THE MONROE DOCTRINE 407 however, whose robust faith foresaw (with the great Secretary of State) that in a few years Oregon would be nearer Washington than St. Louis had been a generation earlier, and that it was to make our indispensable gateway to the Western ocean and the lands of the Orient, "the longsought road to India." Said Senator Benton of Missouri, in an impassioned oration, reproaching Eastern indifference, "It is time that Western men had some share in the destinies of this Republic." In 1821-1823 two foreign perils called forth from the Administration the proclamation of the new policy, America for Americans. In 1821 the Tsar of Russia forbade citizens of other powers even to approach within a hundred miles of the Pacific coast, on the American side, north of the 51st par- The Russian allel. Russia had no settlements within hundreds peril in the Northwest of miles of that line; and this proclamation was practically an attempt to reserve new American territory for future Russian colonization. Moreover it would have turned the Bering Sea, with its invaluable fisheries, into a Russian lake, absolutely closed to all other peoples. The idea was peculiarly abhorrent, both because of Russia's And the exclusive commercial policy (typified in the proc- "Holy lamation), and because the Tsar was the head Alliance" of the despotic "Holy Alliance," which at just this time was planning to extend its political system to South America and Mexico. in the South That plan was itself the second peril. In 1821 the United States recognized the independence of the revolted Spanish American States and appointed diplomatic agents to their governments. But the "crowned conspirators," known as the Holy Alliance, having crushed an attempt at a republic in Spain itself, now planned to reduce the former American colonies of Spain to their old subjection. England stood forth in determined opposition. Canning, the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made four separate friendly suggestions to our minister in England that the England's appeals two English-speaking powers join hands to forbid the project. President Monroe (and his unofficial advisers, Madison and Jefferson 1) wished to accept this offer for allied action; but John Quincy Adams insisted strenuously that the United States must "not come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war," and finally he carried the Cabinet and President with him in his plan for independent action. Canning acted first, and, in his proud boast, "called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old." His firm statement that England would resist the proposed attack upon the revolted American States put an abrupt close to the idea of European intervention. The declaration of policy in the United States came later, but it has had a greater permanent significance. In his message to Congress, The Monroe December 2. 1823, Monroe Doctrine portrait by Stuart, now at Bowdoin College. From 1809 to his death, Jefferson, in retirement at Monticello, remained a chief leader of national policies, constantly consulted by Madison and Monroe. He died July 4, 1826, the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of his great Declaration, on the same day with his old friend and rival, John Adams, with whom in the closing years he carried on an interesting correspondence. adopted certain paragraphs on this matter, written by Adams. These paragraphs were the first announcement of the Monroe Doctrine: 1 Jefferson thought the matter "the most momentous since the Declaration of Independence." England's mighty weight - the only real peril to an independent American system - could now be brought to the side of freedom; and that fact would "emancipate the continent at a stroke." 66 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 409 [1] With special reference to Russia and Oregon, -"the American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." [2] With regard to the proposed "intervention" by the Holy Alliance, 'The political system of the allied powers is essentially different from that of America.1 . . . We owe it. . . to those amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . With the existing colonies. . . of any European power we . . shall not interfere. But with the Governments . . . whose independence we have . . . acknowledged, we could not view any interposition, for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." In justification of this position, the message intimated also that we intended not to meddle with European affairs. We claimed primacy on this hemisphere; we would protect our weaker neighbors from European intrusion or molestation; but we would leave the Old World without interference from us. The thought of the message was not novel. Part of it is found in Washington's utterances, and the best of it had been stated repeatedly by Jefferson. But the practical application, in 1823, gave it a new significance. From an "academic" question, it was suddenly lifted into a question of practical international politics. The message was thoroughly effective at the moment. England hailed it as making absolutely secure her own policy of preventing European intervention in And the America; and the Tsar agreed to move north 250 future miles, and to accept the line of 54° 40' for the southern boundary of Russian Alaska. And the "Monroe Doctrine" was not limited to that period. It had been announced merely as an expression of opinion by the President. No 1 This statement regarding the despotic character of the powers united in the Holy Alliance has, of course, little logical bearing upon intervention in America to-day by any European country. other branch of the government was asked even to express approval. But the cordial response of the nation, on this and all subsequent occasions, has made the Monroe Doctrine, in truth, the American Doctrine. The only real danger to its permanence is that we so act as to inspire our weaker American brethren with fear that we mean to use its high morality as a shield under cover of which we may ourselves plunder them at will. If it ever becomes probable that the sheep dog wards off the wolves that he himself may have a fuller meal, his function will not long endure. CHAPTER XXIV NATIONALISM AND REACTION The war and new manu FROM 1807 to 1815 the embargo and the war shut out European goods.. This afforded an artificial "protection" for home manufactures. We had to use up our own raw cotton, wool, and iron, or let them go unused; and we had to supply our own clothing, fabrics, tools, and machinery, or do without. factures This new demand for building up home manufactures was met mainly in New England, where much capital and labor, formerly engaged in shipping, was temporarily unemployed. In 1807 New England cotton mills had only 8000 spindles in use (page 345); in 1809 the number was 80,000; and, by the close of the war, 500,000, employing 100,000 workers. Woolen and iron manufactures had not grown quite so rapidly; but they also were well under way. The total capital invested had risen to about a hundred million dollars. Two fifths of this was in the cotton industry. When peace returned, it was plain that this manufacturing industry, developed by unnatural conditions, could not sustain itself against restored competition. We could let it die, and permit the capital and labor to find their way back into other industries; or we could now "protect" it from foreign competition by law. To do this, we would place high tariffs on foreign goods like those we manufactured. If we adopted this policy of "protection," we should pay more for the articles than if we let them come in, untaxed, from the Old World, where their cost was lower. But, it was urged, we should have more diversified industries, larger city populations, and so more of a home market for our raw materials and for foodstuffs, and, after a time, |