a change in the time of payment by which it is accelerated 344 or postponed; 345 or a memorandum as to the place of payment.346

Ratification and Waiver.

§ 1774. The consent of a party to an alteration may be given long after,347 and it may be implied from a subsequent promise amounting to a ratification; 348 and such subsequent consent on the part of a surety will not require a fresh consideration.* If an accommodation indorser takes up a draft after its alteration by the drawer, and re-. issues it for money lent him, he will be liable as though he had originally consented.349 And silence on the indorser's part on receiv ing notice of protest, payment of other similar notes, and suffering the suit on the note to go by default, until after the maker had absconded, are all admissible as evidence of ratification.350 So, too, if a party, with knowledge of the alteration, afterwards agrees to extend the time for payment,351 or makes a payment on account of principal 352 or interest.353 But a payment of interest, to amount to a fresh acknowledgment of the debt, must be sufficiently exact to enable the jury to ascertain the precise amount of the debt admitted. 35- If the alteration increases the rate of interest, and the surety pays such increased rate after learning of the alteration, it will be a consent on

344 Tarleton v. Shingler, 7 C. B. 812.

345 Kennerly v. Nash, 1 Starkie, 452; Leykariff v. Ashford, 12 Moore, 281. 346 Chit. Bills, 214; Jacob v. Hart, 6 Maule & S. 142; Stevens v. Lloyd, Moody & M. 292.

347 Willard v. Clarke, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 435.

348 Powers v. Nash, 37 Me. 322; National State Bank of Troy v. Rising, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 793; Humphreys v. Guillow, 13 N. H. 385; Stewart v. Bank, 40 Mich. 348. And he cannot rescind the note and retain the consideration. Singleton v. McQuerry, 85 Ky. 41, 2 S. W. 652. And, if he afterwards knowingly receives the goods purchased with the note, it will be a waiver even of the defense of forgery. Union Bank v. Middlebrook, 33 Conn. 95.

* Pelton v. Prescott, 13 Iowa, 567.

349 Ward v. Allen, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 53.

350 Weed v. Carpenter, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 403.,

851 Bell v. Mahin, 69 Iowa, 408, 29 N. W. 331.

352 Evans v. Foreman, 60 Mo. 449.

353 Cariss v. Tattersall, 2 Man. & G. 890.

354 Chit. Bills, 220; Green v. Davies, 4 Barn. & C. 235, 6 Dowl. & R. 306.

his part.3

355

And even payment, made on a note which is known to be forged, will be a ratification of the forgery, or an admission of the signature as genuine.356

Waiver by Acknowledgment-Promise.

§ 1775. An acknowledgment of responsibility for a forged acceptance is a waiver, if made with knowledge of the forgery 357 and with the intention of being bound by it.358 And the ratification may be a verbal one. 359 And it may be shown by the giving of a renewal with knowledge of the alteration; 360 or requesting an extension; 381 or by the taking of an indemnity bond; 382 or by a promise of payment with full knowledge of an alteration or forgery.363 So, where an agent intrusted with a note altered it to a bill of exchange, and

355 Prouty v. Wilson, 123 Mass. 297.

356 Crout v. De Wolf, 1 R. I. 393.

357 Ex parte Edwards, 2 Mont. D. & D. 241; Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen (Mass.) 447; Forsythe v. Bonta, 5 Bush (Ky.) 547. So, the maker of a note, telling the purchaser that it was all right, Harrison v. Luce, 64 Ark. 583, 43 S. W. 970; or acknowledging a sealed note after alteration, Wester v. Bailey, 118 N. C. 193, 24 S. E. 9; or acquiescing in the alteration, Canon v. Grigsby, 116 Ill. 151, 5 N. E. 362. But mere silence on receiving notice of protest is not enough. Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, supra. Nor failure of a bank to recognize a bank note as forged on its first presentation. Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1. Although it is otherwise, if the bank is guilty of laches. United States Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333. Although it has been said that a forgery cannot be "ratified." Brook v. Hook, L. R. 6 Exch. 89. And see Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 H. L. 200; Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. St. 447; Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 42 N. W. 467.

358 Wellington v. Jackson, 121 Mass. 157.

359 Howard v. Duncan, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 174.

360 Bradford Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 75 Hun, 297, 27 N. Y. Supp. 96. But not the offer of a conditional renewal, which was refused. McDaniel v. Whitsett, 96 Tenn. 10, 33 S. W. 567.

361 Bell v. Mahin, 69 Iowa, 409, 29 N. W. 331.

362 Although admissions of liability after maturity are not sufficient. Woodruff v. Munroe, 33 Md. 146. Nor a mortgage by the principal to the surety which was not delivered nor known to the surety, but recited the alteration in the note. Benedict v. Miner, 58 Ill. 19.

363 Goodspeed v. Cutler, 75 Ill. 534; Pritchard v. Smith, 77 Ga. 463. But it must be made with full knowledge, Gleason v. Henry, 71 Ill. 109; Westloh v. Brown, 43 U. C. Q. B. 402; and upon new consideration, Warren v. Fant's

the principal afterwards examined it and said the agent was primarily liable, but made no other objection, it was held to be a ratification.364 And a new note, given in compromise of one alleged to be forged, is a waiver, and will bar the maker from setting up the original forgery.365 And a maker is liable who signs after the forged signature of a co-maker, although such forgery was not known to him or the holder.366

In like manner, where the teller of a bank declares a certified draft to be good, after notice of its miscarriage and stoppage of payment, and in disregard of the bank custom to look at the drawer's account before certifying, it will be a waiver of a previous alteration raising the amount of the draft.367 So, a telegram by the drawee, directing the drawer to "make drafts payable through clearing house," renders him liable, if the drafts are changed to that effect after being drawn, and are discounted on the faith of the telegram.3 368

What is not a Waiver.

370

§ 1776. An alteration is not waived or consented to by the giving of a note without knowledge of the alteration; 369 nor by trying to arrange with the holder for payment in future; nor by a letter complaining of the alteration, and stating that he had been prepared to pay, and the plaintiff might have the money by calling at the house; 371 nor by writing a waiver of protest over a forged indorsement with no intention of admitting the indorsement; 372 nor by rewriting penciled Trustee, 79 Ky. 1; Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405; and must be in writing, Smith v. Tramel, 68 Iowa, 488, 27 N. W. 471.

364 Ward v. Williams, 26 Ill. 447.

365 Grant v. Chambers, 30 N. J. Law, 323.

366 Hunter v. Fitzmaurice, 102 Ind. 449, 2 N. E. 127. Although the prior signers were principals, and the last a mere surety. Chase v. Hathorn, 61 Me. 505, following York Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me. 506.

367 Clews v. Bank, 105 N. Y. 398, 11 N. E. 814. So, an acceptance for the drawer's honor, relied on by a purchaser, estops the acceptor from setting up the forgery of the drawer's name. Phillips v. Im Thurn, L. R. 1 C. P. 463. 368 Louisiana Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Schuchardt, 15 Hun (N. Y.) 405. 369 Byles, Bills, 328; Bell v. Gardiner, 4 Man. & G. 11; means of knowledge not being equivalent to knowledge.

370 McMillan v. Hefferlin, 18 Mont. 385, 45 Pac. 548.

371 Chit. Bills, 210; Calvert v. Baker, 4 Mees. & W. 417.

872 Robinson v. Barnett, 18 Fla. 602. But see, contra, as to an alteration and

words in ink without noticing the alteration; 373 nor by saying to the purchaser, when he bought the paper, but without knowledge of an erasure in it, that he had no defense; 374 nor by making a part payment without knowledge that the paper had been altered.375 And, even if the maker pays at maturity without knowledge of the forgery of the indorsement, he may recover from the party receiving the payment.37 And a waiver by part payment, made by one of two accommodation makers, will not bind his co-maker, or support an action for contribution against him.377

Admissible against Bona Fide Holder.

§ 1777. The alteration or forgery of a bill is a good defense against a bona fide holder for value before maturity, and renders the bill void, in whosesoever hands it may be found.378 And this is true, alsubsequent waiver of protest, Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 South. 498.

373 Boalt v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 364.

374 Koons v. Davis, 84 Ind. 387.

375 Benedict v. Miner, 58 III. 19. And such payment, made without careful examination, may be recovered back. Fraker v. Little, 24 Kan. 598.

376 Carpenter v. Bank, 123 Mass. 66.

377 Davis v. Bauer, 41 Ohio St. 257.

378 Byles, Bills, 328; Chit. Bills, 209; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. 386; 2 Pars. Notes & B. 544; Burchfield v. Moore, 3 El. & Bl. 683; Vance v. Lowther, 1 Exch. Div. 176; Master v. Miller, 4 Term R. 320, 2 H. B. 110; Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp. 179; Belknap v. Bank, 100 Mass. 376; Mahaiwe Bank v. Douglass, 31 Conn. 170; Bradley v. Mann, 37 Mich. 1; Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; Hunter v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 96; Holmes v. Trumper, Id. 427; Burwell v. Orr, 84 Ill. 465; Auten v. Gruner, 90 Ill. 300; Collier v. Waugh, 64 Ind. 456; Hert v. Oehler, 80 Ind. 83; Cronkhite v. Nebeker, 81 Ind. 319; Lisle v. Rogers, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 528; Laub v. Paine, 46 Iowa, 550; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa, 166, 16 N. W. 64; Bruce v. Westcott, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 374; Sudler v. Collins, 2 Houst. (Del.) 538; Washington Sav. Bank v. Ecky, 51 Mo. 272; Trigg v. Taylor, 27 Mo. 245; United States Bank v. Russell, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 391; Exchange Nat. Bank of Spokane v. Bank of Little Rock, 7 C. C. A. 111, 58 Fed. 140, and 22 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 686, note; Hill v. O'Neill, 101 Ga. 832, 28 S. E. 996; Derr v. Keaough, 96 Iowa, 397, 65 N. W. 339; Burrows v. Klunk, 70 Md. 451, 17 Atl. 378; Erickson v. Bank, 44 Neb. 622, 62 N. W. 1078; Mt. Morris Bank v. Lawson, 10 Misc. Rep. 359, 31 N. Y. Supp. 18; Gettysburg Nat. Bank v. Chisolm, 169 Pa. St. 564, 32 Atl. 730; Stephens v. Davis, 85 Tenn. 271, 2 S. W. 382; Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Novich, 89 Tex. 381, 34 S.

though the alteration could not have been detected.37

So, the drawer

of a bill, which is afterwards altered, is not liable to an accommodation indorser, who takes it up without notice.380 In like manner, a bona fide holder, who claims title under a forged indorsement, cannot hold the bill against the rightful owner or recover upon it against other parties.3 381 But a surety cannot set up as against a bona fide holder that he has been induced in good faith to sign the note by the forged signature of a pretended co-surety.382 If a bank note is forged, the bank will not be liable to a bona fide holder.38 So, if school bonds are fraudulently issued with forged signatures, the school district will not be liable. 384 And if one signs a contract in such manner as to make it possible to alter it to a negotiable note by cutting off a portion of it, and such alteration is made, he will not be liable even to a bona fide holder, where he has been guilty of no negligence.385 So, where one authorizes another to indorse in his name for certain purposes, and the latter fraudulently indorses the name of the former for other purposes, it will be a good defense even against a bona fide holder, who knew nothing of the authority or agreement.38€

But the stamping of a note without authority after its execution will not affect its validity in the hands of a bona fide holder.387 So. even an alteration in the number of a negotiable bond, which the

W. 914; Davis v. Henry, 13 Neb. 497, 14 N. W. 523; Overton v. Matthews, 35 Ark. 146; Fordyce v. Kosminski, 49 Ark. 40, 3 S. W. 892. As to the effect of blanks left, see § 1765, supra.

379 Wade v. Withington, 1 Allen (Mass.) 561.

380 Fontaine v. Gunter, 31 Ala. 258.

381 Esdaile v. Lanauze, 1 Younge & C. Exch. 394; Johnson v. Windle, 3 Bing. N. C. 225, 3 Scott, 608; Colson v. Arnot, 57 N. Y. 253; Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 317; Buckley v. Bank, 35 N. J. Law, 400; Woodruff v. Munroe, 33 Md. 146. Unless the payee is fictitious. Kohn v. Watkins, 26 Kan. 691. 382 Wayne Agricultural Co. v. Cardwell, 73 Ind. 555; Second Nat. Bank v. Hewitt, 59 N. J. Law, 57, 34 Atl. 988.

383 Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1.

884 State v. School Dist. No. 9, 10 Neb. 544, 7 N. W. 315.

885 Scofield v. Ford, 56 Iowa, 370, 9 N. W. 309.

386 Hotchkiss v. English, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 369.

387 Blackwell v. Denie, 23 Iowa, 63. derson v. Starkweather, 28 Iowa, 409.

Although contrary to agreement. An