supply their wants. was taken from the barns of the large had deserted their castles and châteaux; but the men paid for what they had from the peasantry: unable to speak the Bohemian language, they by signs made their wants understood, and the peasantry, as far as lay in their power, supplied them readily, for none were found so ignorant as not to appreciate Prussian coin. The villagers were invariably kindly treated; no cottages had been ransacked, their poultry-yards had been respected, their cattle had not been taken away from them, and though the women of this country are beautiful, no Bohemian girl had cause to rue the invasion of her country.' And again: 'But the people had no cause to fear; they would have done better to remain, for some of the troops had to be billeted in the houses along the road, and when the inhabitants were not present the soldiers took what they required, and there was no one to receive payment for what they consumed. The children did not seem so timid; they were present along the road in large numbers, for the cherries were just ripening, and they took advantage of the panic among their elders to make a raid on the trees which grew in long strips by the side of the way. With them the soldiers soon became great friends. The boys ran along the battalions with their caps full of the fruit, and got coppers in exchange for handfuls of it; the sellers, exulting in the pocketsful of coin they soon collected, seemed to have no scruples as to whose property it rightfully was, but laughed with delight at this unexpected result of the war.' And after the battle of Königgrätz: 'The morale of the army had now risen high, and the soldiers were convinced that the Austrian troops could not stand against them—a feeling which was no contemptible augury of future victories. But though the soldiers were confident in themselves, their arms and their leaders, their confidence never stepped beyond just bounds; they were tender and kind to the wounded and prisoners, not only by attending to their wants, but by showing them much consideration, and never exulting over the victory in their presence, which could hardly be expected from men serving in the ranks. But the Prussian sys

tem of recruiting enlists in the army as privates men of a high education and refined feelings, and these easily influence their comrades, who are naturally warm-hearted, to act kindly and charitably to the unfortunate.'

The system which can produce such an army can not be too highly extolled or too well understood; and the apology which Mr. Hozier makes for the chapter devoted by him to that subject will be deemed wholly unnecessary by every intelligent reader. With nations as with individuals, good often springs from adversity; and the subjugation of Prussia served to lay the foundation of her present military power. The terms of peace dictated by Napoleon after the Jena campaign, allowed the Prussian army to consist of only 42,000 men; but no stipulation was made as to how long these men should serve. In order to secure the means of striking for independence on the first favorable opportunity, General Schamhorst introduced the Krümper system, by which a certain number of soldiers were always allowed to go home on furlough after a few months' service, and recruits were brought into the ranks in their place. Those drilled were, in their turn, sent away on furlough, and other recruits brought on for training.' . . . 'This army fought in the war of independence, and formed the first nucleus of the existing military organization of the kingdom- an organization which, dating from a terrible misfortune, the bitter experience of which has never been forgotten, has since been constantly tended, improved, and reformed, and with careful progress been brought to such a high pitch of excellence, that last year it enabled the Prussian troops to march and conquer with an almost miraculous rapidity, to eclipse in a few days the glories of the Seven Years' War, to efface the memory of Jena by thundering on the attention of the startled world the suddenly decisive victory of Sadowa, and to spring over the ashes of Chlum into very possibly the foremost place among the armies of the world.'. . . By this system, every Prussian capable of bearing arms was, without exception, liable to military duty, and to serve from his 20th to 23d year in the standing army; from his 23d to his 25th in the reserve; from his 25th to 32d in the first levy of the Landwehr, and from his 32d to 39th in the second

levy.' 'The great advantage of this system was, that in peace it necessitated but a small expense, and required but few men to keep up an army which, on the outbreak of the war, could be raised quickly to a large force. As it was arranged after the War of Independence, it endured without alteration during the reigns of Frederick-William III. and Frederick-William IV.' It was found, however, in 1848 and 1849, and again in 1850 and 1859, that there were many defects in the system. The men, taken up with their private occupations, obeyed unwillingly the call to arms, save in moments of great national excitement; the large proportion which the Landwehr formed of the active army caused fatal delays in the preparation of troops for the field; the officers and non-commissioned officers were little used to their duties. The increase in the population, too, caused the system adopted in 1815 to bear with injustice upon the people in 1850, and the revenues had also increased in direct ratio with the increase of population, and so admitted of an increase of the army and of the military expenses. These various reasons combined to induce King William I., while still Regent, to introduce in · 1859 and 1860 a reorganization by which the first levy of the Landwehr was no longer, as a rule, to be sent into the field; and to attain this object, the standing army, including the reserves, was increased by as many men as the first levy of the Landwehr formerly provided in fact it was nearly doubled. The time of service in the Landwehr was diminished by two years, and that in the reserve, in return, lengthened for the same period. this organization, a recruit who joins the Prussian service serves for three years (from nineteen to twenty-two) in the regular army; for five years (from twenty-two to twenty-seven) in the reserve, and for eleven years (from twenty-seven to thirty-eight) is liable to be called up for duty as a Landwehr man.' These constitute the main outlines of a system which combines rigid economy with great military strength, and which possesses wonderful elasticity and rapidity in the mobilisation of immense armies. Although the order for putting the army on a war footing was issued by the Prussian government long after serious preparations were being made by Austria and her allies, yet the superiority of the system enabled her to take the field and

By

assume the aggressive long before the preparations of her antagonists were complete. In peace everything is always kept ready for the mobilisation of the army; every officer and every official knows during peace what will be his post and what will be his duty the moment the decree for the mobilisation is issued; and the instant that decree is flashed by telegraph to the most distant stations, every one sets about his necessary duty without requiring any further orders or any explanations.' When the troops are mobilised, or, to use our vernacular, placed upon a war footing, the reserves are called in, assigned to their respective battalions, and the army is increased from 217,000 to nearly 500,000 trained soldiers. If necessary, the Landwehr, or militia, also trained, follow in nearly equal numbers. Especially interesting to the soldier is the mode in which the waste of war in the several organizations is supplied, and yet the recruits sent forward for that purpose are so combined as to be easily handled, easily moved, yet formed in such due proportions of the different arms as to be capable of independent action. The military organization of the provinces annexed by the late war is, with slight modifications, upon the same system, and will add about 75,000 combatants to the standing army. In view of the important influence Prussia seems likely to exert hereafter in European politics, an acquaintance with her military resources can not but be desirable to the general as well as to the professional reader, and invests with peculiar interest the chapter which Mr. Hozier has devoted to that subject. The military reader would wish even more full and explicit details. Take the book as a whole, it is remarkable for accuracy of observation, clear sound criticism, and graphic narration, while the subject of which it treats is of unusual interest.

ART. IX.- The Sumter and the Alabama; or Memoirs of his Services Afloat during the War between the States. By Admiral Raphael Semmes, of the late Confederate States Navy. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Company. 1868. Pp.

833.

Admiral Semmes, the 'Stonewall Jackson of the Seas', has, in the volume before us, given a most graphic and profoundly interesting narrative of his adventures during the late War. We have not, for twenty years, devoured a novel with half the interest with which we have read this absorbing narrative of his own adventures, by one of the very truest, bravest, greatest heroes of the age. We shall let him speak for himself, for his comrades at sea, and for the cause in which they were enlisted. Our appreciation of his book, as well as of ourselves, is, indeed, far too just, to permit us to occupy the attention of the reader with any poor words of our own, to the exclusion of those of the gallant Admiral himself.

The book is all, nay, far more than all, that is imported by the title at the head of this article. It embraces the memoir, personal and historical, of the Admiral, from his withdrawal from the Federal navy to the close of the war; the operations of the Sumter and the Alabama; the running of various blockades by both ships; and, finally, the engagements of the Alabama with the Hatteras and the Kearsarge. It was the courage, the dash, the heroism, displayed in this last glorious engagement, which drew, with electric force, from the hearts of British naval officers, a wild, enthusiastic burst of admiration and applause, and, from their pockets, a present of the most beautiful sword the writer has ever seen; manufactured, by the best artists of London, expressly for the Admiral; and covered with significant costly devices, as well as blazing with precious stones and gems. Such a testimonial, coming, as it did, from officers of the British navy, speaks more for the gallantry of Admiral Semmes, than could a thousand articles from our poor pen.

The work, however, is not exclusively confined to the above