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the continent of Europe the action is generally of a summary character, and must be brought within a short time after protest. In Great Britain the act provides for summary proceedings on bills within six months after maturity.98

Exceptions for Nonsuit, etc.

§ 1596. Many statutes provide for an extension of time, where judgment (in an action brought within due time) has been reversed or arrested, or judgment of nonsuit entered." So, in case of reversal or arrest,100 or reversal,101 or nonsuit, dismissal, or discontinuance Com. arts. 763, 764). So, as against drawer and indorser, if the acceptor had funds, in PORTUGAL (Code Com. art. 423), the time being extended in other cases to 30 years.

95 ALABAMA (Code, § 2615); COLORADO (Mills' Ann. St. § 2900); CONNECTICUT (Gen. St. § 1371); DELAWARE (Rev. Code, c. 123, § 8); GEORGIA (Civ. Code, § 3767); MAINE (Supp. Rev. St. c. 81, § 82); MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 1); MICHIGAN (How. Ann. St. § 8713); MINNESOTA (Gen. St. § 5136); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2737); NEVADA (Gen. St. $3644); NEW HAMPSHIRE (Pub. St. c. 217, § 3); NEW JERSEY (2 Gen. St. p. 1974, § S); NEW MEXICO (Comp. Laws, § 1862); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 382); OREGON (Code Civ. Proc. § 6); PENNSYLVANIA (Dig. p. 1213, § 19); RHODE ISLAND (Gen. Laws, c. 234. § 3); SOUTH CAROLINA (Code Civ. Proc. § 112); TENNESSEE (Shannon's Code, § 4472); VERMONT (V. S. § 1199); WISCONSIN (Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 4222). So, in GREAT BRITAIN, by 21 Jac. I., c. 16.

96 ILLINOIS (Hurd's Rev. St. c. 83, § 16); INDIANA (Horner's Rev. St. § 293); IOWA (Code, § 3447); MISSOURI (Rev. St. § 6774); WEST VIRGINIA Code, c. 104. § 6). So, in HOLLAND (Exch. Law, art. 207).

97 OHIO (2 Bates' Ann. St. § 4980).

as 18 & 19 Việt. c. 67.

** One year in ARKANSAS (Sand. & H. Dig. § 4841); ILLINOIS (Hurd's Rev. St. c. 83, § 25); MISSOURI (Rev. St. § 6784); NORTH CAROLINA (Code, § 166).

100 ALABAMA (Code, § 2806); COLORADO (Mills' Ann. St. § 2917); CONNECTICUT (Gen. St. § 1386; but where suit is against executor or administrator, six months); DELAWARE (Rev. Code, c. 123, § 15); FLORIDA

101 Six months in MAINE (Rev. St. c. 81, § 91); one year in CALIFORNIA Code Civ. Proc. § 355); KANSAS (Gen. St. c. 95, § 17); NEVADA (Gen. St. $ 3655); NEW HAMPSHIRE (Pub. St. c. 217, § 9); OHIO (Bates' Ann. St. § 4991); OREGON (Code Civ. Proc. § 6); SOUTH CAROLINA (Code Civ. Proc. § 125); WISCONSIN (Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 4235).

only,102 or dismissal of the original action for want of jurisdiction.108 So, in case of the unavoidable abatement of the original action for any cause,10 or of abatement by the death of a party.105 So, where an injunction has been granted, or any statutory prohibition prevents the action, the running of such injunction or prohibition will not be included as part of the time limited.108 And the appointment of a receiver for an insolvent corporation has a like effect.107

Most statutes of limitations recognize and except the natural dis(Rev. St. § 1284, reversal only); MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 13); MICHIGAN (2 How. Ann. St. § 8723); MINNESOTA (Gen. St. § 5155); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2756); NEW JERSEY (2 Gen. St. p. 1978, § 26); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 405); PENNSYLVANIA (Dig. p. 1215, § 21); RHODE ISLAND (Gen. Laws, c. 234, § 9); TENNESSEE (Shannon's Code, § 4446); VERMONT (V. S. § 1214); VIRGINIA (Code, § 2934); WEST VIRGINIA (Code, c. 104, § 19).

102 Six months in GEORGIA (Civ. Code, § 3786).

103 Three months in KENTUCKY (Ky. St. § 2545).

KANSAS (Gen. St. c. 95, § 17); MICHIGAN (How. Ann. St. § OHIO (2 Bates' Ann. St. § 4991); VERMONT (V. S. § 1214); VIR

104 Six months in IOWA (Code, § 3455); MAINE (Rev. St. c. 81, § 91). So. in CONNECTICUT (Gen. St. § 1386), if against an executor or administrator, and otherwise for one year. So, for one year in COLORADO (Mills' Ann. St. § 2917); DELAWARE (Rev. St. c. 123, § 15); MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 13); 8723); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2756); RHODE ISLAND (Gen. Laws, c. 234, § 9); GINIA (Code, § 2934); WEST VIRGINIA (Code, c. 104, § 19). So, for five years in INDIANA (Horner's Rev. St. § 299). And the dismissal of an action because of an accidental omission of the clerk to enter it seasonably on the docket is within the Massachusetts statute. Allen v. Sawtelle, 7 Gray, 165.

105 One year in ARKANSAS (Sand. & H. Dig. §§ 4842, 4843); MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 13); MISSOURI (Rev. St. §§ 6785, 6786); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2756); in CONNECTICUT (Gen. St. § 1386), except where suit originally brought against executor or administrator, six months.

106 ALABAMA (Code, § 2635); ARKANSAS (Sand. & H. Dig. § 4844); CALIFORNIA (Code Civ. Proc. § 356); ILLINOIS (Hurd's Rev. St. c. 83, § 23); IOWA (Code, § 3458); KENTUCKY (Ky. St. § 2544); MINNESOTA (Gen. St. § 5151); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2758a); MISSOURI (Rev. St. § 6787); NEVADA (Gen. St. § 3656); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 406); NORTH CAROLINA (Code, § 167); OREGON (Code Civ. Proc. § 20); SOUTH CAROLINA (Code Civ. Proc. § 126); TENNESSEE (Shannon's Code, § 4447); VERMONT (V. S. § 1212); WISCONSIN (Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 4236).

107 Ludington v. Thompson, 4 App. Div. 117, 38 N. Y. Supp. 768.

abilities which prevent the bringing of suit; and many statutes provide that, where several causes of disability concur, all must cease before the statute will begin to run.108 It is also provided in some states that the action is barred if the cause of action arose, and is bar red, in another state.109 In Nevada the statute makes a distinction between liabilities accrued out of the state and those which accrue in the state, limiting the former to two years or less, according to the time when they became due.110 A similar statute in Colorado has been construed not to apply to a note given in Colorado for a debt which had accrued in Wyoming, notwithstanding a promise made in Wyoming to pay it.111 There was formerly a similar statute in Illinois also, which no longer exists.112

It is provided in some states that, where an action is brought on the ground of a fraud which has been concealed from the plaintiff's knowledge, action may be brought within six years after discovery

108 ALABAMA (Code. § 2637); KENTUCKY (Ky. St. § 2538); MINNESOTA (Gen. St. § 5153); MISSOURI (Rev. St. § 6790); NEVADA (Gen. St. § 3658); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 409); NORTH CAROLINA (Code, § 175); OREGON (Code Civ. Proc. § 23); SOUTH CAROLINA (Code Civ. Proc. § 128); TENNESSEE (Shannon's Code, § 4450); WISCONSIN (Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 4238). But, when the statute once begins to run, no subsequent disability will afterwards interrupt its running. Benj. Chalm. Dig. art. 253; 2 Pars. Notes &B. 646.

109 ALABAMA (Code, § 2625); CALIFORNIA (Code Civ. Proc. § 361), unless held by a citizen of California from its maturity; ILLINOIS (Hurd's Rev. St. c. 83, § 20); INDIANA (Horner's Rev. St. § 297); IOWA (Code, § 3452): KANSAS (Gen. St. c. 95, § 16); KENTUCKY (Ky. St. § 2542); MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 11); MINNESOTA (Gen. St. § 5146); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2754); NEBRASKA (Comp. St. §§ 5608, 5611); NEVADA (Gen. St. § 3662); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 390), unless held by a citizen of New York from its maturity; OHIO (Bates' Ann. St. § 4990); OREGON (Code Civ. Proc. § 26); TENNESSEE (Shannon's Code, § 4480), if party to be charged was a resident of such foreign state when the right of action accrued; TEXAS (Rev. St. § 3374, as to immigrants); VIRGINIA (Code § 2933); WEST VIRGINIA (Code, c. 104, § 18).

110 NEVADA (Gen. St. § 3661). But this limitation, which was formerly six months, was held not to apply to a note signed in another state, but delivered in Nevada, Read v. Edwards, 2 Nev. 262; although it applied to a note payable in Colorado or Nevada, Wilcox v. Williams, 5 Nev. 206.

111 Hawse v. Burgmire, 4 Colo. 313.

112 Campbell v. Harris, 30 Ill. 395.

of the fraud.113

But in Connecticut, when the maker of a negotiable note gives the holder notice in writing that it was obtained from him by conspiracy or fraud, action must be brought within six months after it is due, or within one year after notice.114

114

Duebills and Certificates-Bank Notes-Coupons.

§ 1597. The statute of limitations applies, in general, to all simple contracts, whether negotiable or not. Thus, it will run against a duebill from its date.115 And such bill is held in Louisiana to be a promissory note, within the meaning of the statute.116 But in Connecticut, although a promise of payment is implied by law, a duebill is held not to be a nonnegotiable note, within the meaning of the statute.117

The statute of limitations also affects certificates of deposit; but it runs against such certificate only from demand of payment.11 In Wisconsin, however, certificates of deposit are held to be in effect negotiable demand notes, and the statute runs from the time of issue without demand.11

In general, a bank bill, being intended for indefinite circulation, is not subject to the statute of limitations either against the first or subsequent holders.120 But, when bank notes are no longer in circula

113 MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 14): MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code.

§ 2749). So, in NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 382). And see § 1591, supra. 114 CONNECTICUT (Gen. St. § 1373).

115 Guignard v. Parr, 4 Rich. Law (S. C.) 184; Barnes v. Garvey, 4 Kan. 555.

116 Wardell v. Sterne, 22 La. Ann. 28, overruling Garland v. Scott, 15 La. Ann. 143. So, a duebill payable in current funds subject to draft at 60 days. Spearing v. Succession of Zacharie, 26 La. Ann. 496. Or a written request to pay "as part payment of a note I hold against you." Robichaud v. Thorne, 21 La. Ann. 611. So, a receipt for a certain amount, "to be paid when called upon." Baylis v. Nash, 28 La. Ann. 590.

117 Currier v. Lockwood, 40 Conn. 349.

118 Howell v. Adams, 68 N. Y. 314. So, where the certificate is payable with interest, Payne v. Gardiner, 29 N. Y. 146; or from maturity if payable on a given day, Baker v. Leland, 9 App. Div. 365, 41 N. Y. Supp. 399; or from date, if payable "on return of this certificate," Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, 31 N. W. 705.

119 Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, 31 N. W. 705.

120 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. 691; 2 Pars. Notes & B. 643. And this is provided

tion and reissued, they are liable to be barred by the statute like other Dotes. 121

An interest coupon is, in like manner, barred by the statute; but coupons attached to a bond will not be barred until the statute has run against the bond.122 If, however, they have been detached and negotiated separately, the statute will run against them from their maturity, and not from that of the bond.12

123

Limitation of Checks_Sealed Notes.

125

§ 1598. The statute runs against a check on a bank from the time payment is demanded.124 But where a check was not presented for ten years, and the drawer had no funds in bank at the time of giving the check, or for more than six years afterwards, it was held that the amount became due immediately from the drawer without presentment of the check, and that an action against him on the check was therefore barred within six years from its date.12 The right of action upon a certified check is subject, in like manner. to the bar of the by statute in ALABAMA (Code, § 2639), except as to a bank in liquidation two years from notice; ARKANSAS (Sand. & H. Dig. § 4839); CALIFORNIA (Code Civ. Proc. § 348); MAINE (Rev. St. c. 81, § 86); MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 6); MICHIGAN (How. Ann. St. § 8716); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2758); MISSOURI (Rev. St. § 6792); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 393); NORTH CAROLINA (Code, § 174); SOUTH CAROLINA (Code Civ. Proc. § 129); TENNESSEE (Shannon's Code, § 4476); VERMONT (V. S. $ 1202); WISCONSIN (Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 4230). So, in New Hampshire, as to an action against stockholders. Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason, 243, Fed. Cas. No. 2,121. And the date is no evidence of the time of issue. Dougherty v. Bank, 13 Ga. 287; Long v. Bank, 81 N. C. 41. And the statute would run, not from the date, but from the reissue of the note, Greer v. Perkins, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 588; or from demand and refusal, Farmers' & M. Bank v. White, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 482.

121 Johnston v. Talley, 60 Ga. 540; Kimbro v. Bank, 49 Ga. 419.

122 City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Meyer v. Porter, 65 Cal. 67,

2 Pac. SS4; Philadelphia Trust, Safe-Deposit & Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia & E. R. Co., 160 Pa. St. 590, 28 Atl. 960.

123 Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583.

124 Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y. 435; Viets v. Bank, 101 N. Y. 563, 5 N. E. 457, affirming 31 Hun, 484. They are included in the statutory limitation for bills of exchange. Rogers v. Durant, 140 U. S. 298, 11 Sup. Ct. 754.

125 Brush v. Barrett, 82 N. Y. 400, affirming 16 Hun, 409.

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