Under this head of taxation is now generally understood to be embraced the mode usually practiced in this country of as

v. Helfenstein, 16 Wisc. 136. A law authorizing taxation to repay individuals money paid by them for procuring substitutes for themselves, would be invalid, as a taxation for private purposes. Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me. 545.

But as the Legislature, in the absence of any special constitutional restrictions, can raise money by taxation without specifying the object of the tax, and appropriate it when raised at its pleasure, the range of judicial interference is very limited. In the absence of special limitations upon the Legislature, the judicial question involving the validity of taxation has generally arisen as to local taxes imposed for a particular purpose, or as to municipal engagements-e. g., subscriptions-necessarily involving taxation for their liquidation.

It seems but a corollary of the proposition that the Legislature cannot lay or authorize the laying of a tax for private purposes, that it cannot tax or authorize the taxation of one locality for the public uses of another locality. Thus, it has been held that a municipality cannot be authorized to tax land outside its limits for its own municipal purposes. Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 384. And even a technical annexation to a city of outlying agricultural tracts has been held insufficient to justify taxation for the city purposes. Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491; Maltus v. Shields, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 553; Morford v. Unger, 8 Clarke (Ia.) 82; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; but see Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242; Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wisc. 233; Abegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush (Ky.) 271; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Powers v. Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. S. 285.

Local Assessments.-The better opinion seems to be that, whether expressly given or resulting from the general grant of legislative power, the power to tax implies the power to apportion, and that there is no limitation inherent in the nature of a “tax" which, in the absence of peculiar constitutional restraint, prevents its imposition on a particular locality in any manner the Legislature may see fit. People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Guilford v. Chenango Co. 13 N. Y. 143; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Penn. St. 320; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; State v. Newark, 6 Vroom. 168; per contra, see State v. City Council, 12 Rich. L. 702; see, also, Lexington v. McQuillan, 9 Dana, 513. Although the Constitution of New York speaks of "assessments" as distinct from "taxes," the cases in that State above cited do not at all rest upon that distinction, but place the power to lay local assessments wholly upon the general power of taxation. The whole doctrine is discussed at large and with great ability in the first of those cases. People v. Brooklyn.

When the Constitution recognizes the power of laying "assessments" as distinct from "taxation," limitations upon the taxing power, as, e. g., that taxes shall be uniform, and in proportion to the value of the property taxed, and the like, have been held not to apply to assessments. Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S. 243; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co. 28 Cal. 346; Piper's Appeal, 32 Cal. 530; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wisc. 282; Soens v. Racine, 10 Wisc. 271; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wisc. 284; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242; Lafayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70; Goodrich v. Winchester, &c. Co. 26 Ind. 119; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Law v. Madison, &c. Co. 30 Ind. 77; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kans. 525.

The same is held when the Constitution provides for "duties" as well as for

sessing the expense of local improvements; and thus property is daily taken for opening streets and other objects of a similar

"taxes." King v. Portland, 2 Oregon, 146; see People v. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351, which holds that a charge on the property of a district to pay for levees is a tax, and not a local assessment.

The same is held even where there is no recognition in the Constitution of the power to lay local assessments as distinct from the power to tax. Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. Ann. 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. Ann. 503; In Matter of New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 497; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; Columbia, &c. Co. v. Muir, 39 Mo. 53; McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; St. Joseph v. O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 345; Howard v. First Church, 18 Md. 451; Bishop v. Marks, 15 La. Ann. 147; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429 (affirming Yeatman v. Crandall, ubi sup.); Goodrich v. Winchester, &c. Co. 26 Ind. 119; Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 31; Bliss v. Kraus, 16 Ohio, N. S. 54 (making owner of low ground bear the expense of raising it); Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497.

As a particular tract of land may be assessed, so it would seem may a particular class of personal property that is benefited-e. g., shipping, for improvement of a harbor. See President, &c. v. State, 45 Ala. 399.

Such local assessments may be made according to the actual benefit to each lot. In the Matter of Dorrance St. 4 R. I. 230; or according to some arbitrary standard of benefit, as, for instance, frontage. Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 Ohio, N. S. 520; Northern, &c. R. R. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S. 159; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co. 28 Cal. 346; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Wray v. Pittsburg, 46 Penn. St. 365; Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn. St. 255; St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Mo. 537; but see In re Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 352, limiting the rule to city lots. Even, it scems, the entire expense of the improvement in front of each estate may be assessed upon that estate. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242; Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593; but see Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274; Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495; see, also, Hart v. Gaven, 12 Cal. 476.

When the assessment takes this form, it is sometimes referred to the police power. See Palmyra v. Morton, uti sup.

Or the assessment may be laid according to the value of the lots. Barnes v. Atchison, 2 Kans. 454; Malchus v. District of Highlands, 4 Bush (Ky.) 547; or by the acre. Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. Ann. 503.

Where the limitation of "uniformity" has been held applicable to assessments, it has been construed as requiring uniformity according to the subject-matter-not a theoretical, but a practical, uniformity; and local assessments have been upheld as being as equal a distribution of the burden as the circumstances of the case will admit. But such assessments, to be uniform in this sense, must be according to the benefit, and not in excess of the benefit, and, therefore, an assessment by frontage is held not to be “equal 91 nor "uniform." Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203; Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 Ill. 211; Bedard v. Hall, 44 Ill. 91; Creote v. Chicago, 56 Ill. 422; and such assessments must include all benefited in the ratio of the benefit. Chicago v. Baer, 41 Ill. 306; but, per contra, see Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366, where an assessment, though laid according to benefit, was held void, under a constitutional requirement that all property on which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation and be equal and uniform throughout the State.

nature, often without any pecuniary compensation, and the burden thrown on a particular and small locality. In opening

In Massachusetts, when the power is traced to the power of imposing "proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes," and of passing "wholesome and reasonable laws," assessments according to the benefit have been held valid. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 461.

Some cases have reconciled local assessments with the express or implied requirement of uniformity by considering each locality assessed a separate tax district. Lexington v. McQuillan, 9 Dana, 513.

Local assessments do not conflict with the general provisions for the security of the citizen contained in most Constitutions, as, for example, "the burdens of the State ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens." In the Matter of Dorrance St. 4 R. I. 230; or "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; see, also, Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209; per contra, see State v. City Council, 12 Rich. Law, 702. Local assessments in proportion to the benefit upon the property of a corporation are not contrary to a provision in its charter exempting it from all taxes; otherwise, if the assessment is laid upon the corporation itself-not upon the property benefited-and is not required to be laid according to the benefit. State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. 185. Where a Constitution declared, under the head of "Finance and taxation," that "the Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation," and under the head of "Corporations," that provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, &c., and their power of taxation, assessment, &c., shall be so restricted as to prevent the abuse of such power"—held, the " assessment" in the first clause meant "listing" and "valuation," and did not refer to assessments for local improvements. Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kans. 186. Where the Constitution provides that the Legislature shall impose restrictions upon the abuse of the power of local assessment, it was held in Kansas that if any restriction is imposed, the Legislature is the sole judge of its sufficiency. Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kans. 186; and in Ohio, under the same provision, the court will not treat the assessment invalid, though the Legislature entirely neglect to impose any restrictions. Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S. 243; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. S. 636; sce, also, Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wisc. 282. A provision in a city charter that no tax shall be levied beyond what may be needed for legitimate municipal purposes, without the previous sanction of a majority of the voters, is not such a restriction as the Constitution requires. Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wisc. 616.

Where exemptions from taxation were prohibited by the Constitution, this was held to apply to general taxation only, and not to prohibit local assessments for improvement in real estate. State v. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo. 504. Where the Constitution provided for uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and prohibited the General Assembly from passing local or special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes for State, county, township or road purposes-held, that a law authorizing local assessment for local improvements, e. g., a turnpike, was constitutional. Law v. M. S. & G. Turnpike Co. 30 Ind. 77; Ryker's Ridge Turnp. Co. v. Scott, 32 Ind. 37. A Constitution contained the following: "The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages, may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes." Under this provision,

streets and making other similar local improvements in the United States, it is the general practice, when authorizing the

a levee and drainage company cannot be authorized to impose a tax to defray expenses of the improvement. Harward v. St. C. & M. L. & 1). Co. 51 Ill. 130; Hessler v. Drainage Commrs. 53 Ill. 105. Where a statute as to assessment for a local improvement was manifestly unjust-e. g., when it authorized a particular street to be paved with Nicholson pavement at the expense of the abuttors, without their consent, their consent being necessary to pave other streets, it was held invalid. Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush (Ky.), 493.

In some cases, the laying of local assessments is treated as an exercise of the power of eminent domain. See Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 351. Thus, in New Jersey, as to assessment in excess of the benefit received. Tide Water Co. v. Coster, 3 C. E. Green, 518. But this view is rejected in the vast majority of the cases. That the Legislature may designate the tract on which the assessment for local improvement shall be laid, see Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockton, 175. The improvement must be a public one, and abuttors on a private way cannot be compelled to pay the expense of grading the same, though it is open to public travel. Morse v. Stocker, 1 Allen, 150.

That, in addition to the assessment on the land, there may be a personal liability imposed, see Litchfield v. McComber, 42 Barb. 288; St. Louis v. Clemens, 36 Mo. 467; but see Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal. 613; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 525, overruling St. Louis v. Clemens, supra.

What Objects and Purposes are Public, so that they may be made the occasions of Local Taxation. The principle of local taxation for local improvement being thus admitted, the question recurs, What is an improvement constituting such benefit to the public of the particular locality, that a tax may be imposed? As before remarked, the conflict in the judicial decisions and the theoretical discussions, arises from the attempt to answer this question. The cases frequently turn upon the language of express and special constitutional provisions by which the power of taxation is delegated or limited; but with such special provisions we are not concerned at present. The question is, however, discussed and answered upon general principles, in the absence of special express constitutional directions and limitations. The results of these latter discussions and decisions are now given, arranged under various heads according to the nature of the subject-matter.

Municipal Aid to Railroads.-It has been generally held, and the weight of authority is overpowering, that statutes allowing municipalities to aid (by subscribing for stock, or issuing bonds, or loaning credit), in the construction of railroads and similar improvements, which, by terminating in, or running through the municipality, or by being links in lines or routes of transportation that do thus terminate or run, will, as it is supposed, benefit the municipality, are constitutional and valid. Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Benson v. Mayor, &c. 24 Barb. 248; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; Gould v. Venice, 29 Barb. 442; People v. Henshaw, 61 Barb. 409; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439; Caldwell v. Justices, 4 Jones Eq. 323; Hill v. Forsythe Co. 67 N. C. 367; Gibbons v. Mobile &c. R. R. 36 Ala. 410; Augusta B'k v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507; Burns v. Atchison, 2 Kans. 454; Union Pac. R. R. v. Davis Co. 6 Kans. 256; Comm'rs of Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kans. 479; State v. Nemaha Co. Ib. 542; Morris v. Morris Co. Ib. 576; Cotten v. Leon Co. 6 Flor. 610; Louisville &c. R. R. v. Davidson Co. 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 637; Aurora v. West, 9

work to be done, to cause the expense, which includes the value of the property taken, to be assessed exclusively upon the

Ind. 74; John v. Cincinnati &c. R. R. 35 Ind. 539; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 56; Shelby County Ct. v. Cumberland &c. R. R. 8 Bush, 209; Pattison v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; Stockton &c. R. R. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; Clapp v. Cedar Co. 5 Clarke (Ia.) 15; Stewart v. Polk Co. 30 Iowa, 9; Piatt, Supervisor, &c. v. People, 29 Ill. 54; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474; Comm'rs v. Nichols, 14 Ohio, N. S. 260; St. Joseph &c. R. R. v. Buchannan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; State v. Linn Co. Ct. 44 Mo. 504; San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19; Phillips v. Albany, 28 Wisc. 340; Davidson v. Ramsey Co. 18 Minn. 482. The Supreme Court of the United States has assumed in a series of cases to pass upon this question and to construe State Constitutions, and has fully sustained the power to pass such statutes, see, Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Zabriskie v. Railroad Co. 23 Ib. 381; Amey v. Mayor, 24 Ib. 364; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Mercer Co. v. Hackett, Ib. 83; Meyer v. Muscatine, Ib. 384. Subscription by a town to stock of a company for improving river navigation has also been sustained. Taylor v. Newbern, 2 Jones Eq. 141. But it seems that the Legislature cannot authorize a municipality to donate its aid to a railroad. Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312; Whiting v. Sheboygan &c. R. R. 25 Wisc. 167; Rogan v. Watertown, 30 Wisc. 259; but the contrary was held in Davidson v. Ramsey Co. 18 Minn. 482, and see Cummins v. Jefferson County, 63 Barb. 287. It has been held that the Legislature may compel a county to subscribe to the stock of a completed road. Napa Valley R. R. v. Napa Co. 30 Cal. 435. The Court of Appeals of N. Y. has just decided in a very carefully considered case, in which all the authorities, State and national, are reviewed, that the Legislature cannot compel by a mandatory statute a municipality to subscribe in aid of a railroad against its consent. People v. Bacheller, 8 Albany Law Journal, 120; 53 N. Y. 128.

It is not necessary that the improvement should be within the municipality making the assessment. Pattison v. Yuba Co. 13 Cal. 175; Skinner's Ex'or v. Hutton, 33 Mo. 244. In general the element of situation and benefit must combine to make aid to a corporation come within "county purposes." Cotten v. Leon Co. 6 Flor. 610. That a city cannot lay an assessment as for an improvement, where the improvement consists in abating a nuisance caused by the city itself, see, Weeks v. .Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242; and where a street has been opened and paved, so that the duty of repair is laid upon the city, it seems a change or repairing cannot be treated as an improvement and paid for by local assessment. Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146.

The courts of Iowa have held, reversing their prior decisions, that municipal subscriptions to railroads could not be authorized by the Legislature. Stokes v. Scott Co. 10 Iowa, 166; State v. Wapello Co. 13 Ib. 388; Myers v. Johnson Co. 14 Ib. 47 ; Smith v. Henry Co. 15 Ib. 385; Ten Eyck v. Keokuk, 15 Ib. 486; McClure v. Owen, 26 lb. 243; Hansen v. Vernon, 27 Ib. 28. But the most recent cases in that State, following the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court, and adopting that tribunal's construction of their State Constitution, have receded from this position and affirmed the validity of such legislation. Stewart v. Polk Co. 30 Iowa, 9; Bounifield v. Bidwell, 32 Ib. 149.

In Michigan such legislation is held unconstitutional. People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452; Bay City v. State Treas'r, 23 Ib. 499.