Larson, 13 N. D. 420, 101 N. W. 315; State ex rel. Hagendorf v. Blaisdell, 20 N. D. 622, 127 N. W. 720; State ex rel. Minehan v. Wing, 18 N. D. 242, 119 N. W. 944; State ex rel. Erickson v. Burr, 16 N. D. 581, 113 N. W. 705. These cases are illustrative of instances in which this court has taken or refused jurisdiction in application for original writs. Our Constitution is similar to that of Wisconsin and Colorado, and early decisions in those states furnished the precedent followed by this court in determining when original jurisdiction would be exercised in the issuance of prerogative writs. See Atty. Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 317, and two subsequent opinions by Chief Justice Ryan of that state in Atty. Gen. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 35 Wis. 425, and Atty. Gen. v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400. These are followed in the able opinion by Justice Corliss in State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359, 66 N. W. 234. Other interesting cases on the subject are: People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 822, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198, 86 Pac. 224, 229, 231; People ex rel. Farmers' Reservoir & Irrig Co. v. Jefferson Dist. Ct. 46 Colo. 386, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 886, 133 Am. St. Rep. 84, 104 Pac. 484; State ex rel. West v. Cobb, 24 Okla. 662, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639, 104 Pac. 361; State ex rel. Rinder v. Goff, 129 Wis. 668, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 916, 109 N. W. 628, and see also the editorial note in People ex rel. Graves v. District Ct. 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 768.

The question now arises whether, under the facts as disclosed by relator's application, this court would be warranted in determining that it had jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ prayed for. This involves the consideration of the facts presented, which we will briefly recite.

The respondent, the city auditor of a municipal corporation, the city of Minot, is about to present to the electors of that city, for their use in the coming city election on April 4th, a ballot upon which is a direction to the voters respecting candidates for city commissioners, contained in the following words printed upon the proposed ballots: "Vote for two or two votes for one." Three candidates, among them relator, seek election as city commissioners. There are but two such offices to be filled. The present board of city commissioners have authorized such ballot to be prepared for the avowed purpose of permitting cumulative voting for such candidate. The application further shows that if cumulative voting is permitted, it will be largely exercised, with the

result that if it is illegal the election will be invalidated, and the right of the electors of the municipality to a valid election and the full and legal choice of municipal officers be denied. Likewise, the private rights of relator as a candidate for said office will be infringed, and there will be cast upon him the unnecessary burden of defending in the courts any rights obtained by him under such election. Ballots permitting cumulative voting have been prepared by respondent, and will be used in the election unless prevented by court order. Application for a remedial writ was made to the district court of the district wherein the municipality in question is situated, and relief was denied. Relator has acted with the utmost of diligence since the contemplated act of the respondent has been known or made manifest. No adequate remedy exists at law or in equity to prevent such illegal act of the auditor respondent as is complained of, except the writ herein applied for, and if relator is denied the same, he is without relief.

The court will take judicial notice of the municipalities of the state operating under the plan of government known as the commission system of government for cities, as defined by chapter 45 of the Session Laws of 1907; that all cities operating thereunder hold their elections for the selection of their municipal officers at the same time; and that at the coming election many cities operating under the commission form of government will choose officers. In doing so they will operate under two conflicting methods, one or the other of which must be illegal, thereby tending toward uncertainty and embarrassment in the municipal government of these communities. That all such cities and the many thousand of electors in them will be similarly affected; that the time between this application and the election is too short to permit a determination, by a proceeding through the usual channels and methods of court procedure, of the question of legality of cumulative voting under such statute. The real question in litigation is not, primarily, the right of the relator to the office incidentally within the determination of the question submitted, but instead the decision of the method of the election, and the right of any elector among the thousands to vote more than one vote for one single candidate. The question before us is the construction of a law clearly affecting not only the local community and its candidates, but also the operation of the law throughout the entire state, in all cities having the commission plan of city government. The law is a new and important one of uniform applica

tion throughout all cities similarly affected. Besides, the state, by reason of the taxing power of such municipalities, as well as its general welfare in them, is entitled to have a valid election in such local, selfgoverning bodies, that it may be assured of the regularity of the exercise of taxing powers procuring its revenue. It is further interested in having regularity in the election of such officers, that governmental functions may be properly exercised with uniformity throughout the state; this to the same extent as the state is interested in having all municipalities organized under general law, that the performance of official duties may be uniform as well as general. Also, all citizens and electors of the municipalities so affected have a right to have a law prescribing the method of election of their principal officers declared and settled. The fact that such officers have practically all to do with the rights of property, as well as enforcement of law and order affecting the people themselves directly under the commission system, radically different from that in cities without that plan, is urged as an additional reason why we should assume jurisdiction. It is a fact that under the commission system of government legislative, executive, and administrative powers of government are, for business purposes, such as directness and rapidity of operation, as well as economy, responsibility, and system, centralized in its commissioners, who exercise these governmental functions under a bureau system of city government. In this country, from time immemorial until this system was conceived and put in operation under force of circumstances amounting to catastrophy, no set of men in governmental affairs were intrusted, without a governmental system of checks or balances, with such general powers as under the commission system of government. Such, in brief, is the responsibility of the office sought by relator in his candidacy. And to the above extent has the state an interest in the event of our decision on the questions publici juris involved.

Under these circumstances we are impressed with the necessity to assume jurisdiction, and are convinced beyond the peradventure of a doubt that to do so is but the exercise of our sound discretion, which to do otherwise would be to abuse. Nor are we without precedent in so doing. In State ex rel. Rinder v. Goff, 129 Wis. 668, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 916, 109 N. W. 628, the Wisconsin supreme court holds the decision of a similar question arising on the construction of its primary election law, under less peremptory circumstances, to be a mat

ter concerning the duty of the election officers of the state, and affecting thereby the sovereignty of the state and the liberties of its people, in aid of which, and to determine the course of official conduct to be pursued, the court assumed jurisdiction to hear and determine by the prerogative writ of mandamus. Likewise, the state of Colorado in People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 822, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198, 86 Pac. 224, 229, 231, assumed jurisdiction to prevent wholesale election frauds in the city of Denver, holding that the state in its sovereign capacity, by the very terms of its being, is intrusted with powers and duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, and for the protection of the rights and liberties of its citizens; and that the interest of the state in a legal election was sufficient to authorize the court by prerogative writ to prevent the wholesale threatened violation of such right. That it is the duty of the state to preserve unimpaired every channel through which powers are exercised necessary for the protection of the rights and liberties of its citizens; and to deny to the court of last resort the power to enforce by prerogative writ the sovereign rights of a state in such respects was to deny the supremacy of state government itself. We have similar precedent in this state. See State ex rel. Mitchell v. Larson, 13 N. D. 420, 101 N. W. 315. We will accordingly assume jurisdiction to hear and determine this application under the power conferred by § 87 of our Constitution.

This brings us to the method of election of city commissioners, and the question first to be considered thereunder is whether cumulative voting is permitted in electing officers in cities operating under the commission plan of government. Nowhere else in our scheme of state government is there a possibility for a contention that cumulative voting is allowed. If it is permitted in the case under consideration, § 15 of chapter 45 of the Session Laws of 1907, found on page 41 of said Session Laws, must be the authority therefor. This statute reads as follows: "Commissioners; how elected. The president of the board of city commissioners and four city commissioners shall be elected by the legal and qualified voters in the city in the following manner: The president of the board of city commissioners and the four city commissioners shall be elected at large, and not by wards. Each voter shall be allowed to cast but one vote for the candidate for the office of president of the board of city commissioners. Each voter shall be al

lowed as many votes for the candidates for the office of city commissioners as there are commissioners to be elected, such votes to be distributed among the candidates as the voter shall see fit, but no voter shall be allowed to cast more votes than candidates to be elected." The following section also has a bearing upon the interpretation of the foregoing, reading: "Terms of office. Each of said four commissioners and president of the board shall hold office for four years from and after the date of his qualification, and until his successor shall have been duly elected and duly qualified, except the first board; the two commissioners receiving the highest number of votes shall hold for four years, the two receiving the next highest for two years." In the chapter are provisions declaring how vacancies may arise, and that same may be filled by an election called for the purpose. Sections 33, 34, 36 and 21. And that officers so elected hold until the next regular election. Section 35.

It is apparent from the particularity used in prescribing the manner of election, qualification, appointment, and length of terms of officers, that the legislature, in enacting this chapter, did so with the idea of putting in force thereby a statute as complete in these respects, as in all other particulars, as it was novel in nature. A careful perusal of the entire chapter convinces us that for breadth of subject as well as for completeness in detail it is something unique and out of the ordinary in legislation. The act creates officers formerly unknown and designates them by new names, and, considering the way with which all matters ordinarily left to general statute are provided, it is but reasonable to conclude that the language of the entire act in all particulars was carefully chosen, that the words as used might express the exact meaning of the statutory intent, under the usual rules of statutory construction. With this in mind, let us analyze the section of the statute heretofore quoted. Section 13 of the act provides: "The officers of cities incorporated under this act shall be a president of the board of city commissioners and four city commissioners, who, together with the president, shall be known as the board of city commissioners." Section 15 is headed, accordingly, in logical sequence and precision: "Commissioners, how elected. The president of the board of city commissioners shall be elected by the legal and qualified voters in the city in the fol lowing manner: The president of the board of city commissioners and the four city commissioners shall be elected at large, and not by wards.