by honey-bees.

The clover cannot set seed without the aid of the bumblebee, assisted by butterflies; the lilies and the orchids employ butterflies and moths, as well as bees; the honeysuckle and other sweet-scented flowers of the night attract, for their own purposes, the long-tongued sphinx moths.

In fact, most of our flowering plants would probably cease to exist, were it not for the visits of the self-seeking insects, unconscious of their services, to the flowers that they apparently rob.

Man has no monopoly of deception, for

nature is full of it. Examine the bark of trees and you can hardly fail to find insects that resemble the bark so closely in coloration that they must frequently escape detection and consequent destruction by the birds, their natural enemies. We have many moths similar to the Catocala represented here, whose hind wings are vividly colored, but whose front wings are dull, and marked in such a way that the insect resting upon a tree-trunk, with its hind wings concealed under the front ones, is remarkably like the bark in appearance. The accompanying

BUTTERFLY THAT IMITATES THE MONARCH. (Natural size.)

roundings, that an inexperienced searcher usually overlooks them.

Everyone has noticed how the grasshoppers harmonize with the soil in color and thus escape notice.

In many cases one insect imitates another in form, coloration and habits, to its own advantage. This is true of the butterfly represented p. 1691, one of our common kinds, which departs from the prevailing dark coloration of its relatives to imitate the milkweed butterfly described at the outset of this article. The milkweed species is unmolested by birds, and the mimicking kind is supposed to secure the same immunity by imitating the protected species.

We have flies, quite harmless, that imitate honey bees or bumble bees, with extraordinary accuracy, even to their manner of buzzing about the flowers, and they probably deceive many a bird that has once felt the sting of a bee.

In fact, every student of insects knows many kinds that thus "sail under false col

ors.'

The efficiency of protective resemblance and mimicry, however, is often much exaggerated, owing to the false assumption that the senses of other animals are like our own in range. As a matter of fact, the protectively colored grasshoppers are consumed in immense numbers by three hundred species of birds, while at least twenty species prey upon the twig-like caterpillars, as shown by the contents of their stomachs. Birds detect insects with a facility that far surpasses that of man.

Being placed in the square corner where the two walls come together the hanging lake is attached to both of them and thus it assumes the shape of a rough triangle. The outer rim reaching from cliff to cliff is circular in its general form, but irregular and sometimes zig-zag in formation; it is from three to six inches or more in width. It is still slowly growing and containing more and more water as the years go by.

The lake is situated about a mile from the gorge, opposite Shoshone Station on the Denver and Rio Grande R. R., which is known as Dead Horse Cañon. It is probably on account of this approximation that it is sometimes called Dead Horse Lake, for it is certain that no horse could ever get up into it. Looking upward the hanging lake is like a great waterfall which has been caught in a giant's cup, and is continually overflowing the edge. The water comes pouring down over the entrances to caverns, some of which are twenty feet long by ten feet wide, and high enough to allow a man to stand upright within them.

Looking into it from a point above, small objects may be seen through nearly a hundred feet of this wonderfully transparent water; there are also trees lying in it which are probably petrified to the heart-at all events they are covered with a thin coating of what appears to be limestone, the work being so delicately done that the knots and indentures upon the limbs are clearly seen.

There are no signs of animal life in or around the lake, but there are many skeletons of buffalo below it, hundreds of them having perished there, perhaps from drinking the water, the mechanical effect of which would soon be fatal, or perhaps they were driven over the cliffs in some terrible snowstorm of years ago.

Ο

NE hundred and twenty-six years ago, on the 15th of last April, the Duchess of Kingston was arraigned before the House of Lords of Great Britain on a charge of bigamy, that, being lawfully married to one Hervey, she married the Duke of Kingston, to which charge she pleaded not guilty.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company against the Government, recalls this famous trial before the House of Lords. Not that the Southern Pacific Railroad was indicted for bigamy, or any other crime, in the case, the decision in which has just been promulgated at Washington, but for the reason that the decision in each case lays down rules upon the interesting subject of when a piece of litigation is at an end.

The law upon this question is interesting to the legal profession and also to laymen, for the latter take a peculiar delight in congratulating themselves that they are at last free from the annoyance and expense of some piece of litigation, which has consumed their time for many years, and more or less depleted their exchequer.

Law suits usually last several years. There have been cases that have continued longer than the average period alloted to man on earth. Some litigants have likened a lengthy piece of litigation to a brook that runs on forever. And others have thought it reminded them of the two boat hands, who after working many hours at unrolling a cable from an ocean steamer, became very much interested as to its termination. Finally one remarked that he was in doubt whether it was ever going to end. The other one replied that he did not think it had any end, that someone must have cut

it off.

But it is not with the length of time as measured by years that the subject under consideration has to do, in determining when a law suit is at an end; it is as to the

estoppel which a party is subjected to, when having once tried his cause of action or disputed question, he is thereby prevented from litigating it over again.

The trial of the Duchess of Kingston's case lasted but five days. It commenced on Monday, April 15th, 1776, and ended on Monday, the 22nd, of the same month. While it lasted but one week it is one of the most famous cases of all history. It is reported in the 20th Howell's State Trials, page 355. Its fame is not on account of the fact that the defendant belonged to the nobility, nor on account of the fact that it was tried by the House of Lords, nor on account of the fact that the charge in the case was of a most sensational character, the punishment of which, under the laws of the British

Empire, was usually capital. These features were undoubtedly enough to make the case memorable, were it not for the fact that that high court had before, and has many times since, heard and decided many other cases of far greater importance to the public, and with far more sensational features.

The importance which attaches to the case of the Duchess of Kingston arises from the fact that a general rule was then promulgated on the question known to lawyers, as estoppel of record or res adjudicata. That is, as to when a law suit is ended.

Before any testimony was offered on behalf of the crown, counsel for the Duchess introduced in evidence the judgment of the Ecclesiastical Court in a suit which she had brought against Hervey for boasting and claiming that he was her husband, to which suit he had appeared, affirmed the claim that they were married, and after a trial, that Court had decided his claim unfounded.

It was claimed by the Attorney-General in the case against the Duchess for bigamy in the House of Lords that the prosecution was not bound by this judgment of the Ecclesiastical Court for two reasons: First, that the King was not a party to the suit; and, second, that the judgment in the case

This undoubtedly was a very short time indeed, within which to formulate and announce such sweeping rules as to when a law suit or a disputed question should be deemed concluded, and should be binding upon the parties. Nevertheless this has been the rule for one hundred and twenty-six years in every country where Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence has been adopted, and there is not a text-writer who has written upon the subject, nor a court of last resort in America, British India, Australia, or any other place where English law has gone, but has approved the rule as laid down by Lord Chief Justice DeGrey in the case of the crown against the Duchess of Kingston. But in the application of the rule the cases differ widely, and after a case has been decided and settled it sometimes takes another law suit to determine that it is settled.

It is generally understood by laymen as well as lawyers that, when a party is beaten in a law suit, he cannot try it over again. Of course, this does not refer to the granting of new trials or to reversals of judgments by the direct proceeding of appeal or writ of error to a higher court. But when a litigant has once had his day in court and has been defeated upon the merits, he cannot have another day in that or any other court upon the same cause of action. This much is easy. But the doctrine of estoppel of record or res adjudicata goes further than this; and the rule, as determined by all the courts, is that where a question is decided in one law suit it cannot be re-litigated, in another law suit, although upon a different cause of action, and brought for a different purpose, provided, of course, the two suits are between the same parties, or their privies upon the same subject-matter. Strange as it may seem in the two important cases referred to above, that before the House of Lords and the one in the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that the question had not been tried and that the doctrine did not apply. In the first case it was because the parties were not the same; in the second, that of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company against the Government, it was because the question was not the same. In the latter case the United States brought suit against the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and others, seeking to have certain patents canceled and their title quieted to a large body of land including those described in the patents and situated along the route and within the

grant made to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company. This case is reported in the last volume of the Reports of the Supreme Court of the United States and is found at 183 U. S., page 519.

Litigation between the Government and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company in reference to lands along the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad in the State of California had been going on for a great many years. The result of these suits will be found in the following decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 146 U. S., 570; United States v. Colton Marble & Lime Company, and United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 146 U. S., 615, and Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. United States, 168 U. S., I. These decisions were claimed by the Government to be controlling of the recent case on the principle of res adjudicata. The Government was beaten on this proposition. The opinion of the Court was delivered by that able jurist, Mr. Justice Brewer. After referring to the other cases between the Government and the Railroad above cited he says: "In the last of these three cases the principle of res adjudicata was invoked and held applicabie; and the title of the Government to the lands involved was sustained on the ground that the question in controversy had been finally determined in the prior suits. In the opinion field there was much discussion in respect to res adjudicata, and it was said, on page 48: The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.'

Justice Brewer cites other cases, supporting the same rule, declaring the same doctrine and with the same limitation as given above. The Government therefore succeeded in establishing its right only to an equal moiety in the lands in controversy, but did not establish its title to the whole thereof either on the principle of estoppel or on the merits, for the Southern Pacific