outline of the system of our law in regard to the interpretation and application of statutes, I close this branch of my subject by some instances of the power of interpretation and construction as applied to particular words. It is not designed to do more than to give an idea of the mode in which the judicial authority in this respect is exercised. (a) (a) Particular Words.-Action construed to include suits in equity. Coatsworth V. Barr, 11 Mich. 199. Does so under N. Y. Code. Corson v. Ball, 47 Barb. 452. Does not include criminal proceedings. Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio, N. S. 222. Absent Person in settlement laws. See Wilmington v. Somerset, 35 Vt. 232. And and or are convertible as the sense of the statute may require, even in a crim inal statute. State v. Myers, 10 Iowa, 448. "And" construed "or," as being more reasonable, and as being according to the intent shown by a prior statute in pari materia. Townsend v. Read, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 308. "Or" construed "and." Boyles v. Murphy, 55 Ill. 236. Arbitration distinguished from appraisement by valuers. Collins v. Collins, 26 Beav. 306. Bridge includes such abutments as are necessary. Tolland v. Willington, 26 Conn. 578; and see also Linton v. Sharpsburg Bridge, 1 Grant's Cas. 414. As to "railroad bridge," see Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken &c. Co. 1 Wall. 116. Ceteris paribus construed. See Atty. Gen. v. Earl of Powis, 1 Kay, 186. Casting Vote held to mean in this case a vote where there was a tie, the person having such casting vote himself voting-i. e., having a double vote. People v. Church of the Atonement, 48 Barb. 603. Connection between different railroads defined. Philadelphia &c. R. R. v. Catawissa R. R. 53 Penn. St. 20. Between societies, defined. Allison v. Smith, 16 Mich. 405. Dwelling House means only such as is so used; it is immaterial that the building was originally constructed for that purpose. N. Y. Fire Department v. Buhler, 35 N. Y. 177. Enclosure is not so broad a term as "close." Porter v. Aldrich, 39 Vt. 326. Erection. The removal of a building from one part of a lot to another, where it is permanently located, is not an "erection" within the terms of a statute against the erection of wooden buildings. Brown v. Hunn, 27 Conn. 332. Fire-works defined. See Bliss v. Lilley, 3 B. & S. 128. General and "public" are, it seems, convertible terms as applied to statutes. Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wisc. 136. But many N. Y. cases make a distinction, and oppose "general" to "local," and "public" to "private," holding that a statute may be "public" but "local." See cases collected in note on "Titles and Subjects of Statutes." Grain construed to include "millet," and "sugar-cane seed," in a penal statute. Holland v. State, 34 Geo. 455. Heirs, held to mean heirs according to the statute of distributions, in In re Stevens' Trusts, Law R. 15 Eq. 110. Home or Dwelling Place construed in Wilmington v. Somerset, 35 Vt. 232. Banking Principles.-A statutory authority to a corpora tion to loan and negotiate their moneys and effects upon bank. ing principles, has been said, "if the phrase has any peculiar House, a church held to be a house within meaning of a statute relating to setting houses back from the street. Folkestone v. Woodward, Law R. 15 Eq. 159. Inland Navigation does not include navigation on the great lakes. Moore v. American Trans. Co. 24 How. 1. Internal Improvements. See Mayor of Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651; Low v. Marysville, 5 Cal. 214. Judgment Debtor, in a statute giving certain remedies to creditors, includes a corporation. De Bemer v. Drew, 57 Barb. 438. Laborer, or "operative," does not include a consulting engineer. Ericsson v. Brown, 38 Barb. 390. Nor a contractor for men and horses, although he himself drives his teams. Balch v. N. Y. &c. R. R. 46 N. Y. 521. Lessee of a railroad, construed in Burchfield v. Northern C. R. R. 57 Barb. 589. Lowest Bidder, whether, when a contract is required to be awarded to the "lowest bidder," it can be given to the owner of a patented article in respect of which there can be no competition? It can. Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 246. Per contra, it cannot. Nicholson &c. Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699; and see Cleveland &c. Co. v. Fire Comm'rs, 55 Barb. 288. Month held to mean calendar month, in Gross v. Fowler, 21 Cal. 392. Perishable ordinarily means "subject to speedy and natural decay." Webster v. Peck, 31 Conn. 495. But where the time contemplated is necessarily long, the term may embrace property liable merely to material depreciation in value from other causes than such decay. Ibid. Person includes artificial persons, corporations, or quasi corporations. Douglas v. Pac. Mail S. S. Co. 4 Cal. 304; Louisville &c. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush (Ky.) 250; U. S. Tel. Co. v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 56 Barb. 46; Fisher v. Horicon, 10 Wisc. 351; Canal Co. v. Dauphin Co. 3 Brewst. 124. And it even includes the State in a statute to punish certain frauds against "any person." Martin v. State, 24 Tex. 61. Personal Property, held in this particular case not to include promissory notes; and a dictum that these words do not in general cover promissory notes. McIntyre v. Ingraham, 35 Miss. 25. This dictum is certainly contrary to all of the accepted definitions of the term. There is nothing in promissory notes to distinguish them from other things in action, so that if the dictum were correct, "personal property" would have to be limited to chattels. Personal Representative does not include an agent. Jones v. Tainter, 15 Minn. 512. Possession, for meaning of, as used in the "Factor's Act," see Pegram v. Carson, 10 Bosw. 505. For construction of "actual possession," see Dodge v. Chandler, 9 Minn. 97. Proceeding. The saving clause of a Code of Practice declared that it should not affect any "proceeding" commenced before its enactment; it was held that this did not cover a judgment recovered before the passage of the Code, and that another clause of the Code taking away the lien of judgments applied to such prior judgment. Daily v. Burke, 28 Ala. 328. That the clause taking away such prior lien meaning, to be an authority to deduct the interest at the commencement of loans, or to make loans upon discounts, instead of the ordinary forms of security for an accruing interest."* Billiards.-A license by the Legislature of billiard tables, cannot be understood to authorize any other species of gaming. † Burglary at common law means the crime of breaking into a house in the night time, with the intent to steal or commit a felony; and it has been held in Alabama, that this term, when used in their Code, must receive the same construction. + Cattle.-Various cases have been decided as to what are considered cattle in England; and the construction varies with the statutes in which they are used. Corporate Name.-Where an act required certain suits to be brought in the corporate name of cities or villages, it was held that the phrase meant the name by which the city or vi.. lage was designated in its charter, and a suit brought in the *Maine Bank v. Butts, 9 Mass. 49. Barker v. The State, 12 Texas, 273. Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, the court say, "When words are used by the Legislature in relation to a matter or subject, which, when used in reference to the same subject at the common law, have obtained a fixed and definite meaning, the inference, we think, is irresistible, that they were intended to be used in the common-law sense." 3 Bing. 581; 2 W. Black. 723; ex parte Hill, 3 C. & P. 225; Dwarris, p. 750. would be void as impairing the obligation of contracts, see note to "Obligation of Contracts." Property, as applied to lands, includes "every species of title, inchoate or complete," and "rights which lie in contract, those which are executory as well as those which are executed." Figg v. Snook, 9 Ind. 202. As applied to taxation, “property" includes "credits." People v. Worthington, 21 Ill. 171. Purchaser includes "mortgagee" in the statutory law of Kentucky. Halbert v. McCulloch, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 456. Sale and "gift" distinguished. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184. Whether "sale covers "exchange," see Cady v. Watertown, 18 Wisc. 322; Cleveland v. State Bank of Ohio, 16 Ohio, N. S. 236. Soil, in connection with mineral rights, is equivalent to "surface." Pretty v. Solly, 26 Beav. 606. Subsequent Purchasers, in recording acts, includes purchasers from heirs as well as from ancestor. McClure v. Tallman, 30 Iowa, 515. Such, in statutes, commented on in Eastern &c. R. R. v. Marriage, 6 H. & N. 931. Suit, said to be synonymous with "action," and "proceeding at law." Calderwood v. Estate of Calderwood, 38 Vt. 171. Turned Loose, cattle under care of a servant, but without halters, are not. Sherborn v. Wells, 3 B. & S. 784. Wagon. See Quigley v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 418. name of the "President and trustees" of the village, &c., was held improperly commenced.* Curtilage. This term, which is peculiar to England, and not very applicable to this country, has been held in Michigan to embrace a barn standing eighty feet from a dwelling-house, in a yard or lane with which there was a communication from the house by a pair of bars. † Deny.-Where, in case of an alleged encroachment on the highway, the occupant must, within a limited time after notice, deny the encroachment, his denial must be in writing.‡ Descent.-"Descent from the mother" can not be held to mean descent from the maternal grandfather. || From.-The word "descent from a parent," cannot be construed to mean "descent through a parent." T High Seas. This word, as used in the Crimes Act of the United States (1825, ch. 276, § 22), is used in contradistinction to arms of the sea, and bays, creeks, &c. within the narrow headlands of the coast; and comprehends only the open ocean which washes the seacoast, or is not included within the body of any county in any particular State.** It has been held that by the same phrase, under the Act of 30th April, 1790, is meant any waters on the seacoast which are without the boundaries of low-water mark.++ Improvidence. As to what improvidence is, for which a person will be held incompetent to be an administrator, see Coope v. Lowerre, 1 Barb. Ch. R. 45. Justifiable Cause.-Where an act declares it to be a crime for a master to force a seaman on shore in a foreign port without justifiable cause, these words do not mean such a cause as in the mere maritime law might authorize a discharge, but such a cause as the known policy of the American laws on the subject contemplates as a case of moral necessity for the *The President & Trustees of the Village of Romeo v. Chapman, 2 Mich. 179. The People v. Taylor, 2 Michigan, 250. Lane v. Cary, 19 Barb. 537. See to same effect, Gilbert v. Col. Turnpike Co. 3 John. Cas. 107; and Matter of Cooper, 15 John. 533. In M'Ewen v. Montgomery Insurance Co. 5 Hill, 101, it was held that a verbal notice is good, unless the notice be a legal proceeding, and then it must be in writing. Case v. Wilbridge, 4 Indiana, 51. Gardner v. Collins, 2 Peters, 58. **U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290; U. S. v. Robinson, 4 Mason, 307. tt U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624. safety of the ship and crew, and the due performance of the voyage.* Maliciously.-When an act declares it to be a crime to force a seaman on shore "maliciously and without justifiable cause," the word maliciously is not limited to acts done from hatred, revenge, or passion, but it includes all acts wantonly done, or wilfully done, that are against what any man of reasonable knowledge and ability must know to be his duty.t 394. May and shall. Shall and may. Shall or may. (a)—These * Per Story, J., U. S. v. Coffin, 1 Sumner, Per Story, J., U. S. v. Coffin, 1 Sumner, 394; U. S. v. Ruggles, 5 Mason, 192; Phillips' Case, 1 Moody's Crown Cases, 264, 273. (a) May and Shall.-A statute providing that certain public officers, "if deemed advisable," or "if they believe the public good and the best interests of the city require it," " may" levy a certain tax to pay public debt, is in fact peremptory whenever the public interests or individual rights call for its exercise; e. g., where a judgment creditor seeks to compel the levy by mandamus. Supervisors v. U. S. 4 Wall. 435; Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705. And when by statute a county court "may" submit the question to the people before incurring certain expense, they must do so. Steines v. Franklin Co. 48 Mo. 167. 66 May" is to be construed "shall" where a statute directs the doing of a thing necessary to the ends of justice. Mitchell v. Duncan, 7 Flor. 13. "May" will be construed "shall" where the good sense of the entire enactment requires it; e. g., where a statute establishes an improvement, and devolves upon some one the doing of acts requisite to its completion. People v. Brooklyn, 22 Barb. 404. "May" will not be construed "shall" in order to create a right, but will be so construed in order to enforce a right already existing; e. g., a person cannot compel the granting of a license under a statute merely permissive in its terms. State v. Holt County Court, 39 Mo. 521; and see ex parte Banks, 28 Ala. 28, where by a divided court a provision declaring that a trial "may" be removed to another county" on application of the defendant duly supported by affidavit," was held simply permissive. An act providing that the offender "may" be punished for grand larceny, although the value of the property stolen be less than $25 (that being the general limit separating grand from petty larceny), gives a discretion. Williams v. People, 24 N. Y. 405. A statute regulating foreclosure sales under mortgages given to a public fund, provided that "such sales may be in parcels so that the whole amount may be realized; "it was held that this provision was for the benefit of the fund alone, that the mortgagor bad no right to have it enforced, and that "may" could not be construed "shall." Bansemer v. Mace, 18 Ind. 27. A statute providing that offenders " may" be tried in the county where they reside or where they were apprehended, was held to be merely permissive, and not to oust jurisdiction in the county where the offense was committed. State v. Sweetser, 53 Me. 438. A resolution of the State Legislature was passed after the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold, that the State treasurer "may" pay the bonds of the State in coin; upon the change of decision by the Supreme Court by which no one had the right to demand payment in coin, it was held that this resolution ceased to be mandatory. Kellogg |