THE SOUTHERN REVIEW.

No. X.

APRIL, 1869.

ART. I.-On Liberty. By John Stuart Mill. People's Edition. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green. 1865.

We have, more than once, been reminded of our promise to lay before the readers of the Southern Review our own definition of the nature of Liberty; a promise which, by the way, we have neither forgotten, nor intended to neglect. For, as we have said, Having examined, so freely, the notions of Mill, and Liéber, and Russell, as to the nature of Liberty, we may be reasonably expected to give our own views on the subject. We should be glad,' it is added, 'to do so in the conclusion of this article, [for July, 1867], if our space were not too limited; for we do not shrink from the severe ordeal of criticism to which we have subjected others. We should, on the contrary, court and covet its most searching scrutiny, as the best possible means to eliminate truth from the mass of error in which it is still embedded... There is, indeed, no subject under the sun, in regard to which mankind stand in greater need of clear and distinct knowledge, than the nature of Liberty. A work containing such knowledge is still a desideratum in English literature. Hence, no mean cowardice or fear of the critic's lash, shall keep us from the resolute endeavor, at least, to contribute our mite toward so great and desirable a work. Especially since no people on earth are more interested in the dissemination of real

knowledge on this subject, than are the inhabitants of the United States. On the capitol at Washington, there is a bronze statue of Liberty, [more than half Ethiopian in hue;] on which all persons, as well as members of Congress, may freely gaze. But this would give no one an idea of Liberty, any more than poring over the heavy pages of John Stuart Mill, or of Dr. Francis Liéber. The members of Congress should, indeed, inscribe on the pedestal of that statue the words-To the Unknown Goddess.'

The above promise has already been partially redeemed. For, in our April issue for 1868, the nature of civil liberty is discussed, with a view to explode certain obstinate fallacies connected with the subject, and open the way to a clear and satisfactory apprehension of this great idol of the modern world. In that discussion, it is shown, unless we are greatly deceived, that the formula of 1787, or rather the great maxim of the past, that 'on entering into society, individuals give up a share of their natural rights, or liberty, in order to secure the rest,' has no foundation in the nature of things. That it is, on the contrary, not a principle of science, but only the creation of political theorists. For, by the organization of society, individuals are, indeed, protected in the enjoyment of all their natural rights; so that Liberty, instead of being abridged, is really introduced and established, by the State. The State is, then, if properly organized, the author and the finisher of our Freedom. These conclusions, so different from those usually adopted, show the necessity of a re-statement of the great problem of society, well as indicate a more perfect solution of that problem.

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A further confirmation of this view, is derived from a study of The State of Nature, as it is called; which is considered in an article for July, 1868. In that article, it is shown, that the great boasted liberty of such a state is, in reality, a distorted phantom of the imagination, and not a true form of the passionless reason. Or, in other words, it is there shown, that in a state of nature, as it is called, there is license, not liberty; or ferocity, and not freedom. In such a state, in short, there is violence, anarchy, chaos, and not order, peace, harmony, curity in the enjoyment of rights. This, under God, is due to

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the State; and this is Liberty. As it is license, and not liberty, which needs the restraint of penal codes and human laws; so the great trouble of society is, not how far the natural freedom, but only how far the natural depravity, of mankind shall be limited and restrained by the edicts of society.

We glorify the State, and we honor its laws. The struggle between Liberty and Authority', says Mr. Mill, 'is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly that of Greece, Rome, and England.' Now this struggle, this antagonism, between Liberty and Order, is purely imaginary. Liberty and Order, like twin stars, lend mutual support to each other, and each shines with the borrowed lustre of its fellow, as well as with its own. But despotism is not Order, any more than license is Liberty. Despotism is, on the contrary, inimical to that wholesome public Order, or Authority, which is the source of our social peace and joy, tranquility and rest. It is, indeed, the reign of Authority, of just Government and Laws, which prevents the wrongs, and protects the rights, of all; and thereby ordains Liberty, or the secure enjoyment of rights.' The State is, then, the true Leviathan, the mortal god which, under the immortal God, holds the flaming sword of justice for the protection of the innocent and the terror of the guilty. Hence, in its origin, in its nature, in its sanctions, and in its effects, it is truly divine.' [Southern Review, for July, 1868.] Having thus opened and prepared the way for the introduction of the idea of Liberty, as well as explained some of its most indispensable conditions, we now proceed to define the thing itself.

M. Guizot, as we have already seen, [in our issue for Jan. 1867,] discredits the attempt to define such complex facts as civilization or freedom. If we repeat here, in part at least, our reply to his objection; this is because the Southern Review for 1867, has long been out of print, and cannot be seen by many of our present subscribers. And besides, this reply, by giving the true idea of a 'scientific definition', will enable the reader to judge for himself whether our definition of Liberty be scientific or otherwise, true or false. It is, indeed, in more respects than one, an essential part of the present article. Hence, we must

beg leave to repeat briefly, in this place, the substance of our reply to the above celebrated objection of M. Guizot; especially as it stands directly in the way of our present design, as well as casts discredit on all future attempts to give a 'scientific definition' of the term freedom, or liberty.

M. Guizot, says Alison, is a man of the very highest genius, taking that word in its loftiest acceptation'; and if ever the spirit of the Philosophy of History was embodied in a human form, it was in that of M. Guizot.' It is, then, all the more important that, while the authority of his great name is duly respected, and his opinions carefully weighed, his errors should be opposed.

'In the usual general acceptation of terms', says he, 'there will nearly always be found more truth than in the seemingly more precise and rigorous definitions of science. It is common sense which gives to words these popular significations, and common sense is the genius of humanity. The popular signification of a word is formed by degrees, and while the facts it represents are themselves present. As often as a fact comes before us which seems to answer to the signification of a known term, this term is naturally applied to it, its signification gradually extending and enlarging itself, so that at last the various facts and ideas which, from the nature of things, ought to be brought together and embodied in this term, will be found collected and embodied in it. When, on the contrary, the signifi cation of a word is determined by science, it is usually done by one or a very few individuals, who, at the time, are under the influence of some particular fact which has taken possession of their imagination. Thus it comes to pass that scientific definitions are, in general, much narrower, and, on that very account, much less correct, than the popular signification given to words." He thus repudiates the scientific definition of words, and relies on their popular significations as given by common sense.

'So,' he continues, in the investigation of the meaning of the word civilization as a fact, by seeking out all the ideas it comprises, according to the common sense of mankind, we shall arrive much nearer to the knowledge of the fact itself than by attempting to give our own scientific definition of it, though

this might at first appear more clear and precise.' Thus, in pursuit of the meaning of the term civilization, M. Guizot turns his back on science, and appeals to common sense', to the 'genius of humanity', for light and knowledge. Now, is this' course really sanctioned by science, or by common sense? Or can we escape from the darkness and confusion of the subject, and gain any clearer or more distinct conceptions, by any such vague appeal to any such vague tribunal? If we may judge from the success of M. Guizot, we are bound to answer this question in the negative. For, having interrogated his great oracle common sense', he seems to know as little as ever respecting the nature of freedom; as may be easily shown.

One would suppose, for example, that if any two things on earth should be distinguished from each other, they are human liberty and human depravity. Such a distinction should, most assuredly, be in every man's mind like the difference between light and darkness. Yet, as experience has shown, it is quite possible for a historian and a philosopher to overlook this distinction, even in pronouncing judgment on the most momentous of questions. M. Guizot, for example, in following his guide 'the popular signification of words,' perpetrates this blunder, and plunges into some of the most wonderful errors ever committed by historian or philosopher. In the great historic struggle 'between liberty and power,' says he, the Church has usually ranged itself on the side of despotism.' If so, then this is surely just because the Church has become corrupt, and proved false to her sublime mission to free mankind from the bondage of every corruption, whether internal or external, and restore them to the glorious liberty of the sons of God.' But M. Guizot thinks quite otherwise. If the Church has stood forth as the champion of despotism, 'one need not,' says he, 'be much astonished at this, nor charge the clergy with too great a degree of human weakness, nor suppose it a vice peculiar to the Christian religion.' No, none of these things will explain the attitude of the Church, in her unholy alliance with the enemies of God and man. There is,' says he, 'a more profound cause.' And strange to say, he finds this more profound cause in the very nature of religion in general, and of