It is a debatable question, incapable of exact solution, whether the testator intended to adopt this seal with this inscription as his signature, or whether he intended it as a seal only, and neglected to sign his name. The disposition which the testator has attempted to make of his property is such a natural one, and the proofs are so clear that he intended this document as a testamentary disposition of his property, that I feel that the surrogate should not be astute to search for reasons for rejecting this will, but, on the other hand, should strive to sustain it, especially where the interested parties, all being of full age, raise no objections. I therefore hold that the testator adopted this seal and his indorsement upon it as a signature."

Under an English statute (Wills Act, § 21) providing that interlineations or alterations made in a will are not valid unless executed in the same manner as is required for the execution of a will, and that a will with alterations as a part thereof will be deemed to be duly executed if the signature of the testator and the subscription of the witnesses are made in the margin, it has been held that where two interlineations were introduced into a will after execution and attestation, and the testatrix signed with her initials in the margin against the interlineations, and the witnesses subscribed their initials in attestation of this signature of the testator, the signature and subscription by initials only were sufficient. Blewitt's Goods (1880) L. R. 5 Prob. Div. (Eng.) 116, 49 L. J. Prob. N. S. 31, 42 L. T. N. S. 329, 28 Week. Rep. 520, 44 J. P. 768.

A will has been admitted to probate where it was signed so that the initials of the Christian name and surname were plainly written in ink, and the remaining letters of the full name could be seen somewhat indistinctly impressed on the paper by the pen, without any ink marks whatever. Upon examining with a magnifying glass, the full name could be distinctly seen, the initials being in ink and the remaining letters being impressed

on the paper by the pen without ink. Re Jakob (1888) 21 W. N. C. (Pa.) 510.

For a discussion of the civil law on the question of signing by initials, see Bradford's Succession (1909) 124 La. 44, 49 So. 972, 18 Ann. Cas. 766. V. Signature by wrong name. Where a woman, who had been married a second time, signed a will by the name of her first husband, it was held that the will was valid. In Glover's Goods (1847) 11 Jur. (Eng.) 1022, 5 Notes of Cases, 553. In the case of Redding's Goods (1850) 14 Jur. 1052, 2 Rob. Eccl. Rep. 339, 163 Eng. Reprint, 1338, it appeared that the testator requested a friend to draw up her will, which he did, describing her as "C. Higgins," and that the will was duly executed. Some years later the testator, having, without any assigned reason, changed her name to Redding, requested the person who drew the will to change it, so far as regarded her name. The name "Higgins" was changed to "Redding" in the body of the will, and the attestation clause and the signature were erased with a knife in the presence of the testator and the subscribed witnesses, after which the testator signed the will "C. Redding," but the witnesses, though present, did not again sign. It was held that the facts showed that there was no intention of revoking the will, and that, as the second signature had not been attested, probate must pass on the will as originally executed.

In a case wherein it appeared that a will was in proper form as a nuncupative testament by public act, it was held that the testator's signature by an assumed name was a sufficient descriptio personæ, he having assumed the name by which he signed the will for political reasons, and being generally known in the city in which he resided by that name. Balot y Ripoll v. Moriña (1846) 12 Rob. (La.) 552, 14 Prob. Rep. Ann. 402, note.

Using a wrong name where the signature is by mark is considered under II., supra.

In the construction of the wili of a testator of German nationality, who had changed his name when he came to America, it was urged that a devise in remainder to "the lawful heirs of Charles F. Tyler in the United States of America, or the lawful heirs of Carl F. Theilig, formerly of Noulitz, Saxon Altenburg," being in the alternative, was void. Tyler. v. Theilig

(1905) 124 Ga. 204, 52 S. E. 606. In holding that these names were intended for the same person and used for purposes of identification merely, the court held the devise in remainder to be good, and added that this idea was further borne out by the fact that the testator signed the will by using both names. It does not appear in the body of the opinion that any question was raised with respect to the signature as rendering the will invalid, but in the syllabus, which was prepared by the court, it is stated that a signature by using both names does not render a devise in remainder void.

VI. Signature by stamp. Where the signature was made by means of a rubber stamp used by another at the direction of the testator, it was held to be a good signature under a statute which allowed a will to be signed by another person in the presence and by direction of the testator. Jenkins v. Gaisford (1863) 9 Jur. N. S. 630, 3 Swabey & T. 93, 164 Eng. Reprint, 1208, 32 L. J. Prob. N. S. 122, 8 L. T. N. S. 517, 11 Week. Rep. 854. See Jenkyns's Goods (1863) 9 Jur. N. S. (Eng.) 311, 32 L. J. Prob. N. S. 71, 11 Week. Rep. 501.

VII. Sealing as signing.

In some of the early English cases it was held that a sealing was a sufficient signing, under a statute requiring a will to be signed by the testator. Lemayne v. Stanley (1681) 3 Lev. 1, 83 Eng. Reprint, 545; Warneford v. Warneford (1727) 2 Strange, 764, 93 Eng. Reprint, 834; Lee v. Libb (1688) 1 Shower, K. B. 69, 89 Eng. Reprint, 454. See Emerson's Goods (1882) Ir. Rep. 9 C. L. 443. But this rule has been changed by later English cases, which hold that

sealing is not signing. Smith v. Evans (1751) 1 Wils. 313, 95 Eng. Reprint, 636; Ellis v. Smith (1754) 1 Ves. Jr. 11, 30 Eng. Reprint, 205; Wright v. Wakeford (1811) 17 Ves. Jr. 454, 34 Eng. Reprint, 176. In Smith v. Evans (Eng.) supra, the court, in speaking of the case of Lemayne v. Stanley (Eng.) supra, which held that sealing was signing, said: "That 'putting a seal to a will is a sufficient signing within the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries' is very strange doctrine; for that, if it was so, it would be very easy for one person to forge any man's will, by only forging the names of any two obscure persons dead, for he would have no occasion to forge the testator's hand. And the barons said, if the same thing should come in question again, they should not hold that sealing a will, only, was a sufficient signing within the statute."

It has been held that the impress of his notarial seal by a testator who was a notary public was a sufficient signature to his will. Re Wilson (1914) - N. S. -, 19 D. L. R. 698. And see the case of Re Severance (1916) 96 Misc. 384, 161 N. Y. Supp. 452, cited supra, IV.

VIII. Misspelled signature.

The holding in Bradford's Succession (1909) 124 La. 44, 49 So. 972, 18 Ann. Cas. 766, to the effect that a will is valid, although the name of the testator is misspelled, where it is plain that the name written was intended for the testator's name, is in accord with Word v. Whipps (1894) 16 Ky. L. Rep. 403, 28 S. W. 151. The contention in that case was that the name of the testator was not subscribed to his will as the statute required, for the reason that, when he attempted to sign his name thereto, he wrote "A. J. Whpps," instead of "A. J. Whipps." The court said: "There is no intimation of fraud, or any circumstance attending the execution of the paper casting a suspicion. on the transaction. It is manifest that the omission of the letter 'I' was merely an oversight, and we do not think that, because there is some dif

ficulty in pronouncing the name as written, the due execution of the paper is in any wise affected."

In a case wherein it appeared that the testator omitted the "n" in his signature in writing his first name, "Emanuel," on one of the sheets of the will, it was held that this fact in no wise affected the validity of the will, for there was no contention, even, that he did not intend to, and that he did not, sign the will, but the whole testimony on that point showed that he did intend to, and did, sign it. Boone v. Boone (1914) 114 Ark. 69, 169 S. W. 779.

"Ant nanie" was held to be a sufficient signature to an instrument to entitle it to probate as the will of Aunt Nannie Rodgers, in Wells v. Lewis (1921) 190 Ky. 626, 228 S. W. 3.

IX. Unfinished signature.

Where a testator attempts to sign his will and stops before completing the signature, the execution is insufficient unless he intends the incomplete writing to be his signature. Thus, where a testator started to write his name, but after making one stroke of the pen laid it down saying, "I can't sign it now," it was held that there was not a sufficient signature, as the intent to have the mark considered as a signature was lacking, it being conclusively shown by the testator's words that he did not consider that he had signed, and that he intentionally postponed doing so until a future occasion. Plate's Estate (1892) 148 Pa. 55, 33 Am. St. Rep. 805, 23 Atl. 1038, reversing (1891) 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 644.

In Knapp v. Reilly (1885) 3 Dem. (N. Y.) 427, it appeared that the testator, Patrick J. O'Neill, started to sign his name to the will, but when he had finished the letter "t" in his first name the pen dropped from his hand, and he said that he could not

go any further. Another person present then proceeded to make the cross mark and to finish the signature, but without any direction from the testator. It was held that the portion of the word "Patrick," as written by

the decedent himself, did not serve for a sufficient signature, as it was evident that his relinquishing the pen before he had completed the task he had undertaken was due to physical weakness, and not to a purpose on his part to treat, and to have the witnesses treat, the fragmentary signature already written as the authentication of the will.

X. Signature as "Father," "Mother," or the like.

In the case of Ex parte Walker, 15 Quebec Pr. Rep. 15, it was held that a holographic will, which was signed "Mother," and which will, and the signature thereto, were alleged in the petition for probate to be in the true and actual handwriting of the decedent, was valid and should be admitted to probate.

In the reported case (RE KIMMEL, ante, 678) the word "Father" signed to a letter, testamentary in character, being intended as a completed signature, is held to answer all the purposes of the Wills Act, the writer's intent to execute being apparent.

The signature "Ant nanie” was held to be sufficient to authorize the probate of a will, in the case of Wells v. Lewis (1921) 190 Ky. 626, 228 S. W. 3. It does not appear that the testatrix was the aunt of the person addressed in the instrument.

XI. Signature made with another's assistance.

A signature made by the hand of an illiterate testator incapable of making his own signature, while guided by another at the testator's request, is the testator's signature, where he desires and intends to execute the will. Watson v. Pipes (1856) 32 Miss. 466, approved in Sheehan v. Kearney (1903) 82 Miss. 688, 35 L.R.A. 102, 21 So. 41. It is stated that a signature made in this manner is good, whether the incapacity to write arises from ignorance, or is caused by accident or disease.

In accordance with the foregoing statement, it is held in the following cases that the fact that a testator is so assisted in making his signature because of physical weakness makes it

New York. Re Knight (1914) 87 Misc. 577, 150 N. Y. Supp. 137.

Pennsylvania. Vandruff v. Rinehart (1857) 29 Pa. 232; Shotwell's Estate (1892) 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 444 (knowingly accepted aid); Perchment v. Dietrich (1852) 1 Am. L. Reg. 125; Hopkins's Estate (1923) 277 Pa. 157, 120 Atl. 807. See also McClure v. Redman (1919) 263 Pa. 405, 107 Atl. 25. Rhode Island. Wood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. (1905) 27 R. I. 295, 61 Atl. 757 (no request appears).

Texas. Trezevant v. Rains (1892) Tex. 19 S. W. 567 (requested assistance. Washington. Re Adams (1922) 120 Wash. 189, 206 Pac. 947 (testator's arm supported by physician).

West Virginia. McMechen v. McMechen (1881) 17 W. Va. 683, 41 Am. Rep. 682 (stating that no express request is necessary; that a request may be inferred from circumstances).

The signature of a testator while

being assisted by another was sustained in Re Van Houten (1895) 15 Misc. 196, 37 N. Y. Supp. 39, but there seems to have been no contest over the signature by the testator, the objection being on another ground.

In the case of Re Larson (Minn.) supra, the court upheld the probate of a will signed by the testatrix with assistance only to the extent that her sleeve was held when she started to write.

In the case of Re Gordon (Nev.) supra, the court, after approving the foregoing rule, said: "In order for this rule to apply, it must appear that the testator, at the time of requesting or receiving the aid in the signing of the instrument, had the present volition to affix the signature, and was aware and fully cognizant of the details of the instrument of will or testament to which he, by the aid of the other, was affixing his signature. The fact that the signature of the testator was made in the manner indicated by the record here would not of itself invalidate that signature. Hence we must decide-and we do this in the light of a harmonious line of authorities-that if the testator, in this instance, possessed testamentary capacity, was acting under no undue influence, realized the full force and effect of each and every one of the provisions of the will that he was signing, then the signature, in the manner in which it was made as described by the trial judge, was a valid signature."

It was held in Fritz v. Turner (N. J.) supra, that it is not necessary to reconcile contradictory testimony on the subject of the testator's ability to write, or to determine precisely how far the one assisting controlled the hand of the testator; the important question is whether the testator had the purpose to write his name or make his mark on the will as his signature to it, and whether in fact he did make such a physical effort to sign as resulted in a mark on the paper, by which the paper could be identified. It was further observed that while the statute, as interpreted by the courts,

requires that the testator himself must sign his will, and he cannot direct or authorize another to sign it for him, the legislature could not have intended that the testator's signature must be his unaided act.

In Re Kearney (1902) 69 App. Div. 481, 74 N. Y. Supp. 1045, it was held that the extent of the aid, so long as it is assistance, does not make the signature invalid, if the signing is in any degree an act of the testator, acquiesced in and adopted by him. The question whether the signature is the act of the testator does not turn on the extent of the aid, but on whether the aid was assistance or control. If, against the wish of the alleged testator at the time, or without his consciousness as to the purpose, another writes his name with a pen which is merely in physical contact with the hand of the alleged testator, then the signature is not recognized as made by him. In that case an expert in handwriting, who had compared the signature of the will with two normal signatures of the testator, testified that he failed to see a particle of the testator's handwriting in the signature, and that in his opinion the testator had no superintendence, either mental or physical, of the act, although he might have touched the pen. It was held that this testimony should not prevail against the positive testimony of intelligent and comparatively disinterested witnesses that not only did the testator direct the terms of his will, but that it was read over to him, that he attempted to sign it unassisted, that only when he failed did he accept an offer of assistance, that he took part

in the signing of the will, and that he published it. This statement of the law was approved in Re Baumann (1914) 85 Misc. 656, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1049.

It is sometimes stated that where the hand of the testator is guided by another, at the testator's request, this amounts to, at least, an express direction to the other to sign his name. Watson v. Pipes (1856) 32 Miss. 466; Trezevant v. Rains (1892) Tex. 19 S. W. 567; Den ex dem. Stevens v. Vancleve (1822) 4 Wash. C. C. 262, Fed. Cas. No. 13,412.

In Kirby's Estate (1898) 9 Kulp (Pa.) 345, a witness testified that she steadied the decedent's hand when the will was signed, but that the decedent did not know what she was doing. It was said: "She is not a subscribing witness, but almost equivalent, as she assisted at the signing. A subscribing witness who testifies that the testatrix was unconscious when the will was made stultifies himself, and his testimony is worthless." On the evidence offered, the signature to the will was held to be genuine.

In Peden v. Abraham (1912) B. C. 3 West. Week. Rep. 265, 8 D. L. R. 403, there was held to be a failure to sign, where, when the testator's fingers failed to grasp the pen, a doctor put his hand over the decedent's and traced his name, no request having been made by the testator to that end. The court viewed the case, not as one of assistance in signing, but as one signing for another.

As to the effect of assisting a testator to make his mark, see supra, II. R. S.

V.