Schedules. When, for the purpose of a more than usually comprehensive enactment, it is deemed necessary to include the intended meaning of numerous words in the arbitrary import of one, or that there should be numerous words bearing the same constructive import, that end should be attained by means of a schedule annexed to the act. But the act of Parliament and the schedule are sometimes found to differ; and what will be the result of such discrepancy? If there be any contradiction between the two, and they cannot be reconciled, then, said Lord Denman, "upon ordinary principles, the form which is made to suit rather the generality of cases than all cases, must give way." "Words in schedules must be received as examples, not as overruling provisions," said Tindal, C. J.* (a) * Reg. v. Baines, 12 A. & E. 227; Dwarris, p. 511. than a gallon were saved, held, that where the indictment charged a sale without specifying quantity, it might be maintained on proof of sale of quantity less than a gallon. Teague v. State, 39 Miss. 516. (a) A clause found among the temporary clauses in the schedule to a Constitution will be regarded as temporary: it will be presumed that such was the intention. State v. Taylor, 15 Ohio, N. S. 137. CHAPTER IV. THE ATTRIBUTES AND INCIDENTS OF STATUTES. Applications for the Passage of Statutes.-Contracts to obtain the Passage of Statutes, or to withdraw Opposition.-Authority and Jurisdiction of Statutes.-Time when Statutes take Effect.-Effect of Statutes to avoid Contracts in Violation of them.-Remedies for the Violation of Statutes. -Statutory Forfeitures.— Ignorance of Statute no Excuse.-Limitations of Actions.-Waiver of Statutes by Consent.-Pleading and Proof of Statutes.-Repeal. WE have now to consider the more important attributes and incidents of statutes from the time of the first steps taken, for their enactment to that of their repeal. This will embrace, among other subjects, applications to the Legislature for the passage of laws; the effect of contracts to obtain or oppose their enactment; their authority and jurisdiction; remedies and waiver; the rules of pleading and of proof with regard to them; and finally, the results of their repeal. As a general rule, no public notice is necessary previous to the introduction or passage of an act. Bills are framed either upon petitions, or upon the mere motion of members of the legislative body; and parties interested have only such notice of their introduction as the wisdom of the legislator sees fit to require. To this general practice there is an exception in North Carolina, the Constitution of which State provides "that the General Assembly shall not pass any private law unless it shall be made to appear that thirty days' notice of application to pass such law shall have been given, under such directions and in such manner as shall be provided by law; "+ and also in the State of New York, where the Revised Statutes declare* that, in regard to applications for acts of incorporation, alteration of county, city, or village boundaries, local taxes, escheats, and certain other public objects, notice of the intention to apply to the Legislature shall be given, by newspaper advertisement. But it has been held, in regard to a statute of this class, that it was not necessary to furnish any proof of the publication of the notice having been in fact made; and it was said, "that the notice was a direction to the public, calculated merely to guard the Legislature from surprise and fraud, and to prevent hasty and improvident legislation; that the rule was made by the Legislature for its own convenience, and might be entirely disregarded; and that a law would be valid although no notice whatever of the application was published." + This decision, though perhaps sound, is evidently calculated to defeat the intent of the statutory provision; but in general the effort of our law is, as far as possible to guard against undue private interference with the functions of government. So in this country, contracts made with a view to secure the passage of legislative enactments, or the performance of execu tive acts, have been held to be void, as against public policy. Thus a contract founded on an agreement to obtain signatures for a pardon, to procure the passage of an act by the Legislature by using personal influence, to pay a sum for withdrawing opposition to the passage of a law touching the interests of a corporation, have all been held void. In like manner, in New York, it has been decided that no action will lie for services as a lobby agent, in attending to a claim against the State pending before the Legislature; Mr. Justice Hand, in the language of a high toned morality, alike creditable to himself and to the court of which he is a member, saying, "It is to be intended that the Legislature always have truth and justice before their eyes. It would certainly imply a most unjustifiable dereliction of duty, to hold that the employment of individuals to visit and importune the members is necessary Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts and 1 R. S. 155, Part i, ch. vii, Title 3, §§ 1, 2, et seq. Smith v. Helmer, 7 Barbour, 416. Serg. 315. Purgey v. Washburn, 1 Ack. 264. to obtain justice."* In England, however, it seems that an agreement to withdraw opposition to a railway bill for a pecuniary or other consideration, is not illegal in itself; and such an agreement will be upheld unless it contains something against other acts of Parliament, or injurious to the public or the shareholders. † (a) An interesting question in regard to the passage of laws has presented itself in this country, growing out of the constitutional provisions in some of the States, requiring the concurrence and assent of certain prescribed legislative majori ties, as two-thirds of the members present, or a majority of all the members elected. In these cases, it was for some time doubted how it was to be ascertained whether the requisite * Harris v. Roof's Executors, 10 Barb. 489. But does not the learned judge, too probably, "paint men as they should be, not as they are?" Shrewsbury and Birmingham R. Co. v. London and North Western Co. 2 Macnaghten and G. 324. Thus the former Constitution of New York (of 1821) declared, Art. i, § 12, that Where a bill, having once passed the two branches, is returned by the governor for reconsideration, it must be passed by twothirds of the members present of each branch. The same provision exists in the Constitution of 1846, Art. iv, §9. So again, Art. vii, § 9, declared that "the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature, shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes, or creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic or corporate.' In the same State, the Constitution of 1846 provides, by Art. i, § 9, that "the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature, shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes." And again, by Art. iii, § 15, that no bill shall be passed unless by the assent of a majority of all the members elected to b.ch branch of the Legislature." And again, ey Art. vii. §14, that "on the final passage, in either house of the Legislature, of every act which imposes, continues, or revives a tax, or creates a debt or charge, or makes, continues, or revives any appropriation of public or trust money, or property, or releases, discharges or commutes any claim or demand of the State,--the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, which shall be duly entered on the journals, and three-fifths of all the members elected to either house shall in all such cases be necessary to constitute a quorum therein." And again, by Art. xi, § 6, that "in case the mode of election and appointment of militia officers hereby directed, shall not be found conducive to the improvement of the militia, the Legislature may abolish the same, and provide by law for their appointment and removal, if two-thirds of the members present in each house shall concur therein." So in Michigan, "The assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public money or property for local or private purposes."-Cons. Art. i, § 45. So in Indiana, Cons. Art. iv, § 25. "A majority of the members elected to each house shall be necessary to pass any bill or joint resolution." So in Illinois, Art. iii, § 21. "No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of all the members elect in each house." (a) Motives of legislators are not to be inquired into. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502; People v. Shepard, 36 N. Y. 285; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. 604; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16. Even where the State is plaintiff, as in a quo warranto. McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424. Whether a statute not showing fraud on its face, can be impeached for fraud, and if so, whether otherwise than in a direct proceeding, quære. Wetmore v. Law, 34 Barb. 515; Oakland v. Carpentier, 21 Cal. 642. That debates of constitutional conventions are not to be looked to for intent, see Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107. number of votes had been obtained; whether the printed statute book, or the certificate of the Secretary of State, should be received as conclusive evidence, or not. But that doubt is now resolved, and it is settled that the judges may, and if they deem it necessary should, look beyond the printed statute book, and examine the original engrossed bills on file in the office of the Secretary of State; and it seems that the journals kept by the two houses may also be consulted.† (a) * Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9; Warner v. Beers, 23 Id. 103; The People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31. Purdy v. The People, 4 Hill, 384; De Bow v. The People. 1 Denio, 9; Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Sparrow, 2 Denio, 97. (a) Journals.-Journals are conclusive evidence. McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424. Journals, records of the Secretary of State, &c. may be resorted to, to fix the date of approval, when the date on the statute is simply "Dec. 4." Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499. Journals will be looked to. Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio, N. S. 1; Turley v. Logan, 17 Ill. 151; Prescott v. Illinois, &c. Canal, 19 Ill. 324; Burr v. Ross, 19 Ark. 250; State v. Platt, 2 Rich. N. S. 150; and a provision in the enrolled bill different from that in the bill as presented to the governor has no force. State v. Platt, ubi supra. The original bills, as well as journals, may be looked into, and where a compliance with the provisions of the Constitution can be "spelled out" from loosely kept records, it will be done. Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330. That the court will not go behind the statute as enrolled, if properly authentiticated, see Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514; and will not go behind the engrossed bill to the journals to see what the terms of the law are. Fouke v. Fleming, 13 Md. 392; Mayor, &c. v. Harwood, 32 Md. 471. See People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269; People v. Starne, 35 III. 121. Whether the insertion by inadvertence of distinct matter in making a copy of an engrossed bill for enrollment will invalidate the whole, such new matter not affecting the original bill, see Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721. Publication.-Error in publication will not vitiate the statute: thus, where the Constitution required the laws to be "promulgated" in English and French, and there was an error in the French translation published. State v. Ellis, 12 La. Ann. 390; see also State v. Judge, 14 La. Ann. 491. When the Legislature enacted that a statute should be published in certain newspapers, and take effect from such publication, and such publication is properly made, and corresponds to the original act, it will be in force, though, as published in the session laws, the act is different. State v. Donehey, 8 Clarke (Ia.) 396. The Constitution provided that "no law of the General Assembly of a public nature should take effect until the same was pub- · lished and circulated in the several counties of the State by authority;" and that "if the General Assembly should deem any law of immediate importance, they may provide that the same shall take effect by publication in newspapers in the State." It seems not to be necessary for the Legislature to declare that they deemed the law to be of immediate importance. Ibid. But under a similar but more explicit constitutional provision in Indiana, that the emergency should be declared in the act or preamble, it was held, that, in the absence of such express declaration, the statute would not take effect at once, notwithstanding the statute itself contained a provision that it should go into effect at once. Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98. It is not essential |