Common Law.

arising on sea voyages, and in case any default be made in keeping such medicines,
the owner of a ship is made liable to a penalty, which by section 62 is recoverable
at the suit of any person, and is to be applied in part to the informer, and the residue
to the Seamen's Hospital Society:-

Held, that the penalty was recoverable for a breach of the public duty, created by the
statute, and that the provisions of the statute did not interfere with the common-law
right of a seaman serving on board the vessel to maintain an action in respect of a
special damage resulting to him from the breach of the duty. 1b.

3. Power of Master to borrow Money.] In an action for money lent, it appeared that
the defendant, residing at Exeter, was owner of a ship, and that P., the master, being
wind-bound in a river, at the distance of one day's post from Exeter, borrowed 57.
of the plaintiff, to buy provisions. The master was called as a witness, but was not
asked whether he could have got the goods on the owner's credit: -

Held, that the jury were justified in inferring that there was such necessity for borrow-
ing the 57., as to make the defendant liable. Edwards v. Havell, 303.

4. Collision

-

Costs.] In a collision, where the court, assisted by Trinity Masters, de-
cided that both vessels were to blame, but that with respect to one of them the blame
was to be attributed to the pilot, who had been taken on board under a local (Liver-
pool) Pilot Act:

Held, that such vessel was not to contribute to the loss; and with respect to costs, that
each party must pay his own costs. The Montreal, 580.

The report al-
The four prin-

5. Damage Cause.] The claim made in a damage cause was 3,1217.
lowed 1,7361. A tender was made before the reference of 1,685l.
cipal items disallowed amounted to 1,1097. Claimants condemned in the costs of the
reference as to these four items. The Nimrod, 589.

See ACTION. EVIDENCE. INSURANCE. SET-OFF.

1. Privileged Communication.] The plaintiff, the secretary of a company called the
Brewers' Insurance Company, being charged with misconduct, was called upon to
attend a board of directors for the purpose of explanation, but declined to do so,
whereupon the directors, after hearing the nature of the charges, passed a resolution
declaring him to have been guilty of gross misconduct, and dismissing him from their
service. The defendant, who was a director of that company, and also of another
company called the London Necropolis Company, communicated the fact of the plain-
tiff's dismissal from the service of the former company, "for gross misconduct," at a
board meeting of the latter company, and proposed a resolution to dismiss him from
his employment as their auditor, and, in answer to an inquiry from the chairman,
said that the misconduct consisted in "obtaining money from the solicitors of the
company under false pretences, and paying a debt of his own with it;" and, upon
the plaintiff's appearing on a subsequent day with his attorney before the board, to
meet the charges against him, the defendant refused to go into them. In an action

of slander:

Held, that the communication was privileged, and that the defendant's refusal to go into
the charges in the presence of the plaintiff and his attorney, was no evidence of ma-
lice that could properly be submitted to the jury; for that such refusal being consist-
ent with bona fides, bona fides was to be presumed until the contrary was proved.
Harris v. Thompson, 370.

2. Clergyman.] A declaration for slander by charging a clergyman in holy orders
with incontinency, is bad, without showing actual damage, or that he holds some
office or employment producing temporal profit. Gallwey v. Marshall, 463.

3. The 61st section of the Common Law Procedure Act does not remedy such an omis-
sion. Ib.

STAMP.

See EJECTMENT.

Common Law.

STATUTES CITED, EXPLAINED, &c.

29 Ch. 2, c. 7, (Sunday Act.)

25 Geo. 2, c. 36,

.

(Musical Performance-License.)
41 Geo. 3, c. 109, s. 4, (General Inclosure Act.)
43 Geo. 3, (Inclosure Act.)

7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 75, (The Larceny Act.)

9 Geo. 4, c. 14,

(Limitations.)

3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 2,

5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 92,

(Municipal Corporations Act.)

(Tithe Commutation Act.)

1 Vict. c. 26, s. 1, (Statute of Wills.)

6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71,

3 &

4 Vict. c. 24, (Costs.)

3 & 4 Vict. c. 54, s. 1 & 2,

Common Law.

TENDER.

See SALVAGE.

TIME.

1. Computation of] A fraction of a day cannot be taken into account, where the
conflict is between the right of the crown and the right of the subject. Regina v.
Edwards, 440.

2. Therefore, where an adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of an official
assignee took place in the morning, and at a subsequent period of the day an extent
issued against the bankrupt:

Held, per Pollock, C. B., Parke, B., and Platt, B., that the bankrupt's property might
be taken under the extent. Per Martin, B.-The priority of events happening on
the same day, may be inquired into between the crown and the subject, just as be-
tween subject and subject. Ib.

TIME POLICY.

See INSURANCE.

TITHES.

1. Right to.] Debt for not setting out tithes. The plaintiff was originally lay impropria-
tor of the tithes of certain fen lands in the parish of M., which were from 1816 down
to the time of the action occupied by the defendant. An act for inclosing lands in
the parish of M., gave an option to the Inclosure Commissioners, to make an allot-
ment to the impropriator in lieu of these tithes. By their award, made in 1812, they
stated that they had procured to be made an accurate survey and plan of the waste
lands to be inclosed, and of the ancient inclosed lands, (except the fen lands,) and
then proceeded to allot to the impropriator certain allotments in lieu of and as a com-
pensation for all the tithes growing and renewing within M., and due unto him. A
schedule and also a map or plan were annexed to the award, but neither comprised
the defendant's lands, or the fen lands. From 1816 to 1828 the defendant had paid
no tithes to the plaintiff in respect of his land, but for a period of twenty years
from 1828 the defendant had either paid tithes in kind, or compounded for them to
the plaintiff. In 1841, on an Assistant Tithe Commissioner being sent down with
a view of awarding a sum to be paid as a commutation of the tithes of the parish of
M., the defendant claimed that his lands were exempt from tithes by virtue of the
Inclosure Act and award; but the Tithe Commissioner denied that his lands were
not thereby exempted:-

Held, that the perception of the tithes for twenty years, gave the plaintiff no title to
them under the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. Bunbury v. Fuller, 425.

2. Decision of Commissioner.] Held, secondly, that the decision of the Assistant
Tithe Commissioner, was not conclusive against the exception, since s. 90 of the
Tithe Commutation Act, the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71, took away his jurisdiction, if the
tithes had been extinguished by virtue of the Inclosure Act, and that he could not
give himself jurisdiction by deciding that they were not so extinguished. Ib.
3. Award.] Held, lastly, that though the award professed to give the allotment in lieu
of all the tithes in M., yet as the commissioners had an option whether they would
extinguish all the tithes, and as there was evidence on the face of the award, maps,
and surveys, that the fen lands were not taken into consideration, it was a question
for the jury whether the award in reality awarded any compensation to the plaintiff
for the tithes on the defendant's land. lb.

TRESPASS.

1. Against an Officer.] The assistance of a sheriff's officer, for the purpose of execut-
ing a writ of fi. fa., illegally entered the plaintiff's premises on a Sunday, by break-

Common Law.

ing open a window. They afterwards, by the officer's direction, abandoned posses-
sion on Monday following. On the Thursday after, the officer himself entered the
same premises to execute a distress warrant :-

Held, that he was not debarred by the act of his assistants from selling the goods when
seized on the second occasion. Percival v. Stamp, 399.

2. Illegal Entry.] Quare, whether the officer would have been liable, if the illegal
entry of his assistants on the Sunday had facilitated his own entry on the Thursday,
and he had availed himself of such illegal entry. Ib.

3. Pleading.] The declaration stated that the defendant, on the 6th of March, 1853,
broke and entered the dwelling-house and premises of the plaintiff, and continued
and remained therein a long space of time, to wit, eight days:-

Held, that evidence was admissable of an entry on the day first named, and also on a
subsequent day, although the defendant had, after the first entry, left the premises
without intending to return. Ib.

TROVER.

1. Property in Plaintiffs.] On a contract for building a ship, it is a question of
intention to be inferred from the circumstances whether the property passes before
the completion of the ship or not. Read v. Fairbanks, 220.

2. Bill of Sale.] The plaintiffs contracted with R. to build a ship for them, and made
advances from time to time in respect of her; and R. gave them, as a security for
the advances, a bill of sale of the ship, which stated that he, R., thereby did sell,
transfer, &c., to the plaintiffs a certain ship in progress of building, (describing her,)
to have and to hold the ship, &c., to the plaintiffs forever, when she should be com-
pleted:

-

Held, that the present property passed to the plaintiffs by the bill of sale, and that the
vesting of it was not postponed by the habendum to the time when the vessel should
be complete. Ib.

3. The defendants having converted the vessel before she was finished, and having
finished her, the plaintiffs were

Held entitled to recover, as damages in trover, the value of the vessel at the time of
her conversion, but not her value at a subsequent time, nor, as a special damage,
the value of freight which the plaintiffs might have earned with her, if R. had com-
pleted her, and delivered her to them. 1b.

4. Damages.] And, per Jervis, C. J., semble, that a proper way to estimate the value
of the vessel at the time of the conversion would be to ascertain her value at the
place where she was built, when completed according to the original contract, and
to deduct therefrom the amount which it would have been necessary to lay out after
the conversion, in order to complete her according to the contract. lb.

5. Registry Act. Quære, as to the effect of a certificate under the Registry Act, 8 & 9
Vict. c. 89, s. 11, on the property in a vessel built in British possessions abroad. Ib.
Defendant may show Title in Third Party.] See INTERpLeader.

Common Law.

UTTERING.

See FORGERY.

VARIANCE.

See CONTRACT.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Conditions.] T. being possessed of a plot of land for a term of years, by indenture
dated the 24th of April, 1845, mortgaged the term to S., as a security for 3007., with
an absolute power of sale on default of payment. On the same day he executed a
memorandum of agreement, by which he undertook to deposit with S. a lease of
another plot of ground when it should be executed, the draft of which was already
prepared, as a further and collateral security for the sum secured by the mortgage.
A mill and certain buildings occupied therewith, stood partly on one plot of land and
partly on the other. On the 18th of December, 1848, the lease was granted to T.,
and then deposited with S., in accordance with the memorandum of agreement. By
indenture of the 27th of August, 1845, T. executed a second mortgage of the term
mortgaged to S., as security to H. M. for 100l. On the 2d of March, 1847, T. as-
signed an undivided moiety of the premises comprised in the lease first mentioned,
and of those comprised in the lease of the 18th of December, 1845, and of the mill
and buildings thereon to A.; and on the 20th of September, 1847, assigned all his
estate and effects to trustees for his creditors. By indenture of the 31st of August,
1848, S. and H. M, assigned to the defendant both plots of land, with the mill and
buildings thereon, subject to such equity of redemption as was then existing. In
April, 1852, the defendant sold the premises by auction, the conditions stating that
he sold the whole as mortgagee of T.; but that as to the part comprised in the lease
of the 18th of December, 1845, he had only the equitable interest, and the legal es-
tate was not vested in him, and that the purchaser should accept as to this part such
title as the vendor was able to deduce and convey. The plaintiffs purchased both
plots and paid the deposit thereon; but on the abstract of title being furnished, and
T. refusing to join in the conveyance, they declined to complete, on the ground
that the legal estate in the premises comprised in the lease of the 18th of December,
1845, was outstanding, and might be set up adversely to them. They then brought
an action for the deposit:-

Held, that they were not entitled to recover as upon a failure of consideration, for that
under the circumstances there was the same absolute power of sale as to the premi-
ses comprised in both leases, the deposit having been upon the same terms as the
mortgage; and that even if this were not so, the conditions of sale had been com-
plied with, the defendant having expressly stipulated to sell an equitable interest
only. Ashworth v. Mounsey, 457.

Setting aside.] Where it is clear that one side or the other has committed perjury, the
court will not disturb the finding of the jury. Solomon v. Todd, 366.
Against Evidence.]

See NEW TRIAL.

VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

See MONEY PAID.

VOTER.

Forty-Shilling Freehold.] The appellant claimed to vote in respect of a freehold which
he let for 40s. a year, he agreeing to pay the usual tenant's rates. If he had not so
agreed, he could only have obtained 40s., minus the amount of those rates:
Held, that the appellant had not an estate of the clear yearly value of 40s., and there-
fore that he was not entitled to vote. Moorhouse v. Gilbertson, 309.