that laws are made only for future cases, and can have no retrospective effect. "The law directs for the future cases only; it has no retrospective effect." So, the Constitution of New Hampshire + declares, "Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws should, therefore, be made, either for the decision of civil cases or the punishment of offences." The principle has, indeed, been generally adhered to with great steadiness, both in England and in this country. (a) So in a case under the statute of frauds, which, as originally passed * La loi ne dispose que pour l'avenir, elle + Part i, § 23. n'a point d'effet retroactif. Code Civil, § 2. (a) General Rule.-The general rule is that statutes shall be construed as prospective. The following are some illustrations of such construction applied to particular statutes: Prescribing new penalties on defaulting taxpayers, Bartruff v. Reney, 15 Iowa, 257; taking away defense of usury in favor of bona fide indorsers, North Bridgewater Bank v. Copeland, 7 Allen, 139; requiring new promise to be in writing to take case out of the statute of limitations, Richardson v. Cook, 37 Vt. 599; forbidding banks paying interest on deposits, Hannum v. Bank of Tenn. 1 Cold. (Tenn.), 398; a statute as to execution, &c., of wills, Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Penn. St. 209; abolition of slavery by the State Constitution was held not to take away a pending action of trover for conversion of a slave, Williams, Adm. v. Johnson's Adm. 30 Md. 500. For further instances where statutes were held to be prospective, see Re Miles' Will, 27 Beav. 579; State v. Auditor, 41 Mo. 25; Finney v. Ackerman, 21 Wisc. 268; Abington v. Duxbury, 105 Mass. 287; Amsbry v. Hinds, 48 N. Y. 57; per contra, statutes were construed as retroactive in Cook v. McChristian, 4 Cal. 23; Smith v. Van Gilder, 26 Ark. 527. Statutes are not to be construed as retrospective unless by the language thereof they are clearly intended so to be. Young v. Hughes, 4 H. & N. 76; Williams v. Smith, 4 H. & N. 558; Martin v. State, 22 Tex. 214; Aurora, &c. I. Co. v. Holthouse, 7 Ind. 59; Bond v. Munro, 28 Geo. 597; Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319; Parsons v. Payne, 26 Ark. 124. It is not enough that general terms are employed broad enough to cover past transactions; thus a law permitting a removal of the family residence from a homestead, without rendering it subject to execution, &c., was held not to apply to past judg ment liens. Seamans v. Carter, 15 Wisc. 548. And it has been said that statutes, however general in their terms, are not to be considered retrospective unless expressly so declared. Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer, 181; but this is undoubtedly a too strong statement of the rule, for statutes have been held retrospective which did not contain any express declaration that they were so, e. g., the legal tender act of the U. S. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603. But undoubtedly statutes are to be construed as prospective only, if possible. Smith v. Auditor-General, 20 Mich. 398. Vested Rights.- When the effect of a retroactive construction would be to destroy a vested right, e. g., to cut off an accepted bid for certain work, which acceptance was legally binding by the existing laws, the construction must be prospective. Matter of Prot. Epis. School, 58 Barb. 161. Statutes of Limitation may act retrospectively, if they do not destroy or unreason (29 Car. II, c. 3), enacted that no action should be brought on any parol promise, on and after the 24th June, 1677, an effort ably impair rights of action. Thus, such a statute applicable to "all actions of debt which shall be sued or brought at any time after this act shall go into effect," was held to apply retroactively to causes of action already accrued, provided such construction would leave a reasonable time after the passage of the law for the bringing of an action. Fiske v. Briggs, 6 R. I. 557; and an amendment limiting the time within which judgment liens could be enforced to five years, was held to operate retrospectively, when ample time was left for the enforcement of the existing liens. Burwell v. Tulles, 12 Minn. 572. Dower.-A statute changing the rule as to dower, was held not to be retrospective as to marriages already made, but when death of the husband occurs after its passage, Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; but otherwise, as said by way of a dictum, when the land was sold by the husband before the statute. Davis v. O'Ferrall, 4 Greene (Ia.), 168. Where by the law in force at the time of a foreclosure sale, the dower of the mortgagor's wife was not barred thereby, and a subsequent statute was passed before the husband's death limiting the wife's dower to lands which the husband bad not sold during his lifetime, that is, limiting the dower to lands of which the husband died seized, it was held that such statute cut off the wife's dower in question. Sturtevant v. Norris, 30 Iowa, 65. This and similar decisions are certainly not in accordance with the common-law doctrine of dower which prevails in many States, which treats the wife's dower in lands owned by the husband as an estate. Undoubtedly the wife's capacity to be endowed of lands to be acquired by her husband may be taken away by a retroacting statute, because a mere capacity is not property nor a right in any true sense of the word; but after the dower has once attached to any land of the husband, when the common-law doctrine prevails, it cannot be taken away by statute, although it is inchoate, without violating the familiar constitutional safeguards of property and personal rights. Inchoate dower is so truly an estate at the common law, that nothing but the wife's act can bar it; and the decisions cited, and some other similar ones must have proceeded upon a theory of dower entirely different from that which prevailed at the common law. Settlements of Paupers.-A statute shortening the period of residence of a pauper necessary to confer irremovability was held retroactive in Salford v. Manchester, 3 B. & S. 599; also a provision enlarging the limits of residence which would confer the same privilege, Preston v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 793; but see Abington v. Duxbury, 105 Mass. 287. Amendatory Statutes.-A statute amending a prior one, by declaring that it shall be amended so as to read in a given manner, has no retroactive effect. Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595; Bay v. Gage, 36 Barb. 447. Explanatory Statutes.—An act explaining the meaning of a former act, does not retroact so as to affect the rights of parties in proceedings instituted before the passage of the later statute. McManning v. Farrar, 46 Mo. 376. Statutes going into Effect at a Future Day.-Such a statute is prospective. For example, a statute prescribing that in all cases of partition where a valuation "shall have been made," certain results shall follow, and not going into effect until a future day, will be held not to apply to a valuation made before its going into effect. Dewart v. Purdy, 29 Penn. St. 113. Remedial Statutes.—The rule against retroactive operation has been applied even to remedial statutes; e. g., a statute authorizing supervisors to legalize irregularities in taxes was held to apply only to future taxes. People v. Supervisors, &c., 63 * was made to extend its operation to a promise made in 1676; but it was held that the statute was not to receive a retroactive effect; the court saying that it would be a great mischief to explain it otherwise, to annul all promises by parol before that time, upon which men had trusted and depended, reckoning them good and valid in law; and judgment was given for the plaintiff. So again, in an action for a penalty in not paying a stamp duty. After verdict, the defendant moved to stay judg ment, urging that he was entitled to relief on the ground that he had paid the duty under a clause of the act which discharged parties who had incurred penalties if they paid their duties before a certain time; and the question being whether the act related to actions commenced before its passage, the King's Bench denied the motion, Lord Mansfield saying, "It can never be the *Helmore v. Shuter, 2 Show. 17. Barb. 83; and see Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32; State v. Bradford, 36 Geo. 422. But a statute giving municipalities the right to sell land for taxes, has been held to apply to past delinquencies, on the ground that it was remedial, Haskell v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 232; and a statute providing that certain irregularities shall not affect the validity of tax sales, applies to a sale for prior delinquencies. Sully v. Kuebl, 30 Iowa, 274. Where reliance is had on a retroactive curative statute to bar a right, the terms of the statute must be very clearly applicable. Chalker v. Ives, 55 Penn. St. 81. Procedure. Some cases have held that procedure in cases pending at the passage of a new practice act, or the adoption of a new code, must be governed by the old law. Chaney v. State, 31 Ala. 342; The Steamboat Farmer v. McCraer, 31 Ala. 659 ; Mochlan Township Road, 30 Penn. St. 156. But the weight of authority is undoubtedly the other way. A statute regulating procedure acts retrospectively, so far as to control the proceedings in pending cases, Kimbray v. Draper, Law R. 3 Q. B. 160; whatever relates to the conduct of the trial is retrospective, Hoa v. Lefranc, 18 La. Ann. 393; a statute as to new trials applies to pending cases, Donner v. Palmer, 23 Cal. 40, and see Bensby v. Ellis, 39 Cal. 309. It was held that a statute giving the right of appeal would not apply to pending proceedings, unless the intent was clear, Boston, &c. R. R. v. Cilley, 44 N. H. 578, but see McNamara v. Minnesota R. R. 12 Minn. 388. It was also held that an act shortening the time of notice in mortgage foreclosure cases did not affect pending actions, it not being expressly made retrospective. Hopkins v. Jones, 22 Ind. 310. To be strictly Construed.—A retrospective statute is to be strictly construed. Thus where a statute of limitations provides that it should not apply to actions com menced or causes of action accrued, and a subsequent statute made it applicable to causes of action accrued at its passage, it was held that it did not extend to actions commenced at its passage. Hedger v. Rennaker, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 255. Though a statute is plainly retroactive by its terms, the court will not enforce a penalty for non-compliance with its requirements at a time when it was not in existence. McCowan v. Davidson, 43 Geo. 480. true construction of this act, to take away these vested rights and punish the innocent pursuer with costs."* "All laws," says Blackstone, "should be made to commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement." + The effort of the English courts appears, indeed, always to be to give the statutes of that kingdom a prospective effect only, unless the language is so clear and imperative as not to admit of doubt. "The principle," says the English Court of Exchequer, "is one of such obvious convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the construction of statutes, unless in cases where there is something on the face of the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the Legislature meant it to operate retrospectively." This principle may have been lost sight of in some cases, but has, on the whole, been steadily adhered to. So, where a statute (8 and 9 Vic. c. 109, 8 Aug. 1845) enacted that all contracts and agreements by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void, and that no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court upon any wager, it was held that the statute was not to receive a retroactive construction so as to defeat a suit on a wager commenced before the statute passed.T But it also appears to be clearly settled in England, that the rule to give statutes a prospective operation, is one of construction merely; that it will yield to the intention of the Legis lature, if clear beyond doubt; and that the only question is, whether the retroactive intention is sufficiently expressed;** and this is in entire harmony with the English doctrine which we have already considered, that Parliament is supreme, and that there is no constitutional check on the supremacy of the law. making power. In this country, the same opposition to giving statutes a retroactive effect, has been manifested; and such is the general tenor of our decisions. There are, indeed, here, two classes of retroactive laws absolutely forbidden by the federal Constitu *Couch q. tam v. Jeffries, 4 Burr, 2460. + Com. i, p. 46. Moon v. Durden, 2 Exchequer R. 22. Towler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258; Freeman v. Moyes, 1 Ad. & Ell. 338; Pickup v. Wharton, 2 C. & M. 401; Grant v. Kemp, Id. 636. Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22; and also, Edmonds v. Lawley, 6 M. & W. 285; and Ashburnham, 2 Atk. 36. **Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22, per Parke, B. tion. That great charter of our rights and liberties declares (Art. i, sec. 10) that no State shall pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. We shall have occasion hereafter to consider this clause more particularly; but we may here notice that the term ex post facto applies only to criminal laws.* Many of the State Constitutions also contain clauses prohibiting ex post facto laws; but this phrase has, I believe, been uniformly held to apply only to criminal legisla tion. And we have already noticed that the obligation of contracts does not include the remedy. With these modifications, however, the power of the federal tribunals has been steadily exercised, and State laws of a criminal nature having a retroactive effect, or laws in any way impairing the obligation of contracts, are held to be void, and their operation arrested by the Government of the United States. It is, however, equally well settled, that a law is not unconstitutional under the Constitution merely because it is retrospective in its terms. A conflict arose in the State of Pennsylvania, as to lands held under what were called Connecticut titles; and in 1825, on a case growing out of this question, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl vania held that the relations between landlord and tenant could not exist between persons holding under such a title. Immediately after this decision, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act by which it was enacted that the relation of landlord and tenant should exist, and be held as fully between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylvania claimants, as between other citizens of the commonwealth; and this act, the Supreme Court, in a subsequent case, held to be retrospective in its effect. A writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States; but the judgment was affirmed,-the court saying that the act did not impair the obligation of the contract. "It is said to be retrospective. Be it so; but retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts or partake the character of ex post facto laws, are not condemned or forbidden by any part of the Constitution."+ We have already ‡ considered the retrospective effect of re *Calder and Wife v. Bull and Wife, 3 Dall. 386; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johnson, p. 477. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 380. |