pay debts to their neighbors. Demagogues declaimed, to applauding crowds, that all debts ought to be wiped out. Wild theories as to common ownership of property were in the air. A rude awakening all this proved to the patriots who had expected a golden age. "Good God!" exclaimed Washington, of such disorders: "Who but a Tory could have foreseen, or a Briton predicted, them?" And again, in momentary despair, he declared that such commotions "exhibit a melancholy proof . . . that mankind, when left to themselves, are unfit for their own government." The worst of it was, too, that these semi-criminal forces of lawlessness and confiscation were reinforced by the bitter discontent of multitudes of well-meaning men who were suffering real hardships. Many an old soldier who had lost his home by mortgage foreclosure, or who was in danger of doing so, felt that the loss was due to his having received insufficient pay in worthless paper money, while the law of the time drained his slender resources by extortionate court fees, and threatened to condemn him to hopeless imprisonment for such undeserved debt. Fiat money The most widespread manifestation of this wild spirit was the fiat money craze that swept over half the States and threatened all the others, despite the recent grievous experience with such currency. In New Hampshire an armed mob besieged the legislature to obtain such relief. The Rhode Island experience was the most serious, but it also suggested a remedy. Paper money was the issue in that State in the election of the legislature in 1785. The "cheap money" party won. Creditors fled, to escape accepting the new "legal tender" for old loans of good money, and storekeepers closed their shops rather than sell goods for the worthless stuff. Then the legislature made it a penal offense, punishable without jury trial, to refuse the paper in trade. Finally a certain Weeden, a butcher, who had refused to sell meat for paper to one Trevett, was brought to trial (1786). Weeden's lawyer pleaded that the law, refusing jury trial, was in conflict with the SHAYS' REBELLION 267 The court took "constitution" and was therefore void. this view and dismissed the case. The legislature summoned the judges to defend themselves; and, after hearing their defense, voted that it was unsatisfactory. At the next election, three of the four judges were defeated; but their action had helped to lay the foundation for the tremendous power of the later American courts. Most important of all the anarchic movements was Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts. For six months in 1786-1787, parts of the State were in armed insurrection Shays' against the regular State government. Rioters Rebellion broke up the courts in three large districts, to stop proceedings against debtors. And Daniel Shays, a Revolutionary captain, with nearly two thousand men, was barely repulsed from the Federal arsenal at Springfield. Says Francis A. Walker: "The insurgents were largely, at least in the first instance, sober, decent, industrious men, wrought to madness by what they deemed their wrongs; but they were, of course, joined by the idle, the dissipated, the discontented, the destructive classes, as the insurrection grew.' Congress prepared to raise troops to aid Massachusetts, but, fearing to avow that purpose, pretended to be preparing for an Indian outbreak. In any case, Congress was too slow to help. The legislature of Massachusetts, too, proved timid. But Governor Bowdoin acted with decision. The State militia were called out (supported by contributions from Boston capitalists), and the rebels were dispersed in a sharp midwinter campaign. A few months later, however, Bowdoin was defeated for reëlection by John Hancock, a sympathizer with the rebellion, who then pardoned Shays and other rebel leaders. This rebellion was one of the chief events leading to the new Federal Constitution. Men could look calmly at Rhode Island vagaries, and even at New Hampshire anarchy; but riot and rebellion in the staid, powerful Bay 1 "Constitution" was used here, as by Otis in 1761, in the English sense, since the Rhode Island charter made no specific reference to trial by jury. This makes the decision the more daring and remarkable. State was another matter. It seemed to prophesy the dissolution of society, unless there could be formed at once a central government strong enough "to ensure domestic tranquillity." When Henry Lee in Congress spoke of using influence to abate the rebellion, Washington wrote him in sharp rebuke, “You talk, my good Sir, of using influence. Influence is no government. Let us have one [a government] by which our lives, liberties, and properties may be secured, or let us know the worst." . Weaknesses of the All these evils of the Critical Period had their roots in the Articles of Confederation. The Confederation called itself a “firm league of friendship." Avowedly it fell far short of a national union. The central "Articles " authority was vested in a Congress of delegates. These delegates were appointed annually by the State legislatures, and were paid by them. Each State had one vote in Congress, and nine States had to agree for important measures. Each State promised to the citizens of the other States all the privileges enjoyed by its own citizens (the greatest step toward real unity in the Articles); and the States were forbidden to enter into any treaty with foreign powers or with each other, or to make laws or impose tariffs that should conflict with any treaty made by Congress. Congress was to have sole control over all foreign relations; and, for internal matters, it was to manage the postal service and regulate weights and measures and the coinage. The final article read: "Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual. But a previous article provided, "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." The "Articles of Confederation" was not a crude or THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 269 clumsy document of its kind. Probably it was the best constitution for a confederacy of states that the world had ever seen. Certainly it had many improvements over the ancient Greek confederations and over the Swiss and Dutch unions. The real trouble was, no mere confederacy could answer the needs of the new American people. That people needed a national government. The four great weaknesses of the Articles had proved to be: poor machinery of government, an insufficient enumeration of powers, the impossibility of amendment, and the fact that the government could not act upon individual citizens, but only upon States. 1. The requirement that nine States in Congress must agree for important business hindered action unduly, especially when for long periods not more than Poor manine or ten States were represented. Moreover chinery of the union had no executive and only a feeble government germ of a judiciary. Insufficient 2. No federal government had ever had a longer list of important matters committed to its control, but the list should have contained at least two more powers: power to regulate interstate commerce would have powers prevented much civil strife; and authority to enumerlevy a low tariff for revenue would have done away with the chief financial difficulties. ated 3. After all, the first two defects were matters of detail. They might have been remedied without giving up the fundamental principle of the union as a league of Impossi sovereign States. And the States would have cor- bility of rected them, in part at least, had it not been for amendment the third evil. The amending clause (in the Thirteenth Article) demanded the unanimous consent of the thirteen State legislatures for any change in the Articles. In practice, this prevented any amendment. In February, 1781, Congress submitted to the States an amendment which would have added to its powers the authority to put a five per cent tariff on imports, on imports, the proceeds to be used in paying the national debt and the interest upon it. This modest request for an absolutely indispensable power roused intense opposition. "If taxes can thus be levied by any power outside the States," cried misguided patriots, "why did we oppose the tea duties?" After a year's discussion, twelve States consented; but Rhode Island voted that such authority in Congress would "endanger the liberties of the States," and the amendment failed. Another attempt was made at once (1783), similar to the former except that now the authority was to be granted Congress for only twenty-five years. Four States voted No, Virginia among them; and said Richard Henry Lee, "If such an amendment prevail, Liberty will become an empty name." Congress made these States a solemn appeal not to ruin the only means of redeeming the sacred faith of the Union. Three of them yielded, but New York (jealous now of her rapidly growing commerce) maintained her refusal; and the amendment again failed (1786), after three years of negotiation. Far-seeing men then gave up hope of efficient amendment by constitutional means. Revolution (peaceable or violent) or anarchy, these were the alternatives. " ment by supplication " 4. The fourth evil (the failure to act upon individuals) was fundamental. It could not be corrected except by changing the confederation of sovereign States into some A govern- kind of national union. For three millions of weak subjects Congress might have passed laws. On thirteen powerful subjects it could merely make requisitions. John Smith or Henry Jones would hardly think of refusing obedience to a command from a Central government; but New York or Virginia felt as strong as Congress itself, and would do as they pleased. A confederation of states is necessarily a "government by supplication." In the final outcome it was fortunate that constitutional amendment was impossible. Otherwise, reasonable amendRecognition ment might have patched up the Articles and of the evils kept the defective union alive. But no ordinary amendment could have cured the fundamental evil. The Constitutional Convention of 1787, when it came, perceived |