A street which ends at another and does not continue across it is a crosssection street, within the meaning of an ordinance limiting the speed of automobiles when going across a thoroughfare or cross-section streets. Johnson v. Warwick (1923) - Tenn. -, 254 S. W. 553.

Under a statute providing that vehicles going in the same direction as a street car should be stopped while the street car was taking on or discharging passengers at the crossings or intersections of any public streets or highways, the court was of the opinion in Syslack v. Nevin Grocery Co. (1923) 180 Wis. 267, 193 N. W. 61, that "the term 'intersections' evidently was used to distinguish it from the term 'crossings,' and can have no other meaning than a street running into another street, but not extending beyond it, for such extension would clearly constitute the same crossing, instead of an intersection."

Although the question under annotation was not considered in Mitchell v. Raymond (1923) Wis., 195 N. W. 855, as no exception to the trial court's instruction on that point of law was noted in the record, the court pointed out that the contention of the defendant, that a highway merely opening into, but not stretching across, another highway, did not form an intersection, was disposed of adversely to such contention by the discussion in the case of Bertschy v. Seng (1923) — Wis. —, 195 N. W. 854.

The junction at an acute angle of a street running east and west with a street running north and south forms an intersection within the meaning of an act regulating the operation of motor vehicles at the intersection of public highways, although the street running east and west terminates on the east side of the street running north and south. Wales v. Harper

29 D. L. R. 113, the court was of the opinion that where one street enters into another street, but does not cross it, the former street intersects the latter within the meaning of a statute prescribing the proper course for automobiles when turning from one street into another at the intersection of two streets. The court says: "I think the statute must be read as applying to such a case, because the reason for the rule is no more applicable to a street which crosses another than to one which merely runs into the other."

But, in Atwood v. Connecticut Co. (1909) 82 Conn. 539, 74 Atl. 899, where P. avenue, running north and south, joined M. street from the north, but did not cross the latter street, and B. street, also running in a north and south direction, joined M. street from the south, but did not cross that street, and it appeared that in passing from P. avenue to and through B. street it was necessary to pass for a distance of more than 19 feet longitudinally over a portion of M. street, the court held that P. avenue and B. street did not constitute one continuous street intersecting M. street. The court was also of the opinion that P. avenue, which extended to, but did not cross, M. street, did not form an intersection at that point within the meaning of an ordinance requiring street cars to slacken speed when "crossing all intersecting streets," "intersect" ordinarily meaning to cross,-literally, to cut into or between,-and the ordinance, being penal in nature, required a strict construction.

tomobiles to be slowed down and timely signals given when approaching an intersecting highway, or curve, or corner in a highway, where the operator's view is obstructed. The court says: "Was Cote Brilliante an intersecting highway in the statutory sense? We think not. The object of

the law is to prevent collisions between motor vehicles and other vehicles and persons at the intersection of streets and highways where collisions are apt to happen,-at a point where one street opens into another and vehicles usually run past the mouth of the intersecting street. Where two separate roadways run along a street and a cross street debouches into the roadway an automobile is not running on, the statute does not apply. It is to be borne in mind the statute does not refer to a crossing of a street or highway; that is, the point where pedestrians cross."

The provisions of a statute regulating the operation of vehicles at intersections will not be construed to apply only to two roads that approach and intersect at right angles. McCaa v. Thomas (1922) 207 Ala. 211, 92 So. 414.

The term "intersection of a street or public highway," in a statute giving the right of way to a vehicle approaching from the right at an intersecting highway, means the space of

the street or highway common to both streets or highways. Neumann v. Apter (1921) 95 Conn. 695, 21 A.L.R. 970, 112 Atl. 350.

Under a statute regulating the operation of machines at the "crossing of intersecting highways," the court held in Laing v. Perryman (1923) Ga. App., 120 S. E. 646, that the act referred to an intersection of public thoroughfares as distinguished from private ways, and the crossing of a private road with a public thoroughfare did not form such an intersection as was contemplated by the statute.

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In Dow v. Latham (1922) N. H. -, 120 Atl. 258, under a statute regulating traffic approaching "any intersecting way," and providing that "way' shall mean any public highway, street, avenue, road, alley, park, or parkway, or any private way laid out under authority of statute," the court held that a private way did not fall within the definition of the statute, unless laid out under statutory authority, or unless it had been used for public travel for twenty years.

A beaten pathway across a highway and common is not an intersection of highways within the meaning of a statute requiring drivers of automobiles to give signals on approaching intersections of highways. Aiken v. Metcalf (1917) 92 Vt. 57, 102 Atl. 330. R. P. D.

This action was brought by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and other taxpayers of the city of High Point to test the validity of chapter 268, Private Laws 1923, entitled "An Act to Aid in the Development of the City of High Point," which provides that the "mayor and city council of the city of High Point shall annually set apart and appropriate from the fund derived annually from the general taxes in said city an amount of not less than one thirtieth of one per cent nor more than one tenth of one per cent upon the assessed valuation of all real and personal property taxable in said city, which funds shall be used and expended under the direction and control of the directors of the chamber of commerce, High Point, North Carolina, under such rules and regulations as they shall prescribe, for the purpose of aiding and encouraging the location of manufacturing, industrial and commercial plants in and near said city, the encouraging of the building railroads thereto, and for such other purposes as will, in the discretion of said directors of the chamber of commerce of High Point, increase the population, taxable property, and business prospects of said city."

Upon application of the plaintiff and others, taxpayers of said city, to restrain the defendants, the city government, from levying, collecting, appropriating, and disbursing said tax upon the ground stated in the complaint that the governing and taxing body of the city of High Point are without authority in law to levy said tax and collect the same and appropriate it to pay expenses of the chamber of commerce for the purposes stated in the act, for the reason that "the chamber of commerce of the said city of High Point is no proper part of the said munici

pality, and no department of the same for the expenses and maintenance of which taxes can be levied and collected by the authorities of the town," and asked a restraining order and an injunction against the mayor and board of aldermen. A restraining order was issued by Stack, J., on June 12, 1923, returnable before Shaw, J., on June 23, who denied the motion for an injunction and dissolved the restraining order.

Mr. J. F. Flowers, for appellants:

Defendants, the governing body of the city of High Point, are without authority in law to levy, collect, appropriate, and pay over public funds of the city for the payment of ex penses of the chamber of commerce, and the act in question is in direct contravention of the state Constitu

tion.

Wood v. Oxford, 97 N. C. 228, 2 S. E. 653; Cox v. Pitt County, 146 N. C. 584, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 253, 60 S. E. 516; Johnston County v. Lacy, 174 N. C. 146, 2 A.L.R. 726, 93 S. E. 482; 28 Cyc. 1163, 1164; Bladen County v. Boring, 175 N. C. 110, 95 S. E. 43; Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 63 L.R.A. 870, 101 Am. St. Rep. 825, 45 S. E. 1029; Gray, Limitations of Taxing Power, p. 27; 26 R. C. L. § 26, pp. 41-43; Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 455.

Messrs. Peacock & Dalton and King, Sapp, & King, for appellee:

It is within the power of the legislature to pass the act in question, and the act is valid and binding upon the city of High Point, and is the basis for a successful undertaking to promote the prosperity and general welfare of the community.

People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 94 Pac. 294; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 84 N. E. 865, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; People ex rel. Gauen v. Niebruegge, 244 Ill. 82, 91 N. E. 115; People ex rel. Dougherty v. Rock Island, 271 Ill. 412, 111 N. E. 291; Wharton v. Greensboro, 146 N. C. 359, 59 S. E. 1043; Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N. C. 490; Jones v. Madison County, 137 N. C. 592, 50 S. E. 291;

19 R. C. L. § 73, p. 766; New Orleans v. Clark (Jefferson City Gaslight Co. v. Clark) 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. ed. 521; Guthrie Nat. Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528, 43 L. ed. 796, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513; Cox v. Pitt County, 146 N. C. 586, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 253, 60 S. E. 516; Hanscom v. Lowell, 165 Mass. 419, 43 N. E. 196; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270, 18 L. ed. 350; Dodge County v. Chandler, 96 U. S. 205, 24 L. ed. 625; Burnett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 697, 34 L.R.A. 541, 37 S. W. 689; Com. ex rel. Kelly v. Pittsburg, 183 Pa. 202, 63 Am. St. Rep. 752, 38 Atl. 628; Taylor v. Newberne, 55 N. C. (2 Jones, Eq.) 141, 64 Am. Dec. 566; Hightower v. Raleigh, 150 N. C. 571, 65 S. E. 279.

Clark, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The question presented is the validity of chap. 268, Private Laws 1923, which authorizes the levy and collection of taxes for the benefit of the chamber of commerce, to be expended at their discretion for the purposes set forth. The plaintiff contends that this is in direct contravention of the Constitution, art. 7, § 7, which reads as follows: "No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein."

The defendants in their answer do not even allege that the amount thus to be levied and appropriated and turned over to the directors of the chamber of commerce is for the necessary expenses of the city of High Point, nor that it has been authorized by any vote of the qualified voters therein, nor that there has been any provision for an election to authorize the tax to be submitted to a vote of the people, as was done in Hudson v. Greensboro, 185 N. C. 502, 117 S. E. 629.

It was not stated what was the amount of money thus sought to be levied and appropriated, though it was alleged in the argument here to be $30,000, but this is immaterial,

for if money can be authorized to be appropriated for other than necessary expenses of the city, without a vote of the people, it can be for any amount and for any purpose whatever. The sole question is whether, not being for necessary expenses and not authorized by vote of the people, it can be imposed and collected simply under authority of an act of the legislature. If it can be appropriated for other than necessary expenses without a vote of the people for this purpose, it can be appropriated for any purpose whatever that the legislature may authorize, and we know that in local matters acts for local purposes are passed usually on request of the members for the county in which the municipality is situated.

In Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C. 455, 88 S. E. 642, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 916, Hoke, J., in a very clearly expressed and well-considered opinion, conceding that former opinions, which had unduly restricted the meaning of necessary expenses of municipalities, had been given a wider construction in the opinion of Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 63 L.R.A. 870, 101 Am. St. Rep. 825, 45 S. E. 1029, by extending them to embrace furnishing lights and water owing to the change in the customs and the necessities of the age requisite for those who live in cities, held that it was still requisite that "necessary expenses" within the meaning of this act should mean "the ordinary and usual expenditures reasonably required to enable a county [or other municipality] to properly perform its duties as part of the state government," and quotes Jones v. Madison County, 137 N. C. 579, 599, 50 S. E. 291, 298, where the court said: The term may be said to "involve and include the support of the aged and infirm, the laying out and repair of public highways, the construction of bridges, the maintenance of the public peace and administration of public justice -expenses to enable the county to carry on the work for which it was

organized and given a portion of the state's sovereignty."

For the same reason former decisions construing that "necessary expenses" did not include appropriations for education were overruled in Collie v. Franklin County, 145 N. C. 171, 59 S. E. 44.

In the latter case the extension of appropriations to education had been hampered by another provision of the Constitution restricting the rate of taxation. But all these cases extending the meaning of the words. "necessary expenses" were due to the enlarged scope of governmental expenses, causing a broader vision and a very proper growth in the recognized needs and requirements of municipal government. They were not based upon any idea that "necessary expenses" would take in matters which were not required as necessary governmental expense. know of no reason why the expenses and purposes of a nongovernmental body like a chamber of commerce should become necessary expenses of government.

We

Those who compose such bodies are usually business men of standing, character, and influence in their respective communities, and they are actuated by patriotic motives to advance the public good. But they are in no sense governmental. They are neither elected nor appointed by public authority. They exercise no governmental duty. They have heretofore contributed not only their time, but of their means, but they are not required to do so, and have been actuated by motives for the public good. They are neither a charity nor educational.

If chambers of commerce, composed of business men and serving the advancement of the community in financial matters, can be termed governmental simply because they claim to be advancing the public welfare from their standpoint, and taxation can be levied upon the entire community to advance the ideas that "in their discretion" they deem for the public welfare, we know of no reason why the entire public shall

not in like manner be taxed for the benefit of the Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs, and Lions' Clubs, who, also, as well as the chambers of commerce, are composed of many of our best citizens, and who in the same manner are actuated by patriotic motives to advance the public welfare. Then the ladies have their sororities, the Daughters of the Confederacy, and many other admirable societies for the public good, and there will be no reason why there should not also be embraced as subjects for support by taxation the labor unions, who in their sphere are equally patriotic and are endeavoring to advance the best interests of the community as they see it.

The limitation of the Constitution is very wise and too clear for us to misconceive its meaning. It restricts taxation to necessary governmental purposes except when a purpose outside that sphere has secured a majority vote of the registered voters authorizing taxation to be levied for such purpose. The legislature has no power given it by the Constitution to authorize appropriation or a levy of taxes by the authorities of any county, city, or town except for necessary expenses thereof, "unless authorized by a majority of the registered voters."

If the legislature could pass beyond this line, there is no subject, and no extent, of taxation which would not be sought for and advocated by its friends. There would be a steady conflict between the friends of the different causes seeking public aid, and there would be an unlimited source of friction between them and an unlimited amount of taxation resultant by a possible combination between the friends of powerful organizations.

We have the highest respect for the members of the chambers of commerce in our cities and towns, and believe that their motives are to serve the public welfare, just as we have for the other organizations named, but that does not make their support a "necessary expense" of the municipality, and therefore the